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Abstract 
This project focuses on the relationship between cleavages, political parties, and interest groups 
in the United States, Germany, and Japan. Despite very different political and institutional 
characteristics – two-party, multi-party, and dominant-party systems; the German neo-corporatist 
state, the Japanese “developmental state,” and the U.S. pluralist limited state – all of them suffer 
increasingly from problems of disaffection of the electorate with political parties and elections.  
I explore the question in how far political parties actually represent the demands of 
cleavage-based constituencies as embodied by extra-electoral organized interests, how this 
relationship changed over time, and in how far institutional differences in government- interest 
group embeddedness may account for this. In particular, I am analyzing and comparing time-
series data for political parties, union federations and minority organizations, by employing 
content analysis software in order to process data reaching back as far as five decades.  
As a theoretical framework I reapply social cleavage theory in a way that both parties and 
extra-electoral forms of political participation are included. One of the elements that make this 
project unique, is this approach that permits a comparison of political parties and extra-electoral 
political organizations within the same theoretical and methodological framework. This 
framework enables me to explore the changing relationship between the programmatic language 
of party manifestos and organized interests’ programmatic texts.  
In addition to case specific insights my project will not only provide a contribution to 
theory on the relationship between political cleavages, parties, and organized interests, but it will 
also yield a basis for recommendations on how to make political parties more responsive to the 
demands of cleavage-based organized interests. This project may be particularly useful for 
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fledgling democracies in the early stages of state building, and studies focused on the interaction 
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Chapter One: Identity-Interest organizations and unresponsive parties.                                                                              
 
Introduction 
This project focuses on the relationship between cleavages, political parties, and interest groups 
in the United States, Germany, and Japan. Despite very different political and institutional 
characteristics – two-party, multi-party, and dominant-party systems; the German neo-corporatist 
state, the Japanese “developmental state,” and the U.S. pluralist limited state – all of them suffer 
increasingly from problems of disaffection of the electorate with political parties and elections.  
I explore the question in how far political parties actually represent the demands of 
cleavage-based constituencies as embodied by extra-electoral organized interests, how this 
relationship changed over time, and in how far institutional differences in government- interest 
group embeddedness may account for this. In particular, I am analyzing and comparing time-
series data for political parties, union federations and minority organizations, by employing 
content analysis software in order to process data reaching back as far as five decades.  
Within established democracies across the globe, several divisions within society based 
on distinct group identities such as race, ethnicity, or class, dictate the shape in which politics 
become defined. In some countries such as Belgium or Canada, a linguistic divide can seem to be 
the most politically salient sociological division. In other societies, the division of the means of 
production becomes the most salient division, creating long-lasting, class-based group identities. 
The fierce competition between poor masses and wealthier upper classes in Latin-American 
politics is but one example of such a divide. And in yet other countries, politics may revolve 
around the involvement of religion in the state. Furthermore, combinations of these divides are 
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possible as well, leading to divisions within divisions. These types of divisions are often referred 
to as social cleavages.  
In many cases, these cleavages also tend to find their reflection in party politics. Some 
countries’ party systems will originate in part from the divisions between the poor masses and 
the wealthier elites that emerged in the industrial era. In other cases, linguistic or ethnic divides 
may become factors influencing the origins of parties. However, in some cases, the electoral 
system, or the moment in which parties were created – for example, the time prior to the 
industrial revolution – may result in the absence of such cleavages, which then actually may 
come into existence within society after the formation of a party system. Some electoral systems 
may appear to be more conducive to more accurately reflecting social cleavages, while other 
mechanisms may result in an imperfect reflection. A good example of an imperfect reflection of 
cleavages in a party system is the absence of something resembling an African-American or 
Latino party in U.S. politics despite the fact that race is historically one of the most divisive 
issues in U.S. politics, if not the most divisive issue. Obviously, while the U.S. is a relatively 
straightforward example of how important divisions within a society aren’t as visible in a party 
landscape; many other countries’ party and electoral systems will also have an effect of 
obfuscating these highly politicized divisions known as social cleavages. One consequence of the 
increasing invisibility of social cleavages in party politics may be that voters increasingly stay 
home during elections. The U.S. voter turnout during the 2014 midterm election, for example, 
was the lowest since World War II. (McDonald/U.S. Election Project 2014) Even those countries 
with comparatively high election turnouts are faced with unprecedented drops, such as Japan’s 
2014 election for the Lower House of the Diet. The same is true for most other established 
democracies.  
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The absence of such cleavages in party politics thus doesn’t necessarily mean the absence 
of such cleavages in society. Instead, it is highly likely that such cleavages become visible 
through other forms of political organization. The most extreme cases would be attacks 
committed by terrorist organizations, as in the case of the Northern Ireland conflict, where the 
institutions of democratic governance, particularly the majoritarian party system, were ill-
equipped to deal with the division. In most cases, however, social cleavages ignored by party 
politics or those that gradually become ignored by party politics will be visible through extra-
electoral forms of political organizations, such as labor unions and minority advocacy groups.  
This project was inspired by the literature addressing the increasing inability of political 
parties in recent decades to adequately express the aforementioned divides, or social cleavages; 
not echoing the demands of the people causes increased levels of disaffection of the electorate. 
As previously mentioned, most modern democracies evolved from societies in which these social 
cleavages dictated the respective political divisions within a country, often before the general 
population was involved in the political process. With the advent of modern nation-states, the 
masses gradually became politically involved through the advent of social mass movements. In 
many countries, political parties eventually became the main expression of social cleavages in 
politics. I assert that while political parties at some point and in some place may have been the 
most adequate organizational translation of the public’s demands as incarnated through social 
cleavages, as institutions, they may not have an enduring capacity to do so.  
In particular, I address the failure of the literature, which applies the concept of political 
cleavages in a truncated way by identifying cleavages entirely with parties, to the exclusion of 
extra-electoral forms of political organization, particularly interest organizations. Parties, as 
opposed to other forms of political mass organizations, have a tendency to become deeply 
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institutionalized into the state framework, thereby eroding their ability to adequately fulfill one 
of their most important functions: representation.  
Furthermore, I contend that particular interest groups – which I will define below as 
identity- interest groups – remain a much better repository of cleavage translation than parties, 
especially when parties are unresponsive to cleavages. Understanding how parties become or 
remain unresponsive is of utmost importance if democracies are to remain viable and in line with 
ideals of representation. To keep democracy functional, party programs should be more in line 
with the needs of the people. Even if I were to subscribe to the elitist view that parties should 
moderate more radical demands from the population attributed to ignorance or a mob mentality, 
parties still would be intended to serve the needs or interests of the people. A first step to 
accomplish that is to analyze parties’ unresponsiveness and what relationships look like between 
parties and extra-electoral political organizations.1 To address the question of what is causing 
this dysfunctionality of representation; this project examines common trends between two 
categories of the most tractable social movement organization types: political parties and 
identity- interest groups. To do this, I will compare the programmatic content of party manifestos 
spanning several decades with programmatic documents of major interest groups representing 
                                                                 
1
 Long term time-series data in the form of surveys addressed to individual members of sociological groups was an 
alternative method which was explored for this project. The advantage would be that such data could help control 
for the potential influence of elites, in both parties and identity-interest groups. The problem is that such data do not 
exist in a consistent uniform way, and no such data would be specific enough with regard to the topic explored by 
this project. While the possibility of creating new surveys was considered for this project and finalized to the phase 
of IRB approval and completion of survey questionnaires, because of highly incomplete access to potential 
recipients, and the fact that these data would only be representative for the most recent period, this approach had to 
be abandoned.  
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large segments of the population; in other words, groups with cleavage-based identities. In 
particular, the largest national union federations and minority organizations in the United States, 
Germany, and Japan will be analyzed.  
In this chapter, the central question and related topics will be elaborated upon. A first 
section will briefly review some of the concepts used. The next section will discuss the 
unresponsiveness of parties and the relevance of this project, followed by a section formulating 
the proposed hypotheses. The final section will elaborate on case selection. Chapter Two will 
provide an elaborated background of the cases under analysis, and Chapter Three will elaborate 
more on case-specific data selection and methodology issues. Chapters Four and Five, 
respectively, will present and discuss the data analysis results found for the first two and third 
hypotheses. Chapter Six will provide a discussion of the main findings and a conclusion based on 
the research results, and will provide recommendations with regard to future research agenda 
items.  
 
1. Social cleavages  
Before delving deeper into the problem identified in the above, it is necessary to present a 
definition of what social cleavages are and to illuminate how they relate to parties and organized 
interests.  The idea of something like cleavages as a politics-structuring set of sociological 
divisions within the polity has existed since the beginning of political science, particularly in the 
field of political sociology. Indeed, the origins of the cleavage concept can be traced back to 
authors as Tocqueville, Marx, Michels, Ostrogorski, Weber, Coser and others. (Coser 1956; 
Lipset 1959b; Allardt and Littunen 1964; Lipset and Rokkan 1967) It is then all the more ironic 
that a subfield building on a basis of authors whose works focused on the sociology of politics 
largely lost sight of some of the sociological aspect in their writings, in particular the 
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implications for organized interest groups. However, it was not until Lipset and Rokkan 
published their seminal piece that the cleavage concept began to attract significant attention 
within the field of psephology. (Karvonen and Kuhnle 2001; Franklin 2010) Earlier works in 
political sociology paved the way, as well as some of Lipset and Rokkan’s work, yet many of 
these works either did not receive as much attention as the 1967 article or lacked broader 
theoretical discussion of the cleavage concept. In other publications, the cleavage concept was 
taken as a given without much elaboration on defining it.2 Exceptions that unfortunately did not 
get as much attention were follow-up pieces by Rokkan that addressed some crucial criticisms on 
the 1967 piece and deepened the theoretical debate of the concept. (1970; 1975) Unfortunately, 
despite their very ambitious attempt, Lipset and Rokkan still did not do a thorough job of 
specifying exactly what they meant with the concept “cleavage.” Throughout the years, a range 
of related, yet slightly different, descriptions are used, which makes it difficult for the reader to 
grasp what they meant by the term, and nowhere did they devote a summarizing section to this, 
either. (1967; also cf. Flora et al 1999; Karvonen and Kuhnle 2001; Bornschier 2009)   
Bartolini and Mair criticize the literature employing the cleavage concept for only 
providing truncated versions of the cleavage concept. (1990; Mair 2006, 373--4) Instead, 
Bartolini and Mair emphasize the holistic structural foundations lying at the root of the cleavage 
concept in the 1967 piece. The aspect that was often focused on in the body of literature that 
followed was the dependent variable it appeared to discuss: the stability of party systems. Future 
authors applying the cleavage concept, sometimes for a single case, tended to attempt to explain 
the opposite: the party system stability, instability, or structure would be examined either to find 
or to deny the existence of cleavages. (Franklin 2010) The often diligent efforts put into such 
                                                                 
2
 For some examples see: Lipset 1959a; Lipset 1959b; Allardt and Littunen 1964. 
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research, unfortunately, did not save it from the inherent logical fallacy. Given the fact that 
Lipset and Rokkan, and by extension many of the fathers of political sociology, at least 
mentioned other forms of organizational translation of cleavages, such as labor unions in the case 
of the class cleavage, reversing the relationship of dependent and independent variables could 
only make sense if such forms of organizational translation would also be included. Lipset and 
Rokkan explicitly recognized the importance of non-party political expressions of cleavages, yet 
were mostly interested in explaining contemporary party system structures. In particular, they 
write about “movements” or “social movements,” referring to groups prior to obtaining 
representation through parties. (1967: 17, 22, 23, 30, etc.) The conclusions drawn from such a 
reversed relationship by other authors are at best incomplete, and at worst incorrect. 
Consequently, follow-up research pronouncing the death of cleavage politics, or critics of the 
cleavage concept doubting the relevance of cleavage politics, are in no position to make such 
claims. 3  
                                                                 
3
 For what is probably the most comprehensive work announcing the decline of cleavages , see Evans and De Graaf 
2013 and earlier editions.  
Although in Lipset’s 1959 piece the ideological basis of cleavage seemed to dominate, what is important to him in 
the 1993 – similar to Lijphart (1999) – is the structural division of society into sociological strata. For Dahl: “… any 
difference within a society that is likely to polarize people into several antagonistic camps is a cleavage of 
exceptional importance (1971: 106).” Rokkan was initially unclear about how many “fundamental” cleavages 
actually existed: four, five, or seven, which Flora et al. attributes to an unfinished conception of nation building and 
critical junctures. (1999: 36)  
In his earlier work, Martin Lipset also uses cleavages in a rather broadly defined way, referring to them as the basis 
for “Weltanschaung.” (1959a: 94) Another curious element is that Lipset at a certain point distinguishes between 
basic cleavages and a cleavage in general, without really elaborating on what is meant (99). At the end of his 1993 
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Numerous follow-up pieces have been written that take the cleavage concept of Lipset 
and Rokkan more or less for granted, thereby avoiding a discussion of exactly what it is. 
Currently, the most widely accepted definition, and the one I’ll be using, is the one proposed by 
Peter Mair. (Bornschier 2009; Mair in Katz and Crotty 2006; also see Bartolini 2005 and 
Bartolini and Mair 1990) Mair defines cleavage by pointing to “three distinct characteristics” of 
the concept; in fact he mentions four characteristics, but the fourth comes later in the text. (373): 
 
In the first place, a cleavage involves a social division that distinguishes between 
groups of people on the basis of key social-structural characteristics such as status, 
religion, or ethnicity. A cleavage is therefore grounded in distinct social reality. Second, 
there must be a clear sense of collective identity involved, in the sense that the groups 
on which the cleavage is grounded must be aware of their shared identity and interest as 
farmers, workers, Catholics, or whatever. … Third, a cleavage must find organizational 
expression, whether through a political body, a trade union, a church, or some other 
body. … one additional property of cleavages: they are deep structural divides that persist 
through time and through generations. (Mair in Katz and Crotty 2006; my emphasis).  
 
 
As I mentioned above, Mair’s definition of cleavage seems to implicitly include a fourth element, 
which he later mentions on the same page. Mair argues that cleavages persist because they 
continue to be framed in party politics (373). In line with what I argued above, I think Mair’s 
point here is substantially incomplete, if not wrong. To be fair, this description by Mair of 
cleavage was based on earlier works he and Stefano Bartolini had done, and was written as part 
of a brief article in a party encyclopedia. Thus, I would not go so far to claim that this was indeed 
Mair’s complete stance on the subject, but instead an ill-worded sentence unintentionally 
revealing a lot about the empirical literature about the subject. The sentence contradicts the third 
element of the definition; stating that not just parties can be deemed cleavage expressions, but 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
article The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited , Lipset makes mention of cleavage. Unsurprisingly, he refers 
to the piece he wrote with Rokkan and skillfully avoids any kind of elaboration on the  concept of cleavage (14--18).  
                                                                                                                        
9 
 
also seems to assume that the type of organizational expression determines the fate of a cleavage. 
This assumed importance of organizational expression seems to contradict the first part of his 
definition. If a cleavage is indeed grounded in distinct social reality, how could the choice of the 
organizational expression type be capable of changing this distinct social reality, let alone 
threaten the persistence of a cleavage as a whole? The inclusion of party in the organizational 
element of the definition appears to be observational rather than analytic. It adequately describes 
the turn the literature has taken: a strong emphasis on political parties but a lack of inclusion of 
other forms of political organization, and a lack of a thorough exploration of the relationship 
between parties, organized interests, and cleavages. Indeed, the concept has almost exclusively 
been used in party political research so much that it is sometimes unjustifiably mistaken as a 
necessary element of the definition of cleavage. Also, although the analysis of cleavages and 
party systems may appear to be more easily quantifiable for comparative empirical studies, they 
are certainly not free from methodological issues with measurement. (cf. Stoll 2008; Harrop and 
Miller 1987) Bornschier writes: “Going beyond the three constituting elements of a cleavage, 
then, the term cleavage is usually reserved for durable patterns of political behavior linking 
social groups and political organizations.” (Bornschier 2009) Political parties are thus indeed 
part of the organizational expressions cleavages may entail, but they are certainly not the only 
kind of political organizations that have this quality.4 
                                                                 
4
 For examples of conflating cleavage with issue divide, see among others: Moreno 1999, Deegan-Krause 2006. 
Although Bornschier acknowledges the problems inherent to the cleavage concept as posited by Mair’s 
interpretation of Lipset and Rokkan – among which: the problem of empirical applicability, and the conflation of 
cleavage with “division,” or “conflict” – he seems to mostly agree with them on their definition. As will be 
discussed below, the literature on post-materialism is the only body of literature that deviates from this focus on just 
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What can be surmised from the above discussion is that the concept of cleavage, itself, 
has been shrouded in ambiguity since it has become popular in the field; the seminal piece Party 
Systems and Voter Alignments lacked clarity, and most theorizing of other scholars did not 
succeed in clarifying that much more either (1967).5 A consequence is that future researchers 
defined the concept in a party-centric way, ignoring the wider theoretical implications of the 
Lipset and Rokkan piece. For the purpose of this project, I will continue to use the most widely 
accepted definition within the field, that being the Bartolini and Mair definition, which 
emphasizes that the organized forms cleavages are expressed by political organizations, yet are 
not limited to political parties. The reasons for doing so are that this definition is widely accepted 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
parties, in the sense that other forms of political participation are deemed to be more relevant when discussing 
cleavages. 
5
 In their The Analysis of Political Cleavages, Rae and Taylor attempted to systematize cleavage research 
methodology by coining a new different set of definitions. (1970) Despite the rigor of the analytical model to 
quantify cleavage research that was proposed, the basis on which it is founded is much shakier than the Lipset and 
Rokkan model. They distinguish three types of cleavages each determining aspects of a community: 
 “Ascriptive or ‘trait’ cleavages such as race or caste” that determine level of “heterogeneity or 
homogeneity of a community.” 
“Attitudinal or ‘opinion’ cleavages such as ideology […] or preference” that determine the level of 
“dissensus or consensus in a community.” 
“Behavioral or ‘act’ cleavages” that determine “fractionalization or cohesion of a community.” (1970: 1--2) 
 
In contrast to Lipset and Rokkan, they explicitly look at cleavages as continua. Ascriptive traits in a given 
community may, however, be inescapable and not really conducive to thinking of these differences in terms of a 
continuum.   On the other hand, the attitudinal or preference cleavage doesn’t appear to have anything cleavage-like 
at all, as it seems to be about issue dimensions instead. (cf. Bartolini and Mair 1990)  The authors , themselves, are 
also conflicted about how to categorize religion among these three types of cleavages. (2) What the Rae and Taylor 
definition and model also lacks - that it is, in essence, about deeply-rooted social and political identities - is a crucial 
element of cleavage. 
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in the field, that it is intelligible to students not familiar with this body of literature, and that it is 
analytically useful for this project.  
 
2. Dysfunctional democracies 
During the past few decades, party research on established democracies has focused in part on 
the increase in public disaffection with parties, as evidenced by voter volatility, a general trend 
of decline in electoral participation, and decline in party membership. (Watanuki et al. 1975; 
CreI1984; et al. 1985; Dunleavy 1987; Putnam 1993; Pharr and Putnam 2000, Pharr et al. 2001, 
Dalton et al. 2001; Diamond and Gunther 2001; etc.) The overall conclusion of many empirical 
observations from established democracies of what can be termed the “trilateral world” – 
Europe, North America, and non-Western liberal democracies – can be summarized as that there 
is indeed a growing trend of disaffection of the public with party politics and elections, or in 
other words, that representative democracy is unresponsive to voters, and disconnected with 
those whose interests it claims to represent.  
I propose the term “identity- interest group” to distinguish from more general concepts 
like interest groups or Civil Society. A widely accepted definition of interest group by 
Schlozman and Tierney does list all the aspects that I would include for the types of groups I 
include in this study, yet misses an important aspect for the purposes of this project. (1986) They 
define interest groups as groups seeking to achieve their politically relevant goals through 
collective action, yet this concept can be interpreted very broadly in the sense that interest can 
mean a lot of different things. What is missing from this definition is a connection to group 
identity from which interests may sprout. The National Rifle Association (NRA) also would fit 
this definition, yet the members and supporters are united by a common interest, rather than 
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having a common identity which creates interests. While it may be true that being a gun owner is 
a type of identity, it is more likely that people – in this case Americans – will primarily identify 
as African-American, Latino, etc., instead of identity categories such as gun owners, stamp 
collectors, or lumberjacks. For the purpose of this project, I term those groups identity- interest 
groups, which do pursue politically relevant goals through collective action, but do so to 
advocate on behalf of groups with distinct primary social identities – in other words, social 
identity dictates the groups’ interests. The social identities are primary, in the sense that I can 
reasonably argue that these types of identity can be considered to be the most politically relevant 
within the political context of a country. The types of identity- interest groups this study focuses 
on all originated in distinct social groups, with shared group identities, and a multitude of 
interests borne out of these shared identities; in other words, interest groups that fit with the 
definition of “social cleavage” as defined by Mair. (2006) An important difference for an 
organization that expresses one specific interest, such as gun owners, is that it lacks an identity 
base that could generate future interests. 
If established democracies are indeed experiencing an erosion of party-centric politics, 
one could argue that democracy is in danger, prompting the question of what should be paid 
attention to in order to bring democracy back in tune with the demands of the people. This 
question touches upon the suggested indispensability of political parties in order for democracy 
to survive. (cf. Lipset 2000) Lipset underlines the importance of parties and their ability to 
represent distinct cleavage-based groups as a prerequisite to make liberal democracy functional. 
A need for a supportive, strong Civil Society and even civic culture are also mentioned as 
prerequisites for democracy. (Almond and Verba 1963; Putnam 1993; 2000) While there are 
some who would argue that parties are not necessary per se for the consolidation or preservation 
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of democracy, one can’t ignore the fact that politics in existing democracies are organized 
through political parties and competitive elections between parties, from which can be surmised 
that if not necessary, parties are at least fulfilling the function of aggregating the electorate’s 
demands with the goal of government formation. (Schmitter 2001)  
Whether or not parties are a necessary element for democracies to function, or whether 
they are merely a function of aggregating group interests until something more efficient becomes 
the norm, I should be concerned with their ability to effectively translate cleavages because for 
now, parties are the main venue through which the public finds its representation in politics. To 
this end, I should explore the relationship between identity-interest groups and parties. Or to put 
the question differently, to get a better understanding of why democracy appears dysfunctional in 
established democracies, what should political parties pay attention to if they want to continue to 
translate the interests of the various sociological groups in society they aim to represent? In 
addition, I might ask what party systems perform better and what dynamics exist among parties 
and the sociological groups they aim to represent. Furthermore, to what extent does it matter 
whether a social group forming the basis of an identity- interest group continues to grow or 
stagnate? The main question is how parties’ professed interests are in line with the demands of 
the cleavage-based constituencies they aim to represent. If I want to test this, I need to include in 
my analysis organizations independent of parties that can be deemed much better at translating 
cleavages. 
As mentioned earlier, most of the research has only focused on parties and neglected to 
include other forms of political organization. An exception to this was the body of literature 
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dealing with so-called post-material values.6 (cf. Inglehart 1977; Barnes and Kaase 1979) An 
important aspect about much of this literature is that it takes political participation other than 
                                                                 
6
 Ever since Inglehart (1977), Barnes and Kaase (1979) and others sugges ted the possibility of politicization of post-
material values in society, a lot of speculative literature has emerged on the link between new social movements and 
the possibility of a new cleavage. (Although more focused on transnational activism, also see the writings of Sidney 
Tarrow.) Barnes and Kaase use the term “interest cleavage,” and write (like Inglehart) about “post -material values” 
and “material values,” but also conclude that a cleavage is emerging that dominates the older cleavages (523-533). 
Kitschelt and Dalton et al. operationalized and quantified the idea of new values into a left libertarian vs. right 
authoritarian cleavage and new left/old vs. old left/right, respectively (1994; 1985). Dalton et al. in Electoral 
Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies try to explain electoral change by pointing to the possibility of a new 
cleavage, or “New Politics” (1985). To them, cleavages are: “relatively stable patterns of polarization, in which 
groups support given policies or parties, while other groups support opposing policies or parties. (Inglehart in Dalton 
et al.: 25)”  
This definition seems far away from the revolutionary origins through which the initial four cleavages were forged. 
In addition, Lipset and Rokkan, who depicted parties as the endpoint of a history rooted in cleavages, political 
parties and the democratic opposition vs. governing parties have become only one part of political participation in 
the definition. In the concluding chapter, the editors write: “New Social Movements may realign or rejuvenate party 
systems without breaking down primary cleavage structure.” (455) They argue that social movements must develop 
an institutional basis in order for a new cleavage to become integrated into the party system (457-459). The 
emergence of this kind of literature points to a problem central to their concept of cleavage. Lipset and Rokkan 
started with strong revolutionary, often violent conflict, leading to cleavages. Polarization, opposition, and conflict 
are terms that continuously reappear in the literature to describe cleavages. Here it is suggested that different value  
preferences are supposed to lead to cleavage. It seems doubtful that differences in alleged new values can be packed 
together with deep societal conflict under the category of cleavage. The softening up of the Lipset-Rokkan model, 
itself, by this body of literature (as seen in the example from Inglehart above) provides scholars with the possibility 
to employ not only the concept of cleavage, but the entire model in a far broader, and even more vague, sense than it 
was intended.      
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elections and political parties, in particular social movements, much more seriously than 
traditional research has. It adequately demonstrated that other forms of political participation 
deserve at least as much attention. Although Lipset and Rokkan were most interested in saying 
something about parties and party systems, the inclusion of social movements and their 
institutionalization (e.g. corporatism, clientelism, etc.) was in line with the original idea about 
cleavage not only being reflected in party systems. (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Flora et al. 1999) 
Only by providing an analysis that also includes alternate forms of political representation like 
identity- interest groups, which complement party based research, will I have a better picture of 
how much established democracies, or democratic governance, are indeed affected by a drop in 
support for all types of political organization, instead of merely a drop in support for parties. The 
project proposed here will yield some insights on how effective or ineffective representative 
institutions are with regard to incorporating public demands of mobilized cleavage-based groups.  
While it may be accurate that extra-electoral forms of political organization may also be 
subjected to membership erosion that parties face, there are some important differences that 
warrant not conflating the reasons for membership decrease for both as the same causes and 
consequences. Parties, particularly those originally conceptualized as mass organizations such as 
Social-democratic parties, tended to rely heavily on membership to fund the party organizations. 
The same was true for organizations like unions and some early minority organizations. I 
contend here that a decline in identity- interest group membership does not necessarily equate to a 
decline in support. What would constitute the most reliable indicator, if not the only reliable 
indicator, for a decline in support is the decline of the sociological basis identity- interest 
organizations represent. People may be in favor of workers’ rights without being unionized, 
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themselves.7 Large-scale structural changes from a secondary economy to a tertiary economy 
contributed to a decline of unionization without taking away the basis of the social movement 
underlying unionization. A chronic decline in electoral participation and eroding party 
membership are of a different order than a decline in identity- interest organization membership. 
A decrease in electoral participation either signifies a disinterest in politics – apathy, perhaps – or 
it signifies a disconnection between parties on one hand and voters on the other. If it is apathy 
that is increasing, then this apathy most likely also will affect other facets of political 
involvement of the electorate. However, it is the contention of this project that this political 
apathy is a symptom of a dysfunctional representative democracy caused by the inability of 
political parties to articulate the interests of those they aspire to represent. This project is 
concerned with probing the level to which political parties succeed in translating the interests of 
the electorate. Downs’ contention that “Parties formulate policies in order to win elections, rather 
than win elections in order to formulate policies,” is central to this. (1957, 28) The aspect of 
competing in an electoral arena, populated by political professionals, alienates said professionals 
from their traditional base. I also should expect that variations in party systems may provide 
different levels of insulation of parties from being dependent on voter support in order to stay in 
power. Multiparty systems, in which the regular turning over of power is common, could make 
parties more sensitive to demands of cleavage-based groups, while a lack of turnover, or the 
reduction of parties resulting in a binary choice, could be expected to make parties less prone to 
translate the interests of any specific group.  
                                                                 
7
 For an example see Hara and Sato 2006. While it may be true that non-workers can be in favor of worker-rights 
and not all workers may necessarily agree with what organized labor favors, it  is unlikely that either of the former 
two agents is a better or more legitimate representative of workers’ demands. 
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Additionally, the distortion of parties and party systems will be even larger, depending on 
the number of cross-cutting cleavages. As a consequence, if I want to find out the extent to 
which existing parties articulate the interests of distinct groups in society, such as classes or 
ethnic groups, I need to find comparable organizations – national organizations articulating the 
interests of such groups – the largest of their kind and with the most national political influence 
unlike political parties, such groups will not be subject to the temptations innate to the electoral 
stage, and by virtue of that, a social movement organization will be a much more reliable vehicle 
for contentious politics.8 While the arena of interest organizations is infinite compared to the 
finite electoral arena, selecting the largest and most influential identity-interest organizations 
advocating on behalf of the largest segments of a distinct sociological group at one pole of a 
cleavage, I argue that such selection will at least be sufficiently indicative of the interests of that 
specific segment, and perhaps indicative of the mechanisms at work with regard to the entire 
population on that pole.  
 If Michels’ iron law of oligarchy – the contention that social movement mass-
organization elites like union or party leaders will allow for little internal organizational 
democracy – affects parties, it will also affect interest groups. [1911] There is, however, an 
important difference in that an identity-interest group, despite the effects of what Michels 
described, will still need to continuously appeal to its membership base in order to stay relevant. 
Political parties, despite the potential alienation that in part could be explained by Michels’ 
assertion, is that they operate within the electoral arena where the representative institutions 
serve as sort of a delaying buffer or – among other factors depending on the type of electoral and 
party system – a life insurance policy for the party’s survival, regardless of its unpopularity or a 
                                                                 
8
 Contentious politics in the sense of Tarrow. (1998) 
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decline in voter turnout.9 In other words, I agree that all organizations over time may evolve into 
oligarchies, but argue that political parties, depending on the electoral system, may be more or 
less insulated against the effect of having their supporters alienated by this.10  
Aside from being representative of what could be considered the most salient cleavage 
and the most dynamic cleavages in politics, workers-vs.-owners and subject-vs.-dominant 
population cleavage, respectively, looking at union federations and minority organizations in the 
three selected cases also provides an additional advantage. Although these identity-interest 
organizations are not as intertwined with the state as political parties are, the cases should 
capture the range of variance in logic of embeddedness of identity- interest organizations into 
state structures and the interaction patterns between them and parties such as pluralism, 
clientelism, and neo-corporatism.11 To an extent, one should assume that these different 
regulatory legal frameworks also will shape the way identity-interest groups organize. (cf. 
DiMaggio and Powell 1983) Depending on the regulatory framework of the country, in some 
cases, identity-interest organizations may find themselves deeply embedded into the state. One 
example is the neo-corporatist bargaining structures set up between the state, employers, and 
                                                                 
9
 In Reshaping the Political Arena, Collier and Collier pointed to the fact that the continuation of a party system may 
be just a function of institutional survival, while the ideological and/or sociological basis for party  support may have 
significantly changed, or as Collier and Collier put it: “In some cases, one may be dealing with app arent continuities 
that conceal significant changes” (1991: 34--35). Kitschelt made a similar argument with regard to the continued 
institutional embeddedness of traditional political party system but the sociological and ideological reorientation of 
the parties within that party system (Kitschelt 1994: Ch. 7). 
10
 In no way am I arguing that all organizations are affected to the same degree by Michels ’ law of oligarchy, in fact 
there are exceptions that test the rule. (cf. Lipset 1956; Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 1996) 
11
 For a comprehensive comparative multi-country study, see Thomas 2001. 
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trade unions in Germany. In other cases, the state will adhere to a stricter pluralist doctrine, 
leaving identity- interest groups much more independent, yet also more vulnerable to being 
restricted in their operations by legislation, such as in the U.S. unions. In yet other cases, social 
movements’ organizations may receive substantial support at different tiers such as the 
municipality, or within a certain sector, yet be confronted with an effective bureaucratic 
blockage when trying to play a role of importance at the national level, thereby eroding the 
bargaining power and thwarting the future potential such movements could have at this level. 
One example is Japan, where many citizens’ movements are able to capture significant support 
and success at the grassroots level, or labor unions that are able to attain successes at the 
company level, yet national- level umbrella organizations of these groups fail to obtain similar 
levels of success in large part because of a clientelist political tradition and importance of 
bureaucracy.12 (Curtis 1999; Hrebenar 2001; Tsujinaka and Pekkanen 2007; Benson 2008; 
Haddad 2012)  
An additional reason to focus on these two types of identity- interest organization relates 
to the type of cleavage on which they position themselves. Labor union federations are 
organizations rooted in the cleavage generally considered to be most widely politicized: workers-
vs.-owners. Given the historical importance of the labor movement even in countries such as the 
U.S., which lacks traditional socialist or workers’ parties, it would make sense that these parties 
attempted to attract voters from this group by adopting issues relevant to them. On the other 
hand, minority groups, even those that grew significantly, are by definition not as interesting in 
                                                                 
12
 This is not just the case for what Haddad termed “National Citizen Groups,” but also for labor unions; unlike 
European unions, for example, about 90 % are organized at the enterprise level, contributing significantly to the 
weakness of national union federations. (2012; JILPT 2013/2014, Ch. 4) 
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terms of electoral support for parties because they number fewer potential voters than the 
dominant population group. The reason for inclusion in this case would be to examine under 
what conditions and/or to what extent any parties actually would show attention to in the 
demands of minority interests regardless of their relatively small size. 
This project will focus on the relationship between the programmatic content of national 
labor federations, minority organizations, and parties. The goal will be to determine whether 
long-term trends can be observed in terms of similarity of content, and if possible, what policy 
recommendations can be inferred from this in order to make party-based representative politics 
more attuned to the demands from specific identity- interest groups, and by extension the latter’s 
demographic basis.  
 
3. Hypotheses and core assumptions: 
The main assumption this analysis is based on is that identity- interest organizations that sprout 
from social movements with distinct sociological bases are significantly purer cleavage 
expressions compared with political parties. To address the problems addressed in the previous 
sections, I opted to propose and test two sets of hypotheses. A first set deals specifically with the 
variety in party systems and the relationship with identity- interest groups. A second set addresses 
the relationship between parties and changes of the size of the demographic basis of identity-
interest organizations.13  
Identity- interest organizations do not need to compete in an electoral arena. Political 
parties, on the other hand, need to gain as much support as is needed to win elections. Parties in 
                                                                 
13
 Cf. Rokkan’s  “corporate” and “electoral channels” wherein social movement organizat ions operate. (Rokkan 1977, 
566)   
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two-party systems, in particular, attempt to cater to an as large crowd as possible, which happens 
at the expense of their sociological and/or ideological profiles. (cf. Downs) I assume that because 
political parties will be influenced by crosscutting cleavages, and are compelled to compete for 
the biggest electoral market share, interest groups are assumed to be purer expressions and thus 
are much less affected by this. Furthermore, identity- interest organizations are also assumed to 
be more stable with regard to content because the sociological group identities they represent 
will remain much more constant than for parties. Over time, parties may be subject to much more 
content change, having a myriad of potential effects, such as the erosion of program stability, or 
the enabling of a radical wing to take over and pull a program in a specific direction.14 By 
comparing the positions of identity- interest organizations and parties, and thereby using these 
identity- interest organizations to gain insight into how well parties are representing distinct 
social identities of cleavage based groups within society, I am presenting novel research methods 
in going to the source of identity- interest organizations directly.  It allows us to gain insight into 
the nature of how parties and different kinds of party systems translate cleavages. 
In this project, I use the social cleavage concept because it is much better suited for the 
analysis of various types of social movement organizations – political parties and identity-
interest organizations – within the context of liberal democracies globally, instead of a traditional 
and oversimplified theoretical framework of binary left-right politics. The scope of this project is 
limited to the analysis of two cleavages that the literature identifies to be the most salient. The 
                                                                 
14
 New issues do not constitute new social group identities, let alone cleavages. Although it may be true that interest 
groups can also be subject to internal radicalization or takeover, the lack of a rigid , institutionalized, electoral-like 
framework found in party politics will make it difficult for such groups to remain relevant in the long term in case 
they become too much of a radical fringe group. Third, interest groups will continue to reproduce the same social 
group identity over time, although new issues may be politicized within that logic 
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first is the worker-vs.-owner cleavage that is built around the question of who controls the means 
of production. This cleavage is often understood to be the most salient one because it is conflated 
with the archetypical left-right division in politics. (Bartolini and Mair 1990) The second is the 
subject-vs.-dominant group cleavage revolving around the conflict between majority and 
minority populations with respect to race, ethnicity, or linguistic divides. This does not mean that 
the other cleavages – rural-vs.-urban society or agrarian-vs.- industrial, and religious-vs.-secular – 
are not translated or present in the aforementioned cases.15 Instead, based upon prior studies, I 
assume that there is a high likelihood they will be less salient. One of the cleavages analyzed for 
this project is often conflated with left-vs.-right cleavage, although the Lipset and Rokkan 
version “workers vs. owners” was significantly more specific, as the terms “left” and “right” may 
have varied meanings, depending on the context. (Daalder 1984; Proksch 2010) For example, 
many quantitative studies on the Japanese party system fail to confirm qualitative studies 
confirming a left-right division, in large part because an issue that is considered left in one 
national context doesn’t necessarily have as much weight on a left-right scale in an aggregate 
multi-case study. (Proksch et al. 2010) On the other hand, in two-party systems, the conflation of 
left and right with cleavages is amplified by the deliberate binary logic of the system.16 For 
                                                                 
15
 Cf. Rose and Urwin 1969.  
16
 The effects of Duverger’s tendency, as exemplified by the U.S. two-party system, may create a party system that 
is tailored to a catch-all logic, loosening its ties to specific sociologically dis tinct groups and/or ideology, for the 
purpose of winning a majority in the electoral arena.
16
 (Duverger 1972; Duverger 2003)  
This tendency is often erroneously referred to as “Duverger’s law;” it is erroneous because the latter merely 
described a tendency that he, himself,  wrote: “In 1951, I did say in Political Parties that the former [said tendency] 
was ‘the closest to a sociological law among all the generalizations suggested in this book,’ but this remark did not 
have the significance that was later attributed to it..” (2003: 69)  It also was not found to be 100% applicable based 
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example, the largest party manifesto research program, the Manifesto Project Database, 
“specifically examines the quality of programmatic representation by comparing policy 
preferences of parties to the left-right self-placements of voters over time and across regime 
types through to the present.”17 (MRG/CMP/MARPOR: cf. Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 
2006; Volkens et al. 2013) It therefore should not be surprising that many issues are classified 
incorrectly as left or right, whereas these probably don’t even belong on a left-vs.-right 
dimension.  
Most, if not all, industrialized societies increasingly have become immigration countries. 
In some cases, immigration has always been part of the raison d’état, albeit always engineered 
and not in an unrestricted form. By engineered, I point to the fact that even countries with 
supposedly open/inclusive immigration regimes were and are contingent upon what is deemed to 
be desirable immigrant populations. (cf. Zolberg 2006) Other states, such as many countries in 
Western Europe, have become de facto immigrant countries since the 1960s, yet some struggled 
for a long time to accept this new reality. In the age of globalization, immigration has become 
even more important as a continuous feature of change in industrialized democracies, 
significantly altering the social fabric of states and thereby potentially also reviving a subject-vs.-
dominant population cleavage.18 The influx of new immigrant groups constituting new segments 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
on empirical evidence, and therefore not having the quality of a law. On the transformation to Catch -all or Cartel 
Parties; cf. Katz 1995; Blondel and Cotta 1996.  Bowler et al. mention additional legal and other barriers and the 
importance of elite agency from the two major parties strengthening this tendency in the U.S. case. (2009: Ch. 9)  
17
 https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/information/information last date accessed May 2014. 
18
 In Lipset and Rokkan, this cleavage was termed “Centre vs. Periphery.” (1967) Although the authors do clarify 
that this does not necessarily entail a geographic centre but rather a cultural/ethno -linguistic/racial centre and 
periphery, I opted to use subject vs. dominant population to avoid any misconceptions  and because the former 
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of the citizenry, in particular, if they are phenotypically or religiously distinct from the majority 
population, may rekindle the dynamic of a dominant-vs.-subject population cleavage. Yet other 
demographic changes within the dominant population, such as an aging society, may contribute 
to an increased intensity of this cleavage. Assuming that this cleavage, albeit not the most 
significant, will be the most dynamic in terms of cleavage change due to the significant 
demographic shifts caused by newcomers in past decades, I opted to include it as the second 
cleavage for this project. Ideally, in terms of cases, I would look for a case that has always been 
relatively open to immigration, one that has only recently become more open, and one that is still 
struggling with the need for immigration.  
What both cleavages have in common is that the sociological base has shifted 
significantly in the past few decades. For the worker-vs.-employer cleavage, the labor market 
underwent changes including, but not limited to, the increased participation of female 
employees, an increase of temporary and part-time jobs, a shift from an industrially based 
economy to a more service-based economy, and increased immigration. For the subject-
minority-vs.-dominant-group cleavage, modern industrialized societies underwent such changes 
as an increase of immigration, an increase of or desire for naturalization, or and an increased 
shift of monocultural, largely homogeneous societies toward multicultural, heterogeneous 
societies. Because of these sociological shifts, I propose two different sets of hypotheses. One set 
explores the relationship between identity-interest organizations and parties, whereas the other 
set addresses the relationship between the sociological base of identity- interest groups and 
parties. Hypotheses One and Two below address the former set, Hypothesis Three the latter set. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
authors only looked at this cleavage within a limited context . Here, the opposition is created through what Zolberg 
and Long identified as the majority population and their perception of immigrants as “the dangerous other.” (1999)  
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The first hypothesis (H1) relates to the responsiveness of parties to cleavage translation over 
time. 
H1: In a two-party system, parties will be or become less responsive to cleavage 
translation over time. In a multi-party system, parties will be more responsive to cleavage 
translation over time. In a dominant-party system, the dominant party will be less 
responsive to cleavage translation, whereas the other parties will be more responsive over 
time. 
 
The expectation is that the fewer parties present in a party system, the less congruent their 
programs should be with those of interest groups. Instead, based on the median voter theorem, 
the expectation is that parties will compete for the “median voter,” not only because parties will 
aim to attract as many voters as possible, but also because a loosened link with distinct 
sociological groups will make their programmatic content less contingent upon cleavages. 
(Downs 1957)  In addition, dominant parties may gradually become unresponsive to cleavage 
translation as the mechanisms of normal electoral competition become muffled. Obviously, 
Hypothesis One (H1) implies that the cases included should exhibit significant party systems in 
which at least one should be a two-party system, one a multi-party system, and one a dominant-
party system. Hypothesis Two (H2) explores the level of fluctuation of party translation of 
cleavages over time. 
H2: In a two-party system, it is likely that one party will translate one pole of a cleavage 
slightly stronger than the other party. In a multi-party system, several parties will 
compete to attract the votes of a cleavage-based group; therefore, I should expect 
cleavage translation to fluctuate across parties over time. In a dominant-party system, 
cleavage translation will mainly fluctuate among opposition parties, while cleavage 
translation by the dominant party gradually erodes or remains stagnant at a low level. 
 
The above hypothesis does not conflict with H1, as one party translating a cleavage better than 
the other does not necessarily mean that it is being translated well. While the median voter 
theorem dictates that parties become more alike in content, minor differences will remain 
because it is unlikely that parties will have completely the same content. Hypothesis Three (H3) 
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compares the responsiveness of parties to cleavage translation to changes in the sociological 
basis of the identity- interest organizations. 
H3: Political parties will be more responsive to cleavage translation if the sociological 
base of identity-interest organizations is experiencing continuous growth. Political parties 
will be less responsive to cleavage translation if the sociological base is experiencing 
stagnation or a continuous decrease in growth. 
 
The expectation here is that in order to win elections, parties will attempt to attract votes from 
sociological groups that are continuously growing within a society. An expansion of the labor 
workforce or the inclusions of immigrant groups are but two examples.19 Growth here refers to 
the growth of the sociological basis, the reservoir from which the selected identity- interest 
organizations can draw potential new individual membership. Indeed, in some cases the 
individual membership model may be less effective for the success of an identity- interest 
organization to weigh on policy-making than alternate forms of growth, such as the transition of 
individual membership toward community chapters or affiliates of identity- interest 
organizations. A more reliable way of measuring relevance of identity- interest organizations is to 
measure the size of the potential constituencies they represent. For example, without an identity-
interest organization or any other type of organization to represent them, it is less likely that 
immigrant demands will become an issue voiced by political parties because there is nobody to 
speak for them. Once an identity- interest organization is established, however, the potential of 
that identity- interest organization to have influence in the communities they represent, including 
those who are officially members and those who are not, will mostly depend on the size of that 
constituency and less on the modes of official identity- interest organization membership. 
                                                                 
19
 Rokkan who theorized a lot about the interaction between cleavages and their translation through political 
organizations recognized that migration and immigration could significantly shift cleavage  constellations. (1977, 
569-570) 
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All of the above hypotheses can be tested and are falsifiable, either by conducting 
research on other country cases and/or including more identity- interest organizations.20 To 
ensure that the cases I selected for results that can be argued to be generalizable to a wide array 
of other cases, while at the same time taking into account the breadth of research that would have 
to be conducted per case, I needed to make a very careful case selection upon which I will 
elaborate in the next section. Listed below is a summary of what the expectations are. The 
analysis of the above hypotheses yielded mixed results which will be discussed in Chapters Four 
and Five and in the Conclusion. 
Table 1: expectations H1 and H2 
 H1: Responsiveness of parties to 
cleavage translation over time 
H2: level of fluctuation of party 
translation of cleavages over time 
2-party system Parties are or become less 
responsive  
One party will be slightly more 
responsive than other 
Multi-party system Parties become more responsive 
over time 
Party responsiveness will fluctuate 
over time across parties  
Dominant party system Dominant party is or becomes less 
responsive, other parties will be 
more responsive 
Party responsiveness will fluctuate 
higher among other parties while it 
remains stagnant at low level for the 
dominant party 
 
Table 2: expectations H3 
 H3: Responsiveness of parties to cleavage translation to changes in the 
sociological basis of the identity-interest groups 
2-party system Parties become more responsive if group grows, less responsive if group 
decreases.  
Multi-party system Parties become more responsive if group grows, less responsive if group 
decreases 
Dominant party system Dominant party will be less responsive – other parties become more 
responsive if group grows, less responsive if group decreases  
 
 
4. Case selection  
Political closure – the concept that there are no more available reservoirs to recruit new voters – 
is sometimes assumed to explain the stability of party systems. However, the idea that if there are 
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 The datasets used for this project will be made publicly available for other researchers to use in related projects. 
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no sizable groups to be mobilized, one should not expect any future cleavage system change, is 
wrong.  Some groups in society may not have an influence on party politics, but will be able to 
weigh on the legislative process through other venues, such as identity- interest organizations. 
However, political closure is by no means a kind of teleological endpoint in history. Once a party 
system has become consolidated, the reservoir of voters may appear to be saturated. I posit that it 
is only the appearance of saturation, because the electoral reservoir does not behave according to 
a teleological path. The creation of the “carceral state” in the U.S., for example, led to a re-
disenfranchisement of predominantly African-American males. (Gottshalk 2008)  
Long-term societal evolutions such as mass immigration or the growth of the “carceral 
state” in some cases may inspire states to include or exclude people from voting. Other 
mechanisms such as voter identification and registration requirements also have been applied 
widely to make it more difficult for certain groups in society. The lack of permanent residence 
(such as populations with nomadic lifestyles), voter age restrictions, the synchronicity between 
working hours and voting hours, and voting-by-proxy limitations for citizens abroad, are but a 
few of many elements that make the electoral reservoir much less stable, let alone saturated. 
Over time, established parties may become so institutionalized, and the electoral market so 
engineered to keep undesirable voter contingents at bay and/or to give advantage to the ruling 
parties, that change within the party system may no longer be reliable to make any inferences 
with regard to cleavage alignments within a society. The question is, how do I successfully 
establish the extent to which parties are actually responsive to cleavages, and how do 
demographic transitions affect cleavage translation? The answer is to widen the analysis to extra-
electoral forms of political representation as is undertaken here by also looking at identity-
interest organizations. In no way am I arguing that party-based research should be abandoned or 
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be secondary to the analysis of other forms of political organization. On the contrary, party-based 
research remains just as important, yet to salvage the credibility of findings; it has to be 
complemented with research on alternate social movement organizations, identity- interest 
organizations in particular for this project.  
Nearly all of the established democracies that weren’t already immigration countries, 
such as the U.S. or Brazil, have experienced mass immigration. In some cases, like many West-
European countries, it took a very long time before this reality – the political acceptance of 
actually being an immigration country – came fairly late. In yet other cases, despite the pressures 
of an increasingly aging society and de facto foreign worker migration, such as in the case of 
Japan, policy makers are still struggling with this reality. (Kondo 2004; Chung 2010) The ways 
in which political parties have dealt with the reality of immigration – immigration framed as part 
of the raison d’état of that state, immigration as a necessary post-WWII need, and immigration as 
still far from being accepted as a reality – matters tremendously. The level to which the demands 
of minority organizations originating from the immigrant population are translated by political 
parties may yield insights about how well national political parties cope with immigration. The 
assumption of electoral closure is contradicted by the realities of immigration. On one hand, 
depending on how open a host country is, the number of citizens with immigrant backgrounds 
organized in pro-immigrant interest groups will rise. On the other hand, noncitizens that arrived 
as legal and illegal immigrants, or as refugees, will also be supportive of these groups. As a 
consequence, identity-interest organizations will be able to tap more into these new reservoirs of 
support than political parties will because the latter, for the most part, only will be interested in 
citizen voters. As mentioned earlier, the demographic size of a minority could matter 
significantly in the sense that I also want to see if an increase in size will make them politically 
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more relevant for political parties. For this reason, I should include three cases with significantly 
different sizes of minority populations.  
Given the breadth of this project, cases must be selected that are representative for a wide 
range of alternative cases, and must display enough variation to control for differences that could 
be attributed to cultural factors. To this end, both practical and theoretical criteria need to be 
taken into account. These criteria also should make generalization possible to a wider universe of 
comparative cases.  
From a practical point a view, the cases selected should meet four criteria: First, they 
should be established liberal democracies; second, they should possess traditions of stable and 
longstanding political parties and social movements, and third, albeit less important, – they 
should be cases revisited often in comparative-politics literature dealing with the topics of this 
project. Lastly, there should be available and accessible data. Established liberal democracies 
obviously will not be the only type of industrialized societies that may have longstanding 
divisions rooted in social cleavages. A people’s democracy, for example, may show signs of 
divisions suggesting the existence of cleavage, which might be inferred from the existence of 
ethno-cultural peripheral resistance or terrorist groups, or an oppressed Civil Society. However, 
the practical problem in analyzing these features would lie in the difficulty of measurement. 
Liberal democracies will adhere to a large level of pluralistic freedom both with regard to 
political parties and other forms of political organization, such as identity- interest organizations, 
making data on these organizations much more accessible and quantifiable. In addition, the 
visibility of political movements other than government-sanctioned ones in non-pluralistic 
societies may be too suppressed. Obviously, liberal democracies may display very different legal 
frameworks within which these organizations have to operate; this is true both for parties and 
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interest groups.21 This also means that I should select cases with significantly different political 
institutional frameworks. Because the central problem of political disaffection with parties is 
something all cases suffer from, allowing for cases with different institutional regimes in which 
these organizations operate will help us identify what features may be most conducive to lesser 
rates of disaffection.  
In addition to being liberal democracies, the ideal cases should also be “established” or 
“consolidated” democracies.22 For the purpose of this project, the stability and longevity of the 
political institutions matter in order to make sound observations. As a working definition, I will 
term as “consolidated” those cases that have been around for at least fifty years and did not 
become subject to constitutional breaches or regime changes.23 Note that although this definition 
of established democracy may exclude a number of cases from the analysis, it does not mean that 
inferences based on the results of this project can’t be made for cases that have not yet 
consolidated sufficiently. On the contrary, the findings presented will also have a predictive 
value for such cases.  
                                                                 
21
 Obviously, some types of groups may also be banned in established liberal democracies, yet these would  probably 
not be organizations representing large segments of the population , let alone having large membership potential. On 
the complexity and effects of different regulatory frameworks for private organizations such as nonprofit groups , but 
also interest groups, cf. DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Salamon 1987; Thomas 2001.  
22
 For both concepts , there is neither theoretically nor empirically an agreement in the literature on exactly what that 
is supposed to entail. (Schedler 2001) Without a clear definition, and on just the assumption that the audience will 
understand these concepts in the same fashion, any project avoiding a clear definition opens the door for 
arbitrariness and uncurtailed subjective interpretations. 
23
 To clarify: A change in election regulations in itself is not sufficient to reject it as a potential case. In fact, doing 
so would undermine the premise of the project, as the behavior of parties is an important variable when determining 
the extent to which they adequately translate political cleavages. 
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In terms of theoretical constraints, there are four criteria tied to parties and interest groups 
within a case that should differ in order to make a “most different case” design successful for this 
project. (cf. Mill) The underlying dependent variable I explore is the long-term decreasing 
support of, and disaffection with, political parties. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze this 
phenomenon within a variety of contexts that on one hand remain similar enough for the reasons 
discussed above, yet on the other hand are different enough to be able to infer conclusions from 
our findings that can be assumed to apply to all cases within that range of variation.   
A first criterion and independent variable is the level of regulatory involvement of the 
state and the way in which the identity- interest organizations are embedded into the state. State 
involvement might be very high or the social movement is highly embedded into the processes of 
the state. A sub-criterion here is that state-embeddedness may also occur at different – not 
necessarily geographical – tiers, in the sense that nationwide social movements may be regulated 
and incorporated at the local or regional level instead of national, thereby potentially impacting 
the way demands are translated to national politicians. The most extreme form of this would be 
the institutional regime often associated with a highly verzuilde, or pillarized society, or 
consociational democracy as a sociological basis. (cf. Huyse 1970; Rokkan 1977; Lijphart 1984; 
1990 [1968]; 1999; Deschouwer 2001) However, given the strong interdependence between 
political parties and other organizations within a pillar on one hand, and the very limited number 
of possible cases of pillarized democracies on the other hand, it is best to avoid selecting a 
pillarized society for our analysis. A better alternative is to include the type of democracy that 
Lijphart would classify as an average “consensus democracy” with a corporatist logic of 
embedding interest groups into the state, meaning we’d be looking for a case that is not as 
extreme as a consociational democracy, but rather somewhere in the middle of the spectrum 
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while closer to the consensus democracy pole. (1984)  The opposite is such that the state adheres 
to a relatively strict pluralistic doctrine by not embedding social movements, or relatively strict 
separation of the state and interest-group organizations, such as in Anglo-Saxon democracies like 
the U.K. or the U.S.  
A second criterion is the nature of the party system. Within the literature, there is a 
variety of potential classifications of party systems available. (Duverger 1954; Dahl 1966; 
Blondel 1968; Rokkan 1968; Sartori 1976; etc.) The main thread running through all of these 
classification systems – and also in line with Lijphart’s earlier works cited above – is that I can 
distinguish between two-party and multiparty systems.24 In other words, I opted for Duverger’s 
classification based on the number of represented parties. In addition to two-party and multiparty 
systems, I need to include one case to make our analysis representative for cases in which the 
distinction between two-party or multiparty systems is muffled by the long-term dominance of a 
single party. Potential examples for this could be pre-1969 Germany dominated by CDU-CSU 
(Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschland – Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern [German 
Christian-democratic parties: Christian-democratic union Germany – Christian-social union in 
Bavaria]), pre-1968 Belgium under Christian-democratic PSC-CVP dominance, or present-day 
Japan under a LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) dominance that only started to weaken in the past 
two decades.  
A third criterion is culture. Because some theories of democracy – in particular neo-
Tocquevilleans such as Putnam, Huntington, Almond and Verba – are deeply rooted in 
culturalist beliefs, it is important to select cases from significantly distinct cultural backgrounds 
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 Empirically speaking, this twofold typology for the most part also runs parallel with the distinction between PR 
and Majoritarian voting systems. 
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to be able to reject these type of empirically questionable culture-all-the-way-down explanations. 
(1993; 1963; 1996) Much of the literature on political cleavages, democracy and elections, and 
political parties has focused on the European experience. Given the fact that cultural similarity 
may be a variable that could explain certain aspects of European democracies, it is therefore 
important to look beyond Europe, yet still within the limitations set by the criteria mentioned 
above.25 While the criteria of having established democracies limits the potential of culturally 
diverse cases somewhat – South Africa, for example, can’t be used here – it is still possible to 
find culturally significantly different cases beyond Europe. 
A fourth criterion I briefly touched upon earlier is included because of its increasing 
global importance – the level of openness to immigration and naturalization, and a nation’s 
tolerance of non-majority populations on its soil. To be clear, I am not arguing that immigrant 
populations can be equated with all groups that could be considered segments of the subject 
population. For example, while the African-American minority certainly will share many 
interests with the U.S. Latino population with regard to discrimination from the dominant non-
Latino, Caucasian population, there are obvious differences in historical background, and 
disagreements between both groups are partly related to that. Ideally, I want to include at least 
one case with a relatively open and long-established legacy of immigration. Examples would be 
states with “ius soli”-based types of citizenship, such as Brazil, the U.S., and potentially France. 
(cf. Brubaker 1992) The opposite would be closed societies with restrictive, “ius sanguinis”-
based immigration and naturalization legislation. Examples for this could be Germany prior to 
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 Although some African and Latin American countries qualify for this criterion, they do not qualify for the 
working definition of established democracy applied to this project.  
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2000 [2004/5], or present-day Japan.26 However, given the global traffic of asylum-seekers and 
refugees, a criterion based on the level of openness of a society should also take into account 
hospitability to refugee and asylum-seeking populations.27 Including refugee and asylum-seeking 
populations allows for a more differentiated and realistic approach to assessing the openness of a 
society. Ideally for our analysis, I would include one case that is open to immigrants on one hand 
as well asylum-seekers and refugees on the other, one case that is more open either to 
immigrants or to asylum-seekers and refugees, and one case that isn’t very open to either group.    
The last criterion of difference included relates to the pressures and changes of the labor 
market in postindustrial democracies as part of an increasingly globalized economy. There is 
some overlap between the last criteria in part because immigration connects to this. Other 
evolutions that most democracies underwent, regardless of their geographic location or cultural 
background, include the shift from secondary to tertiary economy, increase of part-time and 
temporary employment, increased influx of female employees, and pressure on welfare systems. 
Ideally, I am looking for cases with distinct differences in the way the relationship is organized 
between the state and labor organizations. 
I opted to select three cases that fit all criteria listed above spanning the wide range of 
variety among the universe of possible cases – the U.S., Germany, and Japan. Within each case, I 
opted to analyze two specific types of cleavage-based identity- interest organizations: union 
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 2000 is the year the Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz (Nationality/Citizenship law) was changed leading to easier 
naturalization of second and third generation immigrants. The new Zuwanderungsgesetz (Immigration law) of 2004 
– active since 2005 – in conjunction with the former law made it also easier for first generation immigrants to 
naturalize. (BGBl. – Bundesgesetzblatt) 
27
 For the UNHCR definition for the difference between asylum seekers vs refugees: UNHCR 
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c137.html 
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federations and immigrant minority groups. The AFL-CIO (American Federation of Labor-
Congress of Industrial Organizations), DGB (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund [German Labor 
Union Federation]), and RENGO (Rengō –Nihon Rōdōkumiai Sōrengōkai [Japanese Trade 
Union Confederation]) are the largest and most influential union federations in these three 
countries. LULAC (League of United Latin American Citizens), TGD (Türkische Gemeinde in 
Deutschland [Turkish Community in Germany]), and BLL (BLL – Buraku Kaihō Dōmei 
[Buraku Liberation League]), are the largest and most influential minority group organizations in 
the U.S., Germany and Japan, respectively. LULAC and TGD not only look after the interests of 
citizens with respective Hispanic or Turkish backgrounds, but also cater to the largest segment of 
immigrant populations from both countries.  
Table 3: Case selection criteria 
 US Germany Japan 
Criteria of similarity 
Established democracy Yes Yes Yes 
Stable Party system Yes Yes Yes 
Has been featured in 
prior related studies 
Yes Yes Yes 
Criteria of difference 
Regulatory 
regime/tradition 
Pluralist Corporatist – strong at 
national, weaker at local 
level 
Clientelist – connection to 
parties and other 
organizations via powerful 
bureaucracy 
Party system Two party Multiparty Dominant party 
Cultural tradition American European Asian 
Openness to immigration High Intermediate Low 
Labor market Inclusive – limited welfare 
benefits 
Inclusive – extensive 
welfare benefits 
Exclusive (company-
oriented and  not migrant- 
and  women-friendly) – 
extensive welfare benefits 
for those included 
 
Because unlike the finite space of the electoral arena, the arena in which identity-interest 
organizations exist is infinite – in the sense that there could be an endless amount of identity-
interest organizations, I limited this project to the analysis of the largest and most influential ones 
representing specific poles of cleavages. Consequently, I indeed should assume that the selection 
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of these organizations is representative of at least that segment of the total population related to 
those cleavages under analysis, with the caveat that an even more complete analysis would 
include other organizations with smaller population bases. Because this project is the first in its 
kind, it seemed reasonable to start with the largest and most influential groups representing the 
largest segments of the cleavage population base. In short, “immigrant,” “minority” and “subject 
population” are not synonymous, yet the largest minority group of a subject population will be 
most likely to help us establish mechanisms that may also be indicative of the political position 
of other segments of the subject population versus the dominant population.  
For the U.S. case, I included LULAC as an organization in part to get an idea about how 
far the programs of the two national parties overlap with the demands of part of the population 
that is not the ethnic or racial majority of Americans. In the preliminary stages of this project, I 
was also considering including the NAACP. Although the latter organization definitely captures 
the schism between a subject and a dominant population in an even more extreme form, I opted 
instead to focus my attention on an organization that not only focuses on the articulation of 
demands of a domestic subject minority group, but one that to an extent also articulates the 
demands of an increasing segment of the immigrant population. In addition to immigration 
politics, LULAC reflects important trends in Latino self-perception with regard to the ambiguous 
racial classification of the Latino community, the conflict between opting for an assimilationist, 
anglicized “political whiteness” identity or an ethno-racial, nonwhite identity emphasizing 
Latino heritage and language. (cf. Basler 2008) To be clear, the NAACP is definitely a case 
worthwhile to study within the theoretical boundaries of this project and in particular is a good 
case for analyzing the racial politics of dominant-vs.-subject group cleavage dynamics. However, 
because one of the aims here was also to say something about the dynamics of historic migrant 
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populations across a variety of cases, LULAC, and by extension the U.S. Latino community, is 
the best-fitting organization for this project. Within the Latino community, several larger 
nationwide organizations operate. While the analysis of LULAC is only indicative of the 
relationship of the Latino segment of the total subject population in the U.S., it may yield 
insights to mechanisms that apply to other segments of the subject population as well.  
The Japanese BLL, strictly speaking, is not an organization representing an ethnic group, 
but instead a separate caste. As stated earlier, I needed to include one country case that was still 
closed to the prospect of immigration. An examination of the Buraku population, Japan’s largest 
minority group, can serve as a proxy for smaller groups experiencing similar levels of exclusion 
and discrimination, such as Zainichi Koreans, Okinawans, or Ainu, but also the comparatively 
small immigrant community. Despite increased assimilation and acceptance, this group is still 
faced with discrimination similar to that of immigrant groups and ethnic minorities discussed in 
the other cases. Similar to LULAC, BLL is only indicative of the relationship of the Buraku 
segment of the total subject population in the Japan, yet it may help us reveal mechanisms that 
apply to other segments of the subject population as well. 
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Chapter Two: U.S., German, and Japanese Union Federations and Minority Organizations 
 
Overview 
In this chapter, the individual identity- interest groups analyzed for this project will be the main 
focus. On one hand, the goal is to make the reader familiar with the different organizations, with 
an emphasis of their importance for this project. On the other hand, this chapter also serves to 
deepen the case-selection justification by providing more detailed data.28 This chapter is 
organized as follows: A first section groups the three selected union federations: AFL-CIO, DGB, 
and RENGO. A second section discusses the three selected immigrant/minority organizations: 
LULAC, TGD, and BLL. As an in-depth discussion of each selected organization might require 
its own volume, the information provided here is limited to what is necessary for the purposes of 
this project. As already pointed out in Chapter One, none of these organizations is assumed to 
represent the entire population that finds itself on the worker and subject population poles of the 
worker-vs.-employer and subject-vs.-dominant population cleavages, respectively. I argue, 
however, that because they not only are the largest and most influential organizations 
representing the largest segments of said populations, they will be sufficient to detect the major 
differences with regard to how well the sociological bases of these specific segments are 
represented by parties compared with identity- interest organizations. Furthermore, I contend that 
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 While a discussion of the individual political parties used in the analysis might seem appropriate, I opted no t to 
discuss them in depth here for two reasons . First, where needed in the empirical and other chapters , the parties will 
be discussed succinctly. Second, all political parties that acquired seats in the respective legislatures of the U.S., 
Germany, and Japan – with a few minor exceptions – were included in the analysis. For the identity-interest 
organizations, however, I selected specific groups while excluding others, a step that warrants a discussion of their 
relevance that is addressed in the current chapter.  
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the mechanisms revealed may yield insights on how the relationship may function between 
parties and the entire sociological base of the two selected cleavages for the three cases. 
 
1. Union Federations 
1.1 USA: AFL-CIO – American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations 
The American Federation of Labor – Congress of Industrial Organizations, is the oldest and 
largest existing union federation in the U.S. The AFL-CIO emerged from the 1955 merger of the 
1886-founded AFL and 1935-founded CIO, and currently comprises more than 50 unions. Of the 
approximately 16 million unionized employees in the U.S., about 13 million were unionized 
through AFL-CIO member unions.29 (U.S. Dept. of Labor OLMS) The focus of the national 
leadership is lobbying employees’ interests at the national level in Washington, while the 
organization is also active on the state and local levels. Strictly speaking, the individual member 
unions are able to maintain an independent course. However, and particular ly with regard to the 
AFL-CIO leadership, the federation has a lot of indirect power over its member unions because 
the national organization is the level that historically had access to the White House and 
legislators in Washington on behalf of the members. (Storch 2013) 30  
                                                                 
29
 After 2005, the membership of the AFL-CIO and CTW (Change To Win) still accounts for approximately the 
same number, with the AFL-CIO having 9 million members and CTW about 4 million members. (U.S. Dept. of 
Labor OLS) 
30
 At the member-union level, however, the so called iron law of oligarchy doesn’t hold up, although  the AFL-CIO, 
itself, has battled with a democratic deficit. It was not until the mid-1990s under the Sweeney leadership that the 
national organization invested in its grassroots connections again. (Francia 2006; Storch 2013) 
The AFL-CIO national leadership is often portrayed as the crucial pivot with regard to the direction in which the 
organization is moving. In other words, despite being built on the logic of mass membership, and the independence 
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Table 4:AFL-CIO membership in thousands 
Period Membership Period Membership 
1955 12,622 1982-83 13,758 
1956-57 13,020 1984-85 13,109 
1958-59 12,779 1986-87 12,702 
1960-61 12,553 1988-89 13,556 
1962-63 12,496 1990-91 13,933 
1964-65 12,919 1992-93 13,299 
1966-67 13,781 1994-95 13,007 
1968-69 13,005 1996-97 12,905 
1970-71 13,177 1998-99 12,952 
1972-73 13,407 2000-01 13,164 
1974-75 14,070 2004-05 12,976 
1976-77 13,542 2008-09 8,374 (13,148)* 
1978-79 13,621 2012-13 8,429 (12,652)* 
1980-81 13,602   
* The number in brackets is the totals for both the AFL-CIO and CTW 
(Source: AFL-CIO, Executive Council Report 2013, 66)  
 
Figure 1: Evolution AFL-CIO membership 1955-2013 and CTW 2007-2013, in thousands 
 
Table 4 and Figure 1 display the national membership of the AFL-CIO since its founding 
in 1955. These numbers appear to remain stagnant within a range of 12 million to 13 million 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
of federation member unions, the national leadership is credited with much power, and internal democracy is lacking, 
which is much in line with Michels ’ iron law of oligarchy. (Storch 2013; Francia 2006; Tillman 1999; Yates 1998)  
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members despite a steady increase of the active population. The only exception to this is the 
most recent decade; the split-off and creation of Change to Win (CTW) as a competing union 
federation in 2005. 31  
Comparing the totals of AFL-CIO members with the total U.S. labor force and the 
unemployed population, as outlined in Figure 2 below, it is obvious that the proportion of 
employees with an AFL-CIO membership is consistently decreasing over time. Union density 
figures confirm this trend, as union density for all wage and salary workers was still 25 percent 
in the 1970s, but shrank to 11 percent by 2013. (Hirsch and Macpherson 2014; U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics) When looking at the private sector, this image becomes even bleaker: While the 
unionization degree was still about 21 percent in the 1970s, it had declined to less than 7 percent 
by 2013. The public sector is the exception: While the unionization density was about 25 percent 
in the early 1970s, it actually increased to about 35 percent in the Reagan era and has remained 
stable to the present. In an international comparison, unionization rates declined, yet while the 
average density for industrialized democracies ranges between 17 percent and 22 percent, it is 
significantly lower for the U.S. at 11 percent. (OECD)  
Despite a decrease in membership numbers, it would be incorrect to attribute this loss of 
membership support solely – let alone primarily – to workers’ apathy or an inability of union 
federations to voice workers’ concerns. Instead, in addition to mentioned above, more likely 
                                                                 
31
 The only exception to this is the most recent decade, which can be attributed to  the creation of the Change to Win 
(CTW) union federation in 2005, which groups a significant amount of unions previously affiliated with AFL-CIO. 
However, when combining the membership totals of both the AFL-CIO and CTW, the total remains within the 12 
million-to-13 million range. In absolute numbers, union federation membership then appears to have been stagnant 
since 1955.  
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explanations for the prematurely announced death of the unions are leadership failures; the 
turnover from a secondary, industry-based economy to a tertiary, service-based economy; 
Republican political pressure and anti-union legislation; and too strong a reliance by the AFL-
CIO on the Democratic party for support, which gradually eroded the impact of unions on the 
national political agenda, starting with the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. (Storch 2013; Warner 2012; 
Tillman 1999)  
Figure 2: The evolution union federation membership compared to total labor force, in thousands. Data for Civilian 
Labor Force and Employed retrieved from U.S. Dept. of Labor OLS 
 
Deficiencies of the national leadership are often pinpointed by some authors as one factor to 
explain both the stagnation of unionism in the U.S., and its more recent, but still frail, revival. 
(Storch 2013; Tillman 1999) In particular, the leadership of the first two presidents, George 
Meany and Lane Kirkland, who governed from 1955 until 1995, is attributed with being 
responsible for much of the stagnation and loss of influence of the AFL-CIO. (Francia 2006; 
Storch 2013)  
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An additional problem that endures today but was much more emphasized during the 
Meany-Kirkland era was the failure of the organization to steer a more independent course in 
politics. During the era of Meany and Kirkland, the leadership was much more in support of 
Republican foreign policy and avoided any suspicion of affinity for socialism. (Storch 2013) As 
a consequence, while on one hand the AFL-CIO was pursuing the interests of workers, including 
those of new groups increasingly entering the workforce, on the other hand, the AFL-CIO didn’t 
present itself as outspokenly travailliste, let alone acquire a socialist or social democratic profile. 
With regard to this awkward attempt to avoid ideology, Yates notes:  
What does the AFL-CIO leadership see as a good society? It is difficult to know. 
A close inspection of America needs a Raise or Common Sense Economics 
reveals little in terms of what the labor movement stands for in principle. There 
are a lot of words devoted to what it is against: low wages, growing inequality in 
income and wealth, unregulated free trade, the destruction of our social safety net, 
the privatization of public services, high interest rates, exorbitant CEO pay, 
excessive overtime, bad labor laws, a flat tax, cuts in the capital gains tax, and 
corporate tax breaks. But the AFL-CIO shies away from saying forthrightly what 
it stands for. (1998, 148-149)  
 
The main problem addressed here is not so much that the AFL-CIO didn’t present itself as left 
enough; the major issue is that it could have presented itself as more independent of politics. 
Mort, Francia, Storch and others do credit the new leadership that started in 1995 with some 
improvements, such as reconnecting with grassroots efforts and the focus on membership.32 
(1998; 2006; 2013) 
                                                                 
32
 Some criticism remains, however, for example, Tillman mentions the Kaiser Permanente partnership. It increased 
the AFL-CIO’s reservoir of members, but it meant that the AFL-CIO agreed not to engage in any activities that 
would damage the company’s public image. (Tillman 1999) For now, the literature is divided on the success of the 
new leadership, leaning somewhat to the positive, yet for the organization to regain its former glory, a lot of work 
lies ahead. (Tillman 1999; Francia 2006) A few of the more positive developments include the addition of LGBTQ-, 
Latin-American-, and Asian-Pacific-American-focused AFL-CIO constituency groups, and a more welcoming 
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Examining the AFL-CIO documents selected for this analysis, from the earliest ones to 
the present, all are shaped by a progressive view on society, paying attention to Civil Rights, 
women’s rights, and immigration. Over time this agenda becomes more progressive, as 
demonstrated by the inclusion of sections on LGBTQ rights.  While the official stance of the 
AFL-CIO on these issues has always been progressive, the organization has been incapable of 
absorbing the member potential among African-American and female workers both during and 
immediately following the Civil Rights movement era, which significantly contributed to the 
stagnation of membership. (Francia 2006; Storch 2013)  
Although the official stance of the AFL-CIO was against racial and other forms of 
discrimination, it remained too tolerant of member unions and leading union officials who 
opposed the promotion of the Civil Rights agenda, which also made it difficult for the AFL-CIO 
to absorb new members from those constituencies, while at the same time it drove away a 
segment of the white male workers by supporting Civil Rights efforts on the national level. 
(Francia 2006; Honey 2007; Storch 2013) The combination of racist and sexist attitudes among 
segments of the white male workers, the suspicious attitude of African-Americans and other 
minorities towards the unions’ commitment to Civil Rights efforts, the inability of the AFL-CIO 
leadership to unite all these groups, and the outsourcing of manufacturing jobs abroad, paved the 
way for a climate of anti-union legislation and right-wing triumph during the Reagan era. This 
eventually also caused the AFL-CIO leadership to become defensive instead of going on the 
offensive, and also made the organization rely more on the Democratic Party. (2013) Because of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
attitude to immigrant workers. (Francia 2006) Constituency groups are suborganizations supported by the AFL-CIO 
representing underepresented groups. Until 2007, the four that already existed were the Alliance for Retired 
Americans, the Coalition of Black Trade Unionists, the A. Philip Randolph Institute, and the Coalition of Labor 
Union Women. 
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this, increased reliance on the Democrats for support of the AFL-CIO agenda, the organization 
sometimes would even act contrary to its members’ interests in order to avoid damaging the 
Democratic Party.33 (Yates 1998) 
The change from an industry-based economy to a service-based economy, combined with 
the inability to attract members from new constituencies, also muffled another change that was 
happening. (Storch 2013) While the general trend of unionization was stagnation, this 
aggregation of all unions combined blurs some significant differences. Many traditional, 
industry-based unions stagnated or lost members while new unions are consistently increasing 
their membership pools. (Southworth and Steppan-Norris 2009) In other words, although an 
overall stagnation appears accurate, it may be the result of a combination of factors that only 
temporarily impedes the growth of U.S. unionization. Although the traditional sociological base 
of the AFL-CIO is industry workers, it is important to highlight that it is not only this type of 
employees that are represented by AFL-CIO, albeit that they still have the highest unionization 
rates among private-sector employees.34  
The last and probably most important reason for membership stagnation is one that 
contradicts the position that a shift from secondary to tertiary economy was the major 
contributing factor in membership erosion, as is often proclaimed by union opposition; in fact, it 
debunks this assumption and identifies another factor as the major contributor. More so than in 
other countries that were confronted with similar shifts in the economic activities, employer 
opposition is identified as leading cause explaining decreasing unionization density. (Walker 
2012) Despite legislation in place to prevent employers from illegal actions, there is little 
                                                                 
33
 Yates mention the example of when the AFL-CIO, in order to avoid embarassing the Clinton administration, 
suppressed an internal report critical about the effects of the NAFTA agreement on U.S. workers. (1998, 150) 
34
 Chapter Five will be dealing with this specifically. 
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disincentive to do so. According to Walker, illegal employer opposition to unionization since the 
1980s has increased not only in frequency but also in intensity, explaining why the U.S. 
unionization density, particularly in the private sector, is substantially lower than in other 
industrialized democracies.35  
 
1.2 Germany: DGB – Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund  
Similar to the AFL-CIO in its importance, with more than 6 million members, the DGB is the 
largest union federation in Germany. The next two major union federations, DBB (DBB 
Beamtenbund und Tarifunion – DBB German public service and tariff union), and CGD 
(Christlicher Gewerkschaftsbund Deutschlands – Christian union federation) total about 1.27 
million and 280,000 members, respectively. The DGB can be traced back to the founding of the 
federal republic in 1949 and was originally intended as a non-party-affiliated union federation 
encompassing all unions, if possible. Despite the intention of not being affiliated with any 
parties – party affiliation was common in the prefascist era – with the support of conservative 
wings of the CDU-CSU (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschland – Christlich-Soziale 
Union in Bayern [German Christian-democratic parties: Christian-democratic union Germany – 
Christian-social union in Bavaria]), the aforementioned CGD was founded. Historically, the 
DGB demographic was closer to the social-democratic SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei 
Deutschland [Social-democratic party Germany]), whereas employers tend to be closer to the 
Christian democrats and conservatives of CDU and CSU.36 
                                                                 
35
 The author compares U.S. practices with other OECD countries and a more in -depth comparison between the U.S. 
and Canada.  
36
 The CDU is the Christian-democratic party of Germany with the exception of Bavaria, where the CSU has that 
position. 
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Technically, the DGB only comprises eight member unions; however, this number is 
misleading, as the eight often originated out of fusions of a higher number of predecessor unions 
due to efficiency concerns.37 The eight large unions that constitute the DGB comprise employees 
from related-yet-separate sectors while the AFL-CIO member unions are much more specific. 
For example: Ver.di (Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft [United Service provider union]) 
comprises people of more than a 1,000 different occupations, while many equivalent occupations 
would be organized in smaller, more specific unions under the AFL-CIO umbrella. 
For most of its history, DGB membership ranges between 6 million and 8 million 
members. An exception to this is the decade right after the reunification. The reunification of 
Germany in 1990 created a population shift, adding 15 million more citizens to the nation’s total. 
The numbers of DGB membership increase spectacularly with 4 million members, or almost 
one-third of the former GDR population. The reason for this is that the only union federation of 
the GDR, the FDGB (Freer Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund [Free German union federation]) was 
subsumed into the DGB. Although FDGB membership was technically voluntary, just as with 
most communist regimes, it was a de facto requirement if one wanted to build a career. The 
added total of 4 million thus was in itself not exactly representative of the number of people who 
would join a union in a pluralist society. As a consequence, a gradual drop in unionization within 
the same decade, going back to pre-1990 levels can be observed.  
 
                                                                 
37
 CGB for example has 16 member unions despite only having about 280,000 members. 









The totals for DBB and CGB are significantly lower. In 1990, DBB manages to pick up 200,000 
more members and gradually increases its numbers above the 1.2 million mark. What explains 
the increased numbers of DBB is that this union federation comprises civil service employees 
and private-sector service workers, while the DGB to an extent is still dealing with the 
conversion from its traditional membership base, the industrial workers, toward a mixed base of 
industrial and service workers. However, DGB is currently still dominated by members 
stemming from the traditional union base of industrial workers. The DBB trend is reminiscent of 
a similar, rising trend among the U.S. service workers’ unions’ membership. When counting the 
DBB and DGB totals together, the total number of unionized employees appears even more 
stable, although union density did decrease as the German population rose.  
                                                                 
38
 The number for CGB is the 280,000 members mentioned in CGB materials. Unfortunately requests for 
membership totals over time remained unanswered. However, based on the literature, this number appears to be 
representative of CGB’s relative weight for the period of 1960-present. 
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When taking into account the growth of the population with 15 million and the effects of 
those among this new group leaving the union in the next decade, the general trend is similar to 
what was observed for the AFL-CIO: While membership totals stagnate within the 6 million-to-8 
million range, the total active population rises. In other words, here, too, union density has 
declined over time. However, despite being faced with similar issues like the shift of the 
economy from secondary to tertiary, and an increase in part-time and alternative employment 
arrangements, the German union density remains significantly higher than that of the U.S.  
While U.S. union density rates plummeted to less than 20 percent after 1980, and less 
than 12 percent by 2006, German union density rates gradually decreased to 18 percent by 2011. 
(OECD) There are three factors that explain why the German union density remains relatively 
high compared with that of the U.S. First, while the U.S. population displayed steady growth, 
from immigration and births, to more than 312 million, the German population growth stagnated 
at about 80 million despite increased efforts to attract more immigrant workers in the past two 
decades. (U.S. Census Bureau; Statistisches Bundesamt) Estimates of the Federal German Office 
for Statistics project a drop of the population to 65 million by 2060. (2009) Part of the 
explanation is that the population decreases while the union membership number is maintained. 
Second, due to the way bargaining is institutionalized at the vocational level between unions, 
employer organizations and the government, unions can exert much more influence during 
collective bargaining negotiations, and illegal and legal means for employer opposition to 
unionization are significantly more reduced compared with the pluralist collective bargaining 
arena in the U.S. Lastly, the proportion of the traditional sociological basis of unions, industria l 
labor, is comparatively higher in Germany than in the U.S.; respectively one-in-five compared 
with one-in-six employees. 




Figure 4: DGB membership compared to total active population. Sources: DGB and D-Statis/Statistisches 
Bundesamt. Data for active population before 1970 was not available. 
 
The trend of decreased union membership in Germany appears to have made a turn towards very 
modest growth recently. Part of the explanation is the increase in membership for the more 
service-oriented DBB and the maintenance of DGB membership levels while population and 
active population numbers start to decline. In any event, the DGB remains by far the largest 
organization voicing the demands of organized labor in Germany.  
 
1.3 Japan: RENGO - Nihon Rōdōkumiai Sōrengōkai 
Three important changes to the labor union movement that occurred in the early 1990s changed 
the dynamics of Japanese labor-politics interactions, or at least planted the seeds for future 
change. First, there was the creation of RENGO as an intended unifying force among labor 
unions and the demise of its three larger predecessors: the left-leaning and then-largest federation 
Sōhyō (nihon rōdōkumiai souhyogika [General Council of Trade Unions of Japan]) loosely 
affiliated with the JSP (Japanese Socialist Party) comprising mostly public employees and the 
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smaller Churitsu Roren federation (the Federation of Independent Labour Unions), and Dōmei 
(zen nihon rodo sodomei [Japan Confederation of Labour]), which comprised mostly private 
employees and had a more centrist political profile. (Hyde 2009) Second, there were the effects 
of the bursting of the bubble and the stagnation of Japanese economy after four decades of 
continuous expansion. Third, there were changes within the Japanese electoral and party system.  
RENGO (Rengō – abbreviation for Nihon Rōdōkumiai Sōrengōkai, or Japanese Trade 
Union Confederation) is the by far largest labor union confederation in Japan. Until its 
foundation in 1989, Japan’s labor union landscape was dominated by four confederations. Sōhyō 
and Domei were the two largest confederations, comprising public-sector employees on one hand, 
and private-sector employees on the other. (Hyde 2009) Upon the dissolution of Domei and 
smaller confederations, RENGO was founded in 1989, incorporating both. Sōhyō was 
incorporated one year later.39 
The novelty of RENGO was not only that it unified public-sector and private-sector 
unions, but also that it positioned itself to be much more independent from political parties, 
unlike some of its predecessor confederations. Of the 9.831 million unionized Japanese 
employees, RENGO represents 6.658 million, while the other two large federations together 
represent 727,000 employees. Another 2.582 million employees are represented by unions not 
affiliated with any of the three large federations. (JMIAC) ZENROREN (Zenkoku Rōdōkumiai 
sōrengō [National Confederation of Trade Unions]) is a smaller union federation also founded in 
1989 as a counter-movement to what was interpreted by some as a too-conservative position by 
RENGO. Although technically independent, ZENROREN is closely tied with the JCP (Japanese 
                                                                 
39
 The only serious crisis RENGO was confronted so far was the risk of splits in the wake of the implosion of the 
JSP. (Reed 2003) 
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Communist Party). ZENROKYO (Zenkoku Rōdōkumiai Renraku Kyōgi-kai [National Trade 
Union Council]) is the third large union confederation, although technically the element of 
confederation is much weaker compared with the other two.  While unionization also has been in 
decline in Japan, it has been more in line with the general trend in OECD countries and not as 
dramatic as in the U.S. A shift from secondary to tertiary economy explains part of the decline, 
and efforts to include the increasing cohorts of part-time and female-identified employees in the 
workforce have come fairly late. Looking at the numbers in Figure 5, it can be observed that the 
unionization numbers for RENGO and the other two larger federations have been fairly stable 
during the past few years, but union density in general has stabilized at about 18 percent. (OECD 
2014)   
  
Figure 5: Members belonging to industrial unions in all three federations in thousands. Source: JMIAC (Japan 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications – Statistics Bureau) 
 
An important way in which RENGO differs from both the AFL-CIO and DGB is the 
number and organizational structure of member unions. While the AFL-CIO and DGB group 59 
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and 8 large sector-based unions, respectively, the RENGO structure can be compared as the 
Matryoshka doll equivalent of a union federation. For example, RENGO groups a large number 
of subordinate union federations, among which is JAW (The confederation of Japanese 
Automobile Workers’ Unions). Under JAW, there are various enterprises (Toyota, Honda, 
Nissan, etc.). Within those enterprises, there are three groups: parts manufacturing, car 
manufacturing, and sales unions. UA ZENSEN (The Japanese Federation of Textile, Chemical 
Food, Commercial Service and General Worker’s Unions) is another example and comprises, 
according to their website, 2,450 member unions, of which the bulk of 1,355 unions have less 
than a hundred members while 98 have more than 3,000 members each. RENGO is thus a 
federation of trade union federations, of which many of the latter may again comprise several 
federations. 
While JAW and UA ZENSEN are a good illustration of how Japanese enterprise-based 
unions are organized, they also illustrate the distance between the RENGO leadership at the top 
and small, individual unions on the bottom, which in part explains why RENGO can be deemed 
less powerful at the national level than DGB.   
Table 5: Upper rows display the number of workers in industrial unions, lower rows in italics display the total of 
industrial and service-sector unions. 
  2000 (12) 2001 (13) 2002 (14) 2003 (15) 2004 (16) 2005 (17) 2006 (18) 
RENGO 7,173,000 7,001,000 6,829,000 6,694,000 6,595,000 6,543,000 6,522,000 
  7,314,000 7,120,000 6,945,000 6,807,000 6,726,000 6,672,000 6,649,000 
ZENROREN 802,000 780,000 787,000 764,000 745,000 723,000 701,000 
  1,036,000 1,012,000 1,018,000 993,000 978,000 954,000 932,000 

















  2007 (19) 2008 (20) 2009 (21) 2010 (22) 2011 (23) 2012 (24) 2013 (25) 
RENGO 6,622,000 6,623,000 6,687,000 6,732,000 6,699,000 6,693,000 6,706,000 
  6,750,000 6,761,000 6,832,000 6,876,000 6,839,000 6,839,000 6,844,000 
ZENROREN 684,000 663,000 647,000 635,000 620,000 607,000 592,000 
  911,000 894,000 883,000 869,000 860,000 837,000 827,000 
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ZENROKYO 132,000 128,000 124,000 118,000 113,000 110,000 109,000 
  150,000 144,000 140,000 133,000 128,000 125,000 124,000 
Source: JMIAC (Japan Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications – Statistics Bureau) 
 
While bargaining in the U.S. case is based on a pluralist logic, in which the state at least formally 
doesn’t get involved, and while bargaining in Germany happens under an institutionalized 
framework under the auspices of the state, the bargaining dynamics for Japanese union 
federations are of an entirely different order. On one hand, unions are very active and often 
successful at the local, or company level. On the other hand, a clientelist political tradition 
prevented national umbrella organizations like union federations to gain much influence in 
national politics, with the possible exception of the annual Shuntō initiatives described below.40 
(Curtis 1999; Benson 2008; Kabashima 2010) While bargaining in Germany also could be 
argued to be more centered on enterprises, or at least vocational sectors, an important difference 
with the type of union that became prevalent in Japan is that they did not seek a wider role in 
society. (Benson 2008) The state is much less present in bargaining than in the German case, but 
bargaining itself resembles the German case much better than the U.S. case. On one hand, this 
feature empowered unions at the local level and with regard to labor market-related demands. On 
the other hand, it weakened the influence of unions at the national level, in particular with regard 
to broader social policy issues.  
The annual national Shuntō spring initiative, which had become a tradition since the 
1940s, entered decline since the stagnation in the economy in the 1990s. Shuntō was the only 
major and regular form of union-bargaining action at the national level. In essence, Shuntō 
initiatives were wage-increase demands that would be voiced every spring by a coalition of 
                                                                 
40
 Tsujinaka and Pekkanen suggest that labor organizations in Japan are much weaker than in  Germany or South 
Korea. (2007) 
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nationally coordinated union federations. (Benson 2008) If demands were not met, short but 
repeated follow-up actions were the next step. While Shuntō action mostly was taken by larger 
unions and federations, they set standards that were then adopted by smaller unions. The Shuntō 
system worked well until the burst of the bubble in the 1990s. As of that point, increased work 
hours and increased productivity were coupled with increased pay, and these bargaining 
arrangements would become more dependent on individual company-union negotiations than 
Shuntō. In other words, the demise of Shuntō weakened collective bargaining at the national 
level even more, making a unified organization like RENGO even more necessary as a 
nationwide voice. 
Table 6: Summary Labor Federations  
 USA Germany Japan 
Political tradition 
underlying government – 
social movement 
interaction dynamics 




from company and politics  
Sectorial, integrated in 
negotiation frameworks 
between: the state, 
employers, and unions 
Enterprise-based 
unionization 
Action area Market related issues and 
broader social issues 
Market related issues and 
broader social issues 
Union enterprises mostly 
focused on market-related 
issues 
Party affiliation Left-leaning but no formal 
affiliation 
Eroding and loose, yet still 
existent affiliation 
primarily with SPD 
Mostly left-leaning but 
indirect connection. 
Unions work just like 
other organizations as 
brokers to mobilize votes  
Influence Union 
federations compared to 
each other  
Weak at local and national 
levels 
Strong at local and 
national level 
Strong at company level, 
but weaker at national 
level 
Member unions Very specific Sectorial 
circumscription: Approx. 
59 member unions 
Larger, loosely Sectorial 
circumscription unions: 8 
large member unions 
Company specific, 
Matryoshka build-up of a 
very large number of local 
and company specific 
unions  
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2. Minority Organizations 
2.1 USA: LULAC – League of United Latin American Citizens 
Currently, the two most prominent and influential national Latino advocacy groups are the 
League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) and the National Council of La Raza 
(NCLR).41 (Martinez 2009) Other organizations advocating on behalf of the Latino population 
tend to be much more specific in scope, such as being focused on students, business leaders, etc. 
or are local or regional. For this project, I decided to focus on LULAC instead of NCLR for a 
variety of reasons. While both interest groups are highly committed to the advocacy of the U.S. 
Latino population, contrary to NCLR, LULAC is an organization with close grassroots ties and a 
large membership. (Martinez 2009) Because each interest group I am interested in needs to be 
both an interest group in the traditional sense, – as discussed in Chapter One, as well as being an 
organization that fits the Mair definition of a political cleavage group, the NCLR is less suited 
for this analysis. (1990; 2006)  
                                                                 
41
 For the purpose of this study I will use the term “Latino,” although the literature tends to use the terms 
“Hispanic,” and “Latino” interchangeably. Aside from a lack of theoretical agreement, the fact that the U.S. Census 
Bureau and research institutes like Pew also use both terms interchangeably prompted me not to go into a deeper 
discussion on terminology. For more on this topic, please see (among others): Oquendo 1995; Martinez 2009. With 
regard to Mexican-Americans, the terms Chicano/a, or Xicano/a also are used. Given the dominance of Mexican-
Americans in LULAC but also in NCLR and other Latino organizations, the term is sometimes conflated with 
Latino or Hispanic.  
In some cases, organizations may only cater to a specific demographic within the Latino community, be it with 
regard to the national origin, gender, or occupation of that substratum, or some organizations will operate in very 
specific domains such as MALDEF (Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund) in the legal sphere. 
Therefore, I only considered nationwide Latino mass organizations with comprehensive agendas affecting the entire 
Latino community.   
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Founded in 1929, LULAC is also significantly older than the NCLR. LULAC presents 
itself as “The largest Latino civil rights and advocacy groups in the United States.” (LULAC 
main site 2014) In the mission statement, however, it uses the term “Hispanic” instead. (LULAC 
“about us/Mission” 2014) NCLR, on the other hand, defines itself as “The largest Hispanic civil 
rights and advocacy organization in the United States.” (NCLR “about us/Mission” 2014) The 
term “La Raza” in the NCLR name literally means “The race.” The use of this term refers 
implicitly to the origin of NCLR’s modeling itself in part after the NAACP; in other words, 
NCLR self-defined the Hispanic population more in terms of race, whereas LULAC has always 
shied away from such categorization, in part because they felt it would undercut the efforts of the 
NAACP.42 (Kaplowitz 2005; NCLR “about us/history” 2014) LULAC’s original stance on the 
discrimination of Latino Americans was originally framed as a lack of means to achieve 
successful integration into a majoritarian-dominated society. In other words, LULAC did not 
perceive their community as in need of the same types of policies intended to remedy the 
discrimination of African-Americans. (Kaplowitz 2005) It is not until the rise of the Chicano-
movement – (cf. note 40), that LULAC gradually changes their position on this. LULAC as an 
organization then captures the ways in which the Mexican community, and by extension the 
population with a Latino background, dealt with identity struggles and discrimination issues that 
have plagued them.43 (1993; 2009) 
                                                                 
42
 MALDEF (Mexican American Legal Defense Fund) was created as a pendant to the NAACP’s legal operations 
with support from LULAC. (Martinez 2009; Waters Yarsinske 2004) 
43
 Two authors in particular appear much divided with regard to where LULAC stands. Marquez sees LULAC for 
the most part of its history as a primarily assimilationist organization with modest influence on the Civil Rights 
movement and a fairly naïve attitude toward anti-Latino racism; Orozco, however, credits LULAC with a significant 
Civil Rights movement involvement predating the larger Civil Movements struggle of the 1960s. Kaplowitz and 
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The qualifier “largest,” as in largest organization, is confusing, but the literature points to 
LULAC as being larger, at least in terms of individual members and volunteers. (Martinez 2009, 
Kaplowitz 2005)  Perhaps most importantly, during the course of its history, LULAC as an 
organization has changed its stance on very important issues for the Latino community such as 
immigration, and has taken a more independent political course from both major U.S. parties, 
unlike NCLR, which is credited with much more leftist attitudes and closer ties to Democratic 
politicians. (Marquez 2003; Kaplowitz 2009; Martinez 2009) My point here is that while an 
organization that is more independent from political parties, such as LULAC, may still have a 
programmatic content similar to that of parties, an organization already closely leaning toward 
one of two parties is much more likely to have similar content. In other words, selecting a case 
that is leaning toward one party is likely to be more similar in content, whereas in the other case, 
I need to see the results before I can even expect our hypothesis to be correct. In terms of party 
closeness – allegiance would be too a strong term here, LULAC was always much more 
ambivalent, in part because its middle-class cadres that tended to prefer economically 
conservative policies, but also because at times, LULAC leadership appeared to differ with 
regard to political preferences with the rank-and-file members. (Marquez 1993; Kaplowitz 2005; 
Martinez 2009) This ambivalence suggests that LULAC aggregates the various interests within 
the Latino community better into one common Latino position.44    
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Martinez can both be situated closer to Orozco, whereas Marquez became less negative in his judgment of LULAC 
in later writings. Much of Marquez’s conclusions can be attributed to putting too much emphasis on the incentive 
theory framework he applies; at times it appears as if he is trying too hard to make the LULAC case fit.   
44
 In addition, NCLR has always been reliant upon outside sponsorship instead of membership contributions . In an 
analysis of the effects of financial sponsorship on Mexican-American/Hispanic organizations, Marquez doesn’t even 
mention LULAC as a case. Although just like other organizations, LULAC evolved to rely more on outside 
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Although the organization’s name and the organizational mission aim at representing the 
wider Latino community, the bulk of the membership since its founding has been Mexican-
Americans, which is not surprising because most Latino Americans do have Mexican 
backgrounds. (U.S. Census Bureau 2013; PewHispanic 2013) Despite this early foundation, 
LULAC only really started as an organization with a national agenda as of the 1960s. (Kaplowitz 
2005) Before that, it was mostly active in the Southwestern areas of the U.S., particularly in 
Texas, New Mexico, California, and Arizona, as well as Florida.45 These regional strongholds 
are still the major hubs of support of the organization, although LULAC local councils have 
spread all over across the U.S. and its territories. (LULAC 2014) Kaplowitz frames LULAC’s 
increased national activity as of the 1960s as the organization’s involvement as a driving force 
behind the wider Civil Rights movement, a claim that is disputed by another LULAC expert, 
Benjamin Marquez.46 (Kaplowitz 2005; Marquez 2006) According to Marquez, LULAC was 
experiencing a significant decline in power and doubts Kaplowitz’s emphasis of LULAC’s 
importance to the Civil Rights movement. (1993; 2006) Regardless of whether or not LULAC 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
sponsorship, at least initially, membership fees were the most important financial resource. In fact, the exclusion of 
LULAC as a case by Marquez appears odd, to say the least. Marquez concludes that major Mexican-American 
political organizations rely mostly on financial sponsors instead of grassroots. Technically , LULAC is not a Chicano 
organization, yet neither is NCLR, which he does include as a case. Including LULAC into this  analysis indeed 
would have been a much better test of his hypothesis instead of focusing on organizations like NCLR that 
historically never had any grassroots connections comparable to LULAC. 
45
 In 1948, all 49 LULAC Councils were Texan; by 1952, there were only six in 5 other states. (Marquez 1993) Of 
the current 900-plus councils, most are still located in the Southwest and Florida, although the organization does 
have at least some councils in nearly every state and territory.  
46
 Also cf. Orozco 2009 
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was in decline during the 1960s and the 1970s, what appears to be evident is that LULAC was in 
a state of transition in terms of both membership and politics.  
The membership data for LULAC are somewhat obscured, to put it lightly. In 2013, 
LULAC stated that it had 115,000 community volunteers; one year later, this number was 
changed to 135,000.47 (Waters Yarsinske 2004; LULAC 2013; 2014) In numbers, LULAC 
underlines its market leadership with regard to the representation of the Latino population as 
follows: “provides counseling to more than 18,000 students per year,” “Annually, LULAC 
engages its network of 135,000 community volunteers, 900 councils, 56 community technology 
centers and 14 LULAC National Educational Service Centers …” (LULAC “about” 2014) Two 
observations can be made here: LULAC refers to community volunteers instead of members, and 
nowhere does it actually mention anything about the paying membership total. On the FAQ site 
the following question and answer are provided: 
4. What does it mean to be a membership based organization? 
LULAC is the largest and most active membership organization serving the 
Latino community. LULAC volunteer members are the driving force behind 
significant advancements and improvements to the quality of life for Hispanics 
across the country. Since LULAC's founding, our members have not wavered in 
their determination to end discrimination and injustice for Hispanics living in the 
United States. (LULAC “about/faq” 2014) 
 
This implies that the organization’s conception of membership mostly means nonpaying 
volunteer members instead the typical paying member. Although the LULAC national 
leadership in Washington provided me with significant help in the form of primary data, 
and a brief interview with their National Executive Director, repeated requests with 
                                                                 
47
 Waters Yarsinske mentioned 115,000 as the number of volunteers. (2004) Martinez cites “Yarsinske” when 
pointing to a paying membership of 10,000 in 2005. (2009, 57) Unfortunately, the citation is missing from the 
bibliography, and the Waters Yarsinske LULAC 75
th
 anniversary book doesn’t mention this figure. 
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regard to paid membership, however, were ignored. I was not surprised that other authors 
had run into the same problem in the past. (cf. Marquez 1993; Martinez 2009)  
A LULAC fiscal report for the year 2003-2004 lists $125,932 as the revenue from regular 
membership dues that year, as well as $3,500 from lifetime membership dues.48 (LULAC 
2004) Currently, regular membership costs about $50 annually and lifetime membership 
costs $1,000. (LULAC “membership” 2014) Regular LULAC membership dues for a 
LULAC charter group are $15 annually, with a one-time fee of $6 for new members.49 
(LULAC “members/start council” 2014) The membership dues figure is probably the 
accumulation of fees from charter groups – a LULAC Council – and national 
membership fees. The most conservative estimate I could make from this, the above 
number divided by the highest regular membership dues amount ($50) adds up to about 
2,500 members. The most liberal estimate, dividing by charter dues, adds up to about 
8,400 members. This means that the number of dues-paying members is probably 
somewhere in between. In other words, if I define membership strictly by including only 
paying members, the numbers estimated by Marquez’s in 1993 appear in line with that. 
Marquez’ study of LULAC paid much attention to the inability of the organization to 
maintain the membership numbers from earlier decades. (1993) However, aside from a 
likely renewed interest in membership, it appears that the logic of LULAC membership 
shifted in the past few decades. LULAC formal membership as computed by Marquez is 
simply no longer a relevant measure.   
                                                                 
48
 After extensive research, the 2004 and 2005 LULAC financial reports were the only two I could obtain.  In his 
study on LULAC, Marquez used a variety of sources to estimate the membership numbers for LULA C. (1993) 
49
 These are just the amounts that are for the national organization, meaning that charter membership can be higher, 
depending on the Council in question. 
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In 1948, LULAC had a mere 49 LULAC Councils, all located in Texas, while 60 
years later, it has more than 900 spread across the U.S. A change in funding resources 
also may have prompted a change in how membership is interpreted by the organization. 
In 1974, LULAC received nonprofit status, making it possible to receive corporate 
sponsorship. (Kaplowitz 2005) In that sense, the mid-1970s marked the time when 
LULAC changed from an exclusively member-funded organization to one more 
comparable to the other large Hispanic organizations. As mentioned earlier, LULAC in 
its own words defines membership in a much more holistic way by focusing on volunteer 
numbers and the councils and the local communities they operate in.50 In conclusion, 
although it is difficult to pinpoint the exact number of LULAC members, in terms of 
popular support, the organization has always been large enough to be considered as a 
mass-based organization capable of weighing in on policy-making at the local and 
national levels. 
 
2.2 Germany: TGD - Türkische Gemeinde in Deutschland 
While there is a myriad of Turkish and immigrant organizations in Germany, TGD (Türkische 
Gemeinde in Deutschland [Turkish Community in Germany]) founded in 1995 is the largest and 
most influential organization among the population in Germany with an immigration background. 
The best possible alternatives to TGD that were considered for this project are the 1993-founded 
                                                                 
50
 According to Martinez, NCLR membership consists of affiliate organizations and individual members. (2009) To 
compare, NCLR doesn’t list any membership data on its website but instead lists affiliated “300 community based 
organizations.” The Latino Intersections page of Dartmouth University/Dartmouth College Library provides a list of 
Latino Organizations and Associations; listing LULAC as largest, and NCLR as having a membership of 7,000 
members for the year 2002.  
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RTS (Rat der Türkeistämmigen Bürger [Council of Turkish-rooted citizens]) and the 1985-
founded BAGIV (Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft der Immigrantenverbände [Federal working 
community of immigrant organizations]). (BAGIV 2011) BAGIV comprises eight nationality-
based immigrant groups. However, it does not include ethnic Turks, although Kurds with 
Turkish citizenship are included through KOMKAR (Konfederasyona Komeleyên Kurdistanê li 
Ewrûpa – Verband der Vereine aus Kurdistan [Union of Kurdish organizations]), and thereby is 
representative neither of the historically largest immigrant population group nor of the Turkish 
population that constitutes more than 60 percent of the population with an immigrant background 
in Germany.51  
Both TGD and RTS were founded relatively late, and both aim at serving the interests of 
the population in Germany with a Turkish background, while the TGD is somewhat more 
encompassing by also fostering good relations between Turkey and Germany. Considering the 
fact that the Turkish population had been the largest immigration-background community in 
Germany for decades, the late formation of a national advocacy organization may seem 
surprising. Kücükhüseyin explains this time lag by pointing to internal political differences in the 
Turkish community –ideological issues related to politics in Germany, as well as political 
rivalries in Turkish politics.52 (2002) Also, TGD proved not only to be the larger but also the 
politically more influential organization, while RTS limits itself to interacting with political 
leaders to achieve their goals, and is somewhat more elitist than TGD, which also puts a lot of 
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 An additional analysis of BAGIV, however, may be part of a future research agenda. BAGIV member federations 
represent part of the following immigrant communities: Spanish, Kurdish, Greek, Armenian, Serbian, Assyrian, 
Portuguese, and Vietnamese.   
52
 There are indeed many smaller Turkish organizations with explicit ideological profiles encompassing the entire 
political spectrum from extreme left to extreme right.   
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energy into increasing its grassroots and public relations, enabling TGD to influence not only 
politicians directly but also public opinion at large.53 (Kücükhüseyin 2002) In terms of issues 
that are reflected by TGD, but also by RTS and regional and local organizations, the equality of 
the Islamic faith, eradication of discrimination on the labor market, integration, and advocacy for 
more open immigration policies, women’s rights, and friendship with Turkey are among some of 
the key issues. While TGD is somewhat closer to Turkey with regard to fostering a good 
relationship with Germany, it is independent from Turkish politics, unlike some other Turkish 
organizations in Germany such as DITIB (Diyanet Işleri Türk Islam Birliği [Turkish Islamic 
Union of the Presidency of Religious Affairs]).54 While some of the issues articulated by TGD 
are obviously more related to Turkey and the population with a Turkish background, there are a 
number of central issues that are also relevant for other, smaller communities of the subject 
population in Germany, such as the equality of non-Christian religions, immigration, 
naturalization and citizenship, integration assistance, and anti-discrimination efforts. 
Aside from internal division, I should also consider that Germany did not see itself as an 
immigration country and assumed immigrant contingents to be temporary, as did many of the 
first-wave immigrants from Turkey. On one hand, like many national federated organizations, 
TGD is to an extent limited to voicing the overall consensus among its highly diverse member 
organizations. On the other hand, the subdivision organizations of TGD are devoid of extremist 
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 A few additional indices pointing to the relative weakness of RTS as a national interest group are that there is a 
dearth of material, there is no web page, and the fact that its national headquarters is located in the Hessian Gießen 
instead of Berlin.  
54
 While there are smaller Turkish political organizations with explicit links to major German political parties, TGD 
presents itself as politically independent, in part in order to achieve higher levels of legitimacy from the  many 
geographical, vocational, and community organizations it groups.  
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groups or organizations with direct links to party politics. TGD presents itself as politically 
independent interest group on behalf of the population with a Turkish background in Germany.55  
Until the 1970s, the majority of foreigners in Germany consisted mostly of Italians, 
Greeks, Spaniards, and Austrians. As of the 1970s, Turkish citizens became the largest group of 
foreign residents in Germany, currently with about 1.54 million who are not citizens and about 
three-quarters of a million naturalized Turks since 1998. (BPB 2014; BAMF; DESTASIS 2014)  
Table 7: Total population including foreigners compared to foreign, EU (and prior to that European Community), 










1967 59948 1806 596 172 1991 80275 6067 1698 1779 
1968 60463 1924 641 205 1992 80975 6670 1719 1854 
1969 61195 2381 709 322 1993 81338 6977 1750 1918 
1970 61001 2738 784 469 1994 81539 7118 1779 1965 
1971 61503 3188 1215 652 1995 81817 7343 1811 2014 
1972 61809 3554 1187 712 1996 82012 7492 1839 2049 
1973 62101 3991 1278 910 1997 82057 7419 1850 2107 
1974 61991 4051 1288 1028 1998 82037 7308 1854 2110 
1975 61645 3900 1250 1077 1999 82163 7336 2299 2053 
1976 61442 3852 1180 1079 2000 82260 7268 2329 1998 
1977 61353 3892 1163 1118 2001 82440 7318 2343 1947 
1978 61322 4006 1145 1165 2002 82537 7348 2299 1912 
1979 61439 4251 1169 1268 2003 82532 7342 2346 1877 
1980 61658 4566 1211 1462 2004 82501 7288 2108 1764 
1981 61713 4721 1234 1546 2005 82439 7289 2144 1764 
1982 61546 4672 1216 1580 2006 82315 7256 2523 1738 
1983 61307 4574 1167 1552 2007 82218 7255 2562 1713 
1984 61049 4405 1142 1425 2008 82002 7186 2584 1688 
1985 61020 4482 1549* 1402 2009 81802 7131 2589 1658 
                                                                 
55
 Originally DITIB (Diyanet Işleri Türk Islam Birliği [Turkish Islamic Union of the Presidency of Religious 
Affairs]) was considered for this project. However, for a number of reasons , I opted not to include it. First, despite 
being the oldest national organization, founded in 1984, it only focusses on issues specifically related to religious 
and cultural affairs. While the name refers to Turks, its aim is rather the representation of Islam in Germany while 
other areas of immigrant interests are of secondary importance. Second, DITIB is far from being politically 
independent; the organization’s imams, their superiors, and religion-attachés are all Turkish civil servants, while 
DITIB, itself, is an affiliate of the Turkish Dinayet [Presidency of Religious Affairs], an official organ of the Turkish 
Republic. (Yaşar 2012)      
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1986 61140 4662 1560 1434 2010 81752 7199 2663 1629 
1987 61238 4286 1408 1453 2011 80328 7339 2822 1607 
1988 61715 4624 1449 1523 2012 80524 6640 3050 1575 
1989 62679 5007 1516 1612 2013 80767 7012 3366 1549 
1990 79753** 5582 1644 1694      
*First year including the 15 EU member state nationals. 




Since a major revision of the German citizenship and nationality law (StAG) in 2000, more than 
half a million Turkish citizens have become naturalized German citizens. (BAMF 2012) While 
some Turks opted to migrate back to Turkey in the past two decades, the decreased number of 
Turkish citizens from its highest point in 1998 is in large part also explained by an increased 
number of naturalizations. According to the German Ministry of the Exterior, there are currently 
about 3 million Türkischstämmige [literally: Turkish-rooted], or citizens and noncitizens with 
Turkish backgrounds. (2014) Almost half of the current foreign population is from within the EU 
realm, which means that the Turkish population remains by far the largest immigrant group, 
representing almost half of non-EU immigration.  
Table 8: Naturalizations of Turkish citizens since the revision of German citizenship and nationality legislation 
2000. 
1998 56,994 2006 33,388 
1999 100,324 2007 28,861 
2000 82,861 2008 24,449 
2001 76,573 2009 24,647 
2002 64,631 2010 26,192 
2003 56,244 2011 28,103 
2004 44,465 2012 33,246 
2005 32,661   
Source: BAMF (Bundesamt fur Migration und Flüchtlinge) and DESTATIS Statistisches Bundesamt and German 
Ministry of the Interior. 
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 More specific data prior to 1990 is not available. Aussiedler/Spätaussiedler, ethnic Germans with citizenship 
rights in Germany primarily from the former Soviet Union, Romania and Poland, are not included because they were 
automatically counted within the category of German citizens. About 2.5 million Aussiedler/Spätaussiedler arrived 
in Germany between 1990 and 2010, although since 2005, the annual immigration rate dropped below 10,000. (BPB 
2011) Data for 1970-1989 had to be calculated from annual immigration data. 
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Because an overwhelming majority of the Türkischstämmige population of 3 million has an 
Islamic religious background, the Turks also represent a majority of more than 60 percent of the 
approximately 3.8 million to 4.3 million Muslims in Germany. (BAMF 2009) As a consequence, 
Islamic is often conflated with Turkish in anti-immigration political rhetoric. Because Turks in 
Germany not only constitute the overwhelming majority among the population with immigrant 
backgrounds, but also the majority of Germany’s population with ties to Islam, they constitute an 
excellent case to analyze the relationship between the majority population and what is often 
perceived by the latter as the “dangerous other” population in the sense of Zolberg and Woon 
when compared to the Hispanic population in the U.S. (1999)  
The structure of TGD is dual and on one hand mirrors the regional distribution of the 
population with a Turkish background. Of the 11 federal state TGD federations, 10 are located in 
what used to be West Germany, with two separate TGD federations in the state of North-Rhine 
Westphalia. (TGD 2014) The only TGD federation in the former GDR area contains the state of 
Berlin and Brandenburg; the national headquarters is also located in Berlin. On the other hand, 
TGD also forms the umbrella organization of several federations and vocational groups without 
geographic circumscription, such as Turkish-German academics, students, physicians, and 
entrepreneurs. 
 
2.3 Japan: BLL – Buraku Kaihō Dōmei [Buraku Liberation League]  
The Burakumin, or village people, are a group that is linguistically, ethnically, racially and 
culturally indistinguishable from the majority population in Japan.57 The difference between the 
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 While Burakumin is acceptable as English equivalent for addressing the minority, in Japanese it is less accepted as 
it is often still used in a pejorative form; instead Hisabetsu Burakumin [discriminated village people] is more 
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majority population and the Burakumin is that they are historically considered to be a lower 
caste, comparable to low castes in India, hence the term “hidden race” that is sometimes used to 
describe them. (De Vos and Wagatsuma 1966) The origins of the group as a distinct social caste 
reach back to the Tokugawa or Edo period of 1603-1868, when Buddhist beliefs together with 
local Japanese religious traditions promoted including the idea of unclean occupations, such as 
leather workers, butchers, executioners, undertakers, and urban sanitation workers. (Alldritt 
2000) In fact, the fear of pollution in Japanese culture reaches back to the founding myths of 
Japan thousands of years ago, long before the introduction of foreign religious or philosophical 
systems such as Buddhism, Confucianism or even Christianity. Buruma goes even so far to 
highlight the significance of purity and fear of pollution by stating that it could be understood as 
the Japanese equivalent to original sin in Western culture. (1984) People belonging in or related 
to the Buraku group were categorized as eta, or dirty/filthy mass. The rigidly hierarchical, semi-
feudal structure of Tokugawa Japan furthered the gradual growth of an entirely new caste that in 
most cases was also constrained to living within their own communities and villages, from which 
the term Burakumin was derived. While in European and Islamic countries similar policies were 
enacted, stigmatizing parts of the population, the difference was that Burakumin, aside from their 
occupations, originally did not have any religious, ethnic or other distinguishing features.58  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
appropriate within a Japanese context. The Tokugawa era term eta [a term referring to defilement or filth] is now 
considered particularly derogatory. (Kitaguchi 1999) 
58
 During the Tokugawa era, differences were aggravated by dress prescriptions, curfews, and even agricultural 
restrictions.  
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With the removal, or rather modernization, of the feudal Tokugawa societal hierarchy the 
Buraku minority also was formally emancipated.59 A consequence of the Meiji emancipation was 
that Burakumin received last names that were indistinguishable from the majority population. 
Despite the apparent difficulty in discriminating against a group that was now virtually 
indistinguishable, discrimination of the Buraku minority continues to this day. Until recently, the 
Japanese government even denied the existence of discriminated minorities in Japan before the 
U.N., contradicting government policies started in the late 1960s to address discrimination 
against the Burakumin. (Kitaguchi 1999) A few of the visible elements that remained and were 
used to discriminate were, among others: maps indicating the historic Buraku districts and 
villages, high poverty rates among Burakumin, and historically separate registries listing 
Burakumin households as of the early 18th century. (Alldritt 2000)  
During the Meiji era (1868-1912), the first movements originated locally with the goal to 
elevate the living standards of the Buraku population. As of 1922, a national organization under 
the name Buraku Liberation League (Buraku Kaihō Dōmei) emerged, yet was disbanded during 
wartime. After World War II, equality of all citizens is once more confirmed in the new 
constitution, yet discriminatory practices remain. To an extent, Buraku people could still be 
found out based on the towns they came from, municipal registries, or background checks 
conducted by employers. Similar to families with Zainichi/resident-Korean or non-Japanese 
backgrounds or connections, Buraku generally would attempt to hide their origins to the outside 
world in order to prevent open or covert discrimination in social life or on the work floor. As of 
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 The caste system was not entirely abolished, but rather was adapted to the needs and goals of the Meiji rulers. The 
Kuge court-based nobility, for example, was merged with the Daimyo caste into a new nobility class of Kazuko, and 
the various nobles were ranked according to European equivalents like dukes, counts, and barons. Noble titles, with 
the exception of the imperial family, were abolished after the end of WWII. 
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the 1960s, the Japanese government started assimilation projects to address some of the 
discrimination issues, thereby officially recognizing the problem for the first time. (Hah and 
Lapp 1978; Pharr 1990; Reber 1998; Gordon 2010)  
While the Buraku population is not the only group that is part of the subject population 
dominated by the majority population within the Japanese context, it is by far the largest group. 
The exact size of the Buraku minority is unknown, although various estimates put their number 
between 1 million and more than 10 million. (BLL 1998; Aldldritt 2000; Gordon 2008) While 
the government numbers are significantly lower, ranging between 1 million and 2 million, other 
minorities in Japan are still substantially smaller, both domestic historical minorities like the 
Zainichi or resident Koreans, Ainu, and immigrant groups.60 The numbers of the Zainichi 
category are also obfuscated by a number of factors, but the number lies somewhere between 
half a million and 1 million out of a population of 127 million. The smallest ethnic minority, the 
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 Zainichi Koreans, or resident Koreans, are descendents of the then-imperial Japanese subjects from Korea residing 
on the Japanese mainland. Although most of them went to Korea after WWII, the approximately 650,000 who 
stayed lost their nationality, although were permitted as legal residents. Because of the difficult and in part 
humiliating naturalization process, many opted to remain residents for generations. The Ainu population is an 
indigenous group of between 25,000 and 200,000 mostly present on the Hokkaido island, with some presence in 
adjacent Russian areas. Ainu have a distinct language, religion, and cultural tradition from the main population and 
are also considered to be ethnically distinct. 
Official figures stem from the population data of districts depending on Dōwa, or assimilation settlements support 
programs for Burakumin. It is not including Burakumin not in poverty or Burakumin who prefer to be perceived as 
just poor instead of as living on Buraku assistance programs. (Aldritt 2000) 
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Ainu population, is since 1997 the only officially recognized ethnic minority in Japan.61 (Weiner 
2009) While Burakumin formally are citizens, unlike the resident Korean minority, they do 
experience similar levels of discrimination in other areas. However, given the fact that they are 
citizens and there is governmental recognition of Buraku discrimination and the need to resolve 
it, they are politically in a much better position.  
Similar to BLL, some of the other subject population groups have advocacy 
organizations. Three organizations compete to represent the resident Korean minority. One is the 
1948-founded MINDAN (Zai-Nihon Chōsen Kyoryū Mindan [Korean Residents Union in 
Japan]) which has ties to South Korea, whereas its competitor CHONGRYON (Zai-Nihon 
Chōsenjin Sōrengōkai [General Association of Korean Residents in Japan]) has ties to North 
Korea.62 (Mitchell and O’Toole 1997; Chung 2010) Both MINDAN and CHONGRYON 
advocate the maintenance of Korean identity and connection with North Korea, and discourage 
assimilation, Japanese citizenship acquisition, and marriages with Japanese. The main difference, 
aside from affiliation with North or South Korea, lies in the degree to which these principles 
were advocated, and at least with regard to MINDAN, the staunch anti-assimilationist dogmatic 
position declined somewhat. As such, both organizations initially presented themselves rather as 
an advocacy group of foreign citizens in Japan, and not as an ethnic minority advocacy group. 
However, as Chung pointed out, the positions of both organizations strengthened the position of 
the Japanese government in excluding resident Koreans as an ethnic minority, and triggered a 
legitimacy decrease for both organizations among the second and third generation resident 
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 Other smaller ethnic minorities in Japan include: resident Taiwanese/Chinese (descendants of former Japanese 
imperial subjects from Taiwan), Okinawans/Ryukyuans, descendants of former non -ethnic-Japanese people from 
Japanese imperial possesions in the Pacific. 
62
 Both MINDAN and CHONGRYON also have Korean names. 
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Koreans. (2010) Over time, MINDAN became the largest and most politically influential 
resident Korean organization, with about two-thirds of the resident Koreans as its members. 
Currently MINDAN advocates integration of resident Koreans in Japanese society, by focusing 
on issues such as demanding local suffrage. The third and youngest resident Korean 
organization, founded in the 1970s, is MINTOHREN (Minzoku Sabetsu to Tatakau Renraku 
Kyogikai [National Council for Combatting Discrimination Against Ethnic Peoples in Japan]), 
which is a younger association and in many ways can be seen as the organizational resultant of 
declined MINDAN and CHONRYON legitimacy among newer generations of resident Koreans. 
MINTOHREN is advocating for integration of resident Koreans through a multicultural 
approach. Unlike the previous two organizations, MINTOHREN holds no formal affiliation with 
North or South Korea and focuses more on local issues and Japan as its homeland. (Fukuoka and 
Tsujiyama 1992) 
For the purpose of this project, I opted to focus on the Buraku minority, not only because 
they are by far the largest minority in Japan, but also because of a number of additional 
considerations. First, Japan was deliberately chosen as a case because of its very young and still-
closed status, comparatively speaking, as an immigrant country. This also means that there is a 
relative dearth of data on how immigrant groups affect political parties. The analysis of the 
relationship of existing domestic minorities may provide us with an idea of how future 
relationships evolve between a growing, and/or better-integrated immigrant population and 
Japanese parties. Second, while Burakumin are citizens, the majority of the resident Koreans are 
not. Although it would be wrong to argue that relevant political parties do not pay any attention 
to the plight of the resident Koreans, from an electoral point of view, political parties wouldn’t 
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be as interested in them.63 Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, despite the fact that Burakumin 
share ethnic origins with the majority population, throughout history they have been 
continuously depicted and treated as ethnically or racially different. (Kitaguchi 1999) In fact, the 
start of what Kitaguchi calls “ethnic difference” theory was perpetuated as of the Tokugawa era, 
implying that the Burakumin were descendants of Korean immigrants and were considered 
“Kikajin (‘descendants of those who have changed their nationality,’ the Japanese as yet having 
no word for immigrant).” (1999, 78-85) Kitaguchi links the Buraku discrimination of the 
Tokugawa era with anti-Korean prejudices of Japan since the Meiji era. Also, in the modern era 
there is a lot of overlap with regard to the social realities of resident Koreans and Buraku. On one 
hand, Koreans that settled in Japan in pre-WWII Japan often engaged in activities typical for 
Buraku such as selling shoes, creating businesses taken over by the coming generations in 
modern Japan. (Gordon 2008) On the other hand, neighborhoods historically inhabited by 
Buraku also exhibited high numbers of resident Korean populations, which is part helped 
strengthen solidarity and cooperation between both minorities.  
While it would be incorrect to state that the Zainichi minority is the same as the Buraku 
minority, and while some issues central to resident Koreans such as suffrage and political rights 
are not an issue for Buraku, there are at least a number of social issues rooted in historic 
discrimination of both minorities, such as poverty, educational disparity, social discrimination by 
the majority population, and perhaps most importantly a lack of acknowledgement as an ethnic 
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 On party political activity on behalf of resident Koreans , see Chung 2010. While this may also be true for the 
noncitizen part of the Hispanic and Turkish immigrants in the U.S. and Germany, unlike resident Koreans , 
substantially more members of both minorities are citizens compared with those who are not. On top of that, the 
proportion of both Hispanic and Turkish minority members in the U.S. and Germany are significantly higher, 
especially in particular geographic areas. 
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minority by the government, that created a shared set of interests. Additionally, deep-rooted, 
ancient beliefs and fear of pollution mixed with modern ideas of racial purity created an 
environment apprehensive of those considered to be foreign and impure. In short, while the 
analysis of BLL mainly reveals the relationship between Japanese parties, and the main advocacy 
organization of the Buraku population, our insights may help understand the nature of the 
relationship between political parties and other identity- interest groups representing smaller 
segments of the subject population as well. 
Initially, the BLL was mostly successful at the local level in the 1950s and the1960s. It 
was not until the late 1960s that pressure from the BLL also had influence on national politics, 
not just with regard to specific Buraku issues, but also in the field of Human Rights legislation. 
(Kitaguchi 1999) In 1968, the BLRI (Buraku Liberation Research Institute) was founded with 
assistance of the Osaka prefecture and city. (BLHRRI 2014) From 1969 until 2002, the Japanese 
governments invested in Dōwa projects (Assimilation Projects/Policies [dōwa taisaku jigyō]) 
aimed at improving the education and housing facilities of communities in need. (Gordon 2008) 
Technically, these types of projects were aimed at the poorest in Japanese society, although in 
practice most of the beneficiaries were Buraku. The latter is not surprising because the Buraku 
were proportionally much more severely affected by poverty as a result of centuries of 
discrimination.64  
Reflecting the increased scope of the BLL, now also more generally advocating on behalf 
of human rights for all inhabitants of Japan, the institute’s name was changed to BLHRRI 
(Buraku Liberation and Human Rights Research Institute) in 1998. The shift from only focusing 
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 In some cases, Buraku would refuse to rely on Dōwa assistance out of fear it would signal to the outside world 
their Buraku identity.  
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on Buraku specifically to human rights more generally also could be explained by the fact that 
the BLL was aware of the Japanese government’s intentions to end the Dōwa projects. (Gordon 
2008) The end of the Dōwa measures also reduced the BLL’s influence on politics, as they were 
deeply involved in the implementation. The BLHRRI can be described as the research and 
content pillar of BLL. While the BLHRRI/BLL has several publications, the only regular 
publication is the bimonthly Buraku Liberation Newsletter, which I used for this analysis 
because  it adequately reflects the new programmatic accents the BLL has adopted during the 
past two decades regarding Buraku rights, but also more generally the human rights of other 
minorities in Japan.  
Politically, the BLL and former Buraku movements have always have been closer to 
socialist parties, in particular the JSP (Japan Socialist Party) and the JCP (Japan Communist 
Party). Initially, the BLL was intensely left militant, but gradually became more moderate. (Hah 
and Lapp 1978) During the time when the national government became involved in the Buraku 
issue in the early 1960s, political rivalry and disagreements among the militant leftist and 
moderate Buraku, in part fostered by the JCP, led to a split between Buraku activists supporting 
JCP or JSP. JCP went as far to create a party-affiliated Buraku advocacy group, Zenkairen 
(National Coalition of Buraku Liberation), yet the independent BLL remained the main advocacy 
group supported by the Buraku population.65 (Gordon 2008) Similar to the evolution of RENGO, 
the implosion of the old JSP in the 1990s provided the BLL with the opportunity to repackage 
itself as a politically more diverse organization, and while it is generally closer to the DPJ, there 
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 There were more attempts to create alternative national Buraku advocacy groups, yet none of these managed to 
push BLL from its dominant position. (cf. Gordon 2008)  
                                                                                                                        
77 
 
is some support for LDP politicians as well.66 BLL has its national office in Tokyo but also has 
an affiliate national office in Osaka, which can be explained by the larger number of citizens 
with Buraku background and influence in Osaka-area politics.67 (BLL 2014a) BLL has 
community chapters organized by seven larger regional subdivisions, which themselves are 
grouping several prefectural communities. (BLL 2014b) The BLL has no presence in areas that 
historically only had a very small Buraku population or none at all, meaning they have no 
presence in Hokkaido and the northern part of Honshu.68  
Table 9: Summary Minority/Immigrant advocacy organizations       
 USA Germany Japan 
Political tradition 
underlying government – 
social movement 
interaction dynamics 
Strong pluralism  Neo-Corporatism Clientelism 
Predominant 
organization type 
Moved from individual 




Local communities and 
organizations as members 
Local communities and 
organizations as members 
Action area Fighting discrimination 
against Hispanic U.S. 
citizens and immigrant 
community 
Fighting discrimination 
against Turkish German 
citizens and immigrant 
community 
Fighting discrimination 
against Burakumin citizens 
and defending human 
rights 
Party affiliation No formal affiliation Closer to the Greens and 
Social Democrats 
Originally leaning towards 
JCP and JSP, but now 
more independently 
leaning towards DPJ  
Influence as compared to 
each other  
Weak at local and national 
levels 
Strong at local and 
national levels – lower 
presence in former GDR 
Strong at local level in 
some areas of the country, 
(in particular Osaka 
region) but weaker at 
national level 
Member organizations Hierarchy of LULAC 
community chapters, 
organized by state, and 
member-volunteers 
Dual hierarchy of TGD 
community chapters 
organized by state 
grouping several local 
groups, and separate other 
federations.  
Hierarchy of BLL 
community chapters, 
organized by prefecture – 
no presence in North 
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 Including LDP Diet members with a Buraku background. 
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 The Osaka office that is also home to the BLHRRI has 30 staff members, whereas the national headquarters in 
Tokyo only has 10. Most prefectural offices have a staff between one and 10. (Correspondence with BLL 2014)  
68
 Hokkaido and Honshu are the two most northern of the four Japanese main islands.  
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Chapter Three: Methodology and Data  
 
Overview 
In order to provide an answer to the hypotheses formulated in Chapter One, a content analysis-
based method will be employed to compare the programmatic content of extra-electoral identity-
interest organizations with that of national election manifestos published by the national political 
parties. The main assumption is that the programmatic content of the largest national union 
federations’ documents will much better translate the worker side of the “workers-vs.- 
employers” cleavage than any political party does because unions traditionally cater to that 
demographic, whereas in order to win elections, parties have a need to expand their potential 
voter reservoirs. In a similar vein, I will explore the extent to which the issues important to the 
largest segments of the subject population are translated by the national parties. In other words, 
the level to which party documents correspond with these of identity- interest organizations 
advocating on behalf of these groups will tell us how well parties translate the issues important to 
the population on one side of a cleavage divide, to what extent these parties can be considered to 
be representative of that population segment, and to what extent different party systems are 
representative of that population segment. 
Because of practical considerations, I limited the analysis to a selection of the largest and 
most influential union federations and minority advocacy groups. On one hand, this enables us to 
lay a foundation for what promises to be an interesting research project with an exciting future 
research agenda. On the other hand, because it is impossible to include all potential organizations 
advocating on behalf of the selected populations on the worker and subject-population pole of 
the two cleavages under analysis, our findings will not be complete. However, while the 
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inclusion of additional identity- interest organizations representing the workers and subject-
population side of the selected cleavages would provide even more accurate results, I contend 
that by selecting those groups advocating on behalf of the largest segment of the sociological 
base of the subject-population and worker-cleavage poles, I will at least have a result that 
approximates models and mechanisms of what I likely would find if it were actually possible to 
compare the demands of the entire sociological base of both cleavage groups with the 
programmatic content of parties.  
It makes sense to expect a significant difference in topics and emphasis between party 
manifestos on one hand and extra-electoral organizations’ documents on the other. However, the 
point here is not to establish the obvious fact that there is such a difference; instead, the goals 
provided by the formulated hypotheses are to measure which parties do a better job translat ing 
cleavage alignments of the respective groups, and to discover what trends appear.  
 
1. Methodology - Computerized Content Analysis  
The analysis of political parties’ ideological, dimensional, policy and cleavage positions has 
grown as an important aspect of empirical data collection within the field of political science. 
Dinas and Gemenis distinguish three types of methods either used separately or in combination 
to do so: expert surveys, opinion poll data, and content analysis of party manifestos. (2009) 
While there certainly are expert data on the types of organizations analyzed here, I was unable to 
find uniform formats, in part because of the infinite nature of the interest-organization arena 
when compared with the electoral arena. Given the unique topic of this project comparing 
documents of political parties and identity- interest organizations, expert survey data, aside from 
a potential subjectivity bias, would only be useful for party-centric projects and thus will not be 
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considered here. Opinion poll data has been considered as a method in earlier drafts, yet given 
the lack of sufficient uniform survey data on multiple cases over a significantly long time span, 
this approach also had to be abandoned. Voting results and membership data may say something 
about the support political parties receive – and membership may say something about non-
party-organization support – yet as a variable, they do not really say anything independently 
about the position a party takes on a cleavage, nor about how well it will translate cleavages. The 
only pertinent remaining method that is sufficient for this project is content analysis. Aside from 
that content analysis also enables us to compare party and non-party texts with each other. 
Slapin and Proksch classify content analysis methods within the field of political science 
in two categories: hand-coded methods and computer-based approaches. (2008) The largest 
project involving hand-coded content analysis is the Manifesto Research Group/Comparative 
Manifesto’s Project MRG/CMP/MARPOR. (Volkens et al. 2013; also cf. Budge et al. 2001; 
Klingemann et al. 2006) Aside from the enormous time and resources hand-coded content 
analysis would require  for this project – the DGB case, for example, encompasses 77 
documents, each between about 40 and 300 pages long, or several million words in total – there 
are a number of theoretical reasons for not applying this method. The hand-coded approach 
depends on the subjective judgment of the coder to attach meaning to the coded fragments. 
Although coders are usually trained in order to avoid too-subjective selections, there remains a 
significant risk of human bias. On top of the simplification mentioned in Chapter One of only 
using a left-vs.-right dimension, the coder’s subjectivity bias, and the ability to read, translate, 
and accurately interpret non-native languages, further decrease the quality of the data. An 
additional, related concern is that findings are often compared to the results of expert surveys. 
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Since there is nothing similar that is available for the identity- interest organizations included in 
this project, this method can’t be applied here.  
An innovation in content analysis of party manifestos and political texts came with the 
creation of the Wordscores software by Benoit et al. (2003; Benoit et al. 2009) As Benoit et al. 
put it: “Our crucial move is to abandon the notion, which runs throughout most political science 
content analysis, that the objective of an analyst coding a text is to identify its meaning. Indeed, 
this notion has been so much taken for granted that it is seldom even recognized as an 
assumption.” (2003, 329) Furthermore, they assert that this focus on a priori attachment of 
meaning to text prevented the generation of a successful computerized method of content 
analysis. (329) The identification of meaning of words comes after the step of coding. 
The attractiveness of Wordscores lies in the ease with which it can be applied to large 
amounts of data compared with previous techniques. The meaning of words in Wordscores is 
determined by the use of two documents representing opposing ends of the dimension one 
wishes to analyze. With the exception of filtering out stop words and irrelevant data (e.g. headers 
and footers, page numbers, dates), Wordscores does not rely on human coders to interpret word 
meaning a priori as with the MRG/CMP/MARPOR data. The accuracy of Wordscores’ results 
depends on the similarity of meaning of words over time. One way to ensure this is to have a 
lexicographic similarity that is as close as possible. In some cases, however, it is impossible to 
find texts that are similar in word use. For example, in elections for which no manifestos exist, 
the coder must select data from alternative program data such as speeches, pamphlets, and other 
publications. I should not expect documents published by identity- interest groups to be any less 
comparable; in fact, out of the six extra-electoral organizations’ texts selected for this project, 
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half are identical in format in terms of lexicography, while the other half are at least similar 
enough in terms of lexicography despite different formats.  
Regardless of the success of Wordscores as a method, some of the underlying 
assumptions and practical considerations make it less attractive for this project. A first concern is 
that Wordscores relies on the appropriate selection of two reference texts. In a nutshell, the 
problem is similar to attaching meaning to words in hand coded approaches, as the identification 
of reference texts may be just as subjective. (Slapin and Proksch, 2008) Additionally, 
Wordscores requires the identification of two documents that demarcate the opposite poles of the 
distribution. Unfortunately, by doing so, it also impedes the accuracy of the estimate in the case 
that there are documents that would fall outside the scope of these demarcations with a more 
dynamic model, and thus would create the risk of an additional bias of not selecting the best two 
documents for this. A more important problem caused by the former problem, and specifically 
relevant to this project, is that Wordscores doesn’t deal well with time series; in fact, Benoit et al. 
argue against using Wordscores for time series, as the meanings of words change from election 
to election. Attempts have been made to resolve this problem by expanding the amount of 
reference texts, yet problems remain. Slapin and Proksch summarize this as follows:  
“Time-series party positions can be estimated with Wordscores if one is ready to make 
three assumptions. First, the political lexicon remains sufficiently stable over time, 
second, chosen reference texts include all relevant words over time, and third, the 
reference texts represent the most extreme positions during the time period.” (2008, 708)   
 
   
For the purpose of this project, I opted to apply Wordfish, developed by Slapin and Proksch. 
(2008) Because Wordfish does not require reference texts, the latter two assumptions mentioned 
in the quote above are unnecessary. Instead, Wordfish “… assumes an underlying statistical 
distribution of word counts, and, […] the ability to use all words in all documents and to estimate 
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the importance of each of these words.” (2008, 708) In terms of dimensionality – or in this case, 
dichotomous cleavages – “Wordfish assumes the principle dimension extracted from texts 
captures the political content of those texts.” (2008, 711) Although Slapin and Proksch warn 
against using documents in their entirety to determine the position of an organization on multiple 
dimensions, there should be no problem with regard to the analysis of one dimension or 
cleavage. (712) If I were to be interested in only foreign policy, for example, running the 
analysis on the entire text of the manifestos would provide inaccurate results because large 
segments of text may not deal with it. Yet if I approach the selected documents in their entirety 
as representative of an organization’s position on an underlying abstract structural division, I 
should not run into this problem.  
The one remaining potential problem is the stability of word meaning over time. 
However, this is a problem that all current existing content analysis methods face when dealing 
with time series.69 An advantage of Wordfish with regard to this is that “If the political lexicon 
changes by words entering and exiting the political dialogue, rather than changing meaning, our 
method does take these changes into account when estimating positions.” (711) In sum, Wordfish 
is a methodological tool that best fits the analytical goals set by this project. 
Wordfish has only been around for a few years, which explains why the number of 
studies to date remains relatively low.70 Wordfish is a scaling algorithm that helps to estimate 
policy positions based on word frequencies. (Slapin and Proksch 2008) The advantages over 
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 Indeed, qualitative studies such as expert surveys are also affected by this because experts’ understanding of the 
meaning of words may also be contingent upon the period in which they were socialized, schooled, and their 
research took place. 
70
 The Wordfish website contains software, publications and manuals free of charge: 
http://www.wordfish.org/index.html  
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previous content-analysis methods can be summarized as follows: “[…] its ability to produce 
time-series estimates, the fact that it does not require the use of reference texts because it instead 
assumes an underlying statistical distribution of word counts, and, lastly, the ability to use all 
words in every document and to estimate the importance of each of these words.” (2008, 708) 
The stochastic model that underlies Wordfish is a Poisson process that counts a number of 
events and the frequencies of those events within a set time frame.71 Slapin and Proksch explain 
the model as follows: 
This particular distribution is chosen because of its estimation simplicity: it only has one 
parameter, λ, which is both the mean and the variance. This assumption means that the 
number of times party i mentions word j in election year t is drawn from a Poisson 
distribution. This model specification is essentially a Poisson naïve Bayes model […] 
The functional form of the model is as follows: 
 
Yijt ~ Poisson(λijt) 
λijt = exp(αit + ψj + βj * ωit) 
 
where Yijt is the count of word j in party i’s manifesto at time t, α is a set of party-election 
year fixed effects, ψ is a set of word fixed effects, β is an estimate of a word-specific 
weight capturing the importance of word j in discriminating between party positions, and 
ω is the estimate of party i’s position in election year t (therefore it is indexing one 
specific manifesto).72 (2008, 709-711) 
 
Before being able to run Wordfish, the selected documents need to be carefully processed and a 
word frequency matrix created. Because the processing of the documents differs from case to 
case, I will elaborate on this step in the following sections of this chapter. For the step of creating 
a word frequency matrix, however, the method is uniform. For all documents I used Jfreq as 
                                                                 
71
 This type of distribution was named after the mathematician Simeon Denis Poisson, which also explains the name 
of the software Wordfish.  
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 For an entire overview of how the right-hand side of the equation is estimated, and a summary of the 
implementation in R, please see Slapin and Proksch 2008: pp. 709-712. For a manual on how to use Wordfish in R, 
please see Proksch and Slapin 2009. 
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word frequency generating and stemming software. (Lowe 2011) To filter out stop words – 
words without substantive meaning – I used the Porter list. (2001) The advantage of both Jfreq 
and the Porter list, aside from being frequently used for content-analysis purposes, is that the 
former can recognize German words, and that the latter has equivalent versions for a number of 
other languages than English, including German. For the original Japanese texts analyzed in this 
project, I had to include an additional step in the data-processing phase. Although I will elaborate 
more thoroughly on this in the section on Japanese parties, the nutshell version is that for the 
word recognition of Japanese characters in a text, I will employ so-called tokenizer software.    
For this project, the selected documents will come both from parties and from identity-
interest groups. In some cases, the publication of the selected identity-interest group documents 
will be in line with election years. In other cases there will be gaps, but that should not matter, as 
the word frequencies of all documents are weighed relative to each other regardless of their 
publication dates. As stated earlier, the selected documents should be similar from a 
lexicographic point of view. Indeed, most of the selected documents are very similar in the way 
they are formulated. After careful consideration of potential problems regarding document 
selection and validity issues, including extensive correspondence with one of the Wordfish 
creators, Sven-Oliver Proksch, I am confident that the method selected here is very well suited 
for the purposes of my analysis.73 Table 10 provides a summary of the documents included here: 
manifestos, resolution texts, platforms, and in some cases policy-related press statements.  
Table 10: Summary data collection 
US 
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 For further reading on pitfalls and validity issues, please see: Proksch and Slapin (2009), Franchino and Mariotto 
(2012). During the data collection phase, I had extensive email and phone contact with Dr. Proksch.  
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o PDS/Die Linke 
o Bündnis 90/Die 
Grüne 






















Press statements/policy statements  
Japan**** 




o New Komei 
o Other*** 






















Press statements  
* For a few elections, CDU and CSU did not participate in the elections as one formation. 
** In a few earlier cases, no explicit program was printed and instead an election declaration is used. 
*** Minor parties that received representation in the Japanese upper or lower houses in the period of the analysis  
**** Although the time period is shorter, I did manage to create a lot of data points because I consider elections for 
both the upper and lower houses; for both RENGO and BLL, annual data are available. 
***** Election programs were not published before 2000; a change in the election law changed this. Some of the 
programs from before that time that were used for the analysis are in fact basic programs and not specifically 
tailored to one election. 
 
Proksch et al. demonstrated that even a comparison of newspaper interview responses can 
be similar enough to conduct this type of analysis in a credible way. (2010) Franchino and 
Mariotto also demonstrated that different formats of documents are not an obstacle for 
comparison as long they are lexicographically similar. (2012) As long as I include documents 
covering policy-related content, while controlling for idiosyncratic terminology – for example, 
the use of “It is resolved that” in resolution texts – the use of different formats (e.g. platforms, 
                                                                                                                        
87 
 
resolutions, press statements) should not be an obstacle to the analysis. For each of the case 
chapters, I will provide a more thorough discussion of the selected documents in the following 
sections. 
Computerized content-analysis methods such as Wordscores or Wordfish usually do not 
include proxy variables. Either a manifesto was published for an election year and it is included, 
or no manifesto was published and there is no data included to fill this void. Absent manifestos 
are generally explained in two possible ways: irretrievable data or lack of publication. Only in 
the first case – the fact that some data may not be retrievable, accessible, or otherwise not usable 
for the analysis – the use of a proxy seems justified, as it fills up a void that theoretically could 
have been filled because data does exist. In the event of the other possibility, the addition of 
proxies seems unjustified. A potential problem emerges when doing time-series analysis because 
with the entrance of new parties, the content of their manifestos is weighed against that of those 
longer-established parties. The potential problem is that in terms of words used, the older 
programs will weigh more heavily in the analysis than manifestos of new parties. However, 
Wordfish in particular takes into account this changing context, making it much more suitable to 
time-series analysis. Whereas it may be accurate that the usage of certain words throughout the 
consecutive party manifestos of an established party will influence the way in which the 
difference in cleavage positions of the party is measured, the newer manifestos will still 
influence this measurement, too. To ensure that the analysis doesn’t become skewed by words 
that only have high frequencies in one or few documents, I apply a 20 percent rule previously 
used in other analyses applying Wordfish. (Proksch and Slapin 2009, 334) This means that words 
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used in less than 20 percent of the documents are not included in the analysis.74 Making sure that 
only words used in at least one-fifth of the documents are included ensures that I have a very 
reliable basis of comparison.75  
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 To an extent, the limit of 20 percent is arbitrary. An additional reason why Slapin and Proksch applied it is that it 
would guarantee that only words that were present in at least two elections were used . Given that this project 
involves multiple cases and decades, I chose the 20 percent cutoff as a practical way to filter out data that would 
only skew the analysis but not really contribute to it, and to create a uniform mold that would guarantee the use of 
words that are used in different years and by different organizations.  
75
 A minor concern is that the included organizations only represent one side of a cleavage, whereas organizations 
on the opposite end of the spectrum are not included here. In particular with the union federation cases, the addition 
of employer organizations might seem feasible. The short answer to this is yes, this might add to even better results. 
However, just like a building can only be built once a foundation is created, it matt ers to focus first only on one type 
of organization in comparison with political parties. By making a comparison between one specific interest group 
and political parties, I can draw clear conclusions that will help us create a future research design involving several 
extra-electoral organizations and political parties from opposite sides of a cleavage. It should also be noted that in 
some cases, there may not be an organizational emanation opposite pole, such as an advocacy organization 
representing the dominant group in a society. 
 Although the organizations selected within the three cases are by far the largest of their kind, one could 
argue that including more organizations would provide an even better analysis. My response to this concern would 
be in line with the one above: Yes, this is definitely an element considering for a future research agenda. However, 
unlike the electoral arena, the arena of extra-political mass organizations is not a closed system. Although I agree 
that exploring more organizations would definitely be an element for a future research agenda, one purpose of this 
analysis is to provide a clear basis justifying such an agenda by focusing on organizations that could be considered 
market leaders in their field.  
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2. Data Collection: US, Germany, Japan Case Studies 
2.1 United States  
2.1.1 Parties 
For the U.S. parties, I selected the 28 presidential election platforms since 1960. Although 
presidential elections are not the only type of elections that could be understood as national, 
there are a number of reasons why the Congressional elections were not included. First, there is 
too much irregularity and difference in the documents that were produced. Weak party discipline 
and coherence, or the “empty vessels” nature of both U.S. parties, only contribute to this lack of 
a clear national program in non-presidential election years. (Katz and Kolodny 1994) With a few 
exceptions, nearly all national conventions of both parties have been held during presidential 
election years.76 This could be explained by the fact that candidates for the House and the Senate 
during non-presidential election years rely on the local party organizations. It would be incorrect 
to state that there are no texts available at all. The 1994 Republican “Contract with America” and 
the 2010 “Pledge to America,” or the Democratic “100 hours plan,” are but a few of such texts.77 
In terms of both content and format, however, they differ significantly from each other. On one 
hand, they are often much more succinct than presidential platforms, and on the other hand, the 
content may range from that of a strategic guideline to that of an electoral pamphlet. The 
CMP/MRG/MARPOR project, currently the largest manifesto research database, does list the 
non-presidential election years, yet doesn’t hold any data at all for midterm elections. (Volkens 
et al. 2013) As a consequence of the lack of a regular midterm convention cycle and 
accompanying texts, the content of the House and Senate candidates also will reflect the state or 
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 The DNC, for example, only held national conventions for midterm elections in 1974, 1978, and 1982. 
77
 GOP website: http://www.gop.gov/resources/library/documents/solutions/a-pledge-to-america.pdf 
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district level much more than the national presidential platforms. This constitutes an additional 
reason not to consider the few texts that could be considered as midterm platforms. 
Table. 11: Approximate word count for Democratic and Republican platforms 1960-2012. 
Year Democratic Party – total words Republican Party – total words 
1960 16,106 10,683 
1964 20,129 8,743 
1968 16,794 10,016 
1972 25,618 24,410 
1976 21,205 20,476 
1980 38, 186 34,569 
1984 37,234 27,400 
1988 4,841 35,856 
1992 8,558 28,548 
1996 18,110 27,840 
2000 24,223 34,558 
2004 17,754 41,788 
2008 25,997 23,618 
2012 26,565 31,355 
Bold-printed totals are the largest number of words used by a party for that election year. 
 
 
2.1.2 Identity-Interest Organizations – AFL-CIO 
Because the types of documents addressing national politics varied over the years, and because 
the AFL-CIO changed its national convention cycle, four different categories of primary sources 
had to be consulted: AFL-CIO platform proposals presented to the Democratic and Republican 
Conventions (published 1960-1984), AFL-CIO Executive Council recommendations taken from 
the biannual AFL-CIO Executive Council reports of 1985-1993, AFL-CIO Resolutions adopted 
at the AFL-CIO biannual conventions 1995-1999, and the AFL-CIO Resolutions adopted at the 
AFL-CIO quadrennial conventions 2001-2013. These texts represent a level of lexicographic 
similarity that is more than sufficient to be adequate for a successful content analysis comparison 
with presidential platforms.78 
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 AFL-CIO adopted resolution texts of the quadrennial national conventions are available online from 2001-2013. 
(See links in bibliography) Older convention resolution texts are available at the George Meany Archives at the 
University of Maryland at College Park (UMD).  
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Before getting into the analysis, itself, I shall elaborate on why the selected AFL-CIO 
data are the best available and sufficient for a successful analysis. The four main criteria for data 
selection I adhered to were content, lexicographical similarity, date of publication, and length. 
With regard to content, it was important to select documents that focus on the national policy 
agenda; documents pertaining to state, local, or regional matters – in as far as they did not have 
national political significance – thus were not included. In addition, topics that were related to 
issues pertaining to internal union matters and other topics not directly significant for the 
national policy agenda also were excluded.79  
In terms of lexicography, two elements were important to withhold texts for 
consideration: First, texts should be worded in a similar fashion, and second, since the 
presidential platforms are more prospective in nature – they deal with future intentions and 
significantly less with accomplishments – documents considered also should be mostly 
prospective in nature. The third criterion, date of publication, is relevant because the goal is to 
make the AFL-CIO documents as comparable as possible with presidential platforms. The 
advantage of the AFL-CIO platform proposals addressed to the Democratic and Republican 
parties is that their format is closest to the publication of the party platforms.80  
                                                                 
79
 The most obvious examples of excluded data were texts on AFL-CIO constitutional changes, internal 
organizational matters, or texts specifically related to internal member-union issues.  
80
 The disadvantage might be – our analysis will either confirm or deny this – that the AFL-CIO proposal platforms 
are slightly watered-down versions of the AFL-CIO programmatic stance, as the explicit point of these documents is 
indeed to serve as a template for both parties’ platforms.

 The preface of the 1964 AFL-CIO platform proposals 
mentions that they are “in identical language” as  the policies adopted at the AFL-CIO national conventions. 
Notwithstanding this, the selection made will still reflect a more pragmatic stance, as these documents are addressed 
specifically to both parties and not to the AFL-CIO membership. A difficulty is  that ever since the AFL-CIO ceased 
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The last criterion, length, implies that documents included should preferably go beyond 
the content of a leaflet or summary. Although strictly speaking, short documents can be 
compared together with substantially longer ones with Wordfish, as a rule, longer is better. 
(Slapin-Proksch 2008) The “AFL-CIO platform proposals presented to the Democratic and 
Republican National Conventions,” 1960-1984, are shorter when compared to the platform texts 
of both parties – usually more than 50 pages – yet this difference doesn’t matter that much. They 
also provide an idea of what to focus on when selecting documents from other AFL-CIO sources. 
Based on the above, AFL-CIO platform proposals 1960-1984, AFL-CIO Executive Council 
recommendations that served as texts for AFL-CIO resolutions 1960-1993, and adopted 
resolution texts 1995-present were selected.  
For the period of 1960 to 1993, I deliberately opted for the Executive Council 
recommendations in the Executive Council Reports instead of the texts of adopted resolutions. 
There are a number of reasons why I did so. They most closely resemble the presidential 
platform documents not only in lexicography but also in length. The resolutions, themselves, 
contain a lot of words that would need to be filtered out, such as names, locations, debates, 
voting proceedings, etc. On top of that are adopted, tabled, and rejected resolutions not separated 
and instead listed chronologically, making it even more difficult to separate the relevant ones 
accurately. In many cases, resolutions were subsumed in other resolutions, their names changed, 
or referred to the Council.81 Also, constitutional resolutions, resolutions pertaining to local and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
to publish platform proposals in 1984, the only documents that can be deemed appropriate for the period are the 
biannual national convention texts from 1988-1999 and the quadrennial national convention texts from 2001-2013.   
81
 In this case, they require further deliberation by the Council before being submitted again for a vote. (The current 
AFL-CIO internal governance rules such as the constitution and convention rules can be consulted at: 
http://edit.aflcio.org/About/Exec-Council/Conventions/2013/Rules-and-Governance) 
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internal union organizational matters, all of which aren’t germane to the topic of the analysis 
here, are listed in a similar fashion. The texts of the Executive Council report recommendations, 
however, not only correspond for the most part with the resolution texts adopted on topics 
relevant to this analysis, in terms of length, they also are much more succinct and more 
comparable to the AFL-CIO platforms and presidential platforms. The aforementioned “AFL-
CIO platform proposals presented to the Democratic and Republican National Conventions” 
were an additional check in terms of content. For the years 1993 and afterward, I did select the 
adopted resolution texts. The reasons for doing so are that AFL-CIO proceeding reports for this 
period clearly provide information on which resolutions got adopted, that there are many fewer 
but longer resolutions, and the Executive Council reports become much more succinct and 
eventually did not contain sections on recommendations of the Executive Council anymore. 
Instead, these find their way to the Convention as Executive Council resolutions.  
The first AFL-CIO dataset contains the 28 Presidential Democratic and Republican 
platforms from 1960-2012 and 26 AFL-CIO documents from the same period. Table 12 gives a 
breakdown of the included AFL-CIO documents. 
Table 12: AFL-CIO data used for Dataset I-III
82 
Year Total words Type of document 
1960 10,090 Platform 
1964 19,469 Platform 
1968 24,146 Platform 
1971 12,613 Council Recommend./Resolutions  
1972 30,938 Platform 
1973 16,012 Council Recommend./Resolutions  
1975 15,478 Council Recommend./Resolutions  
1976 43,663 Platform 
                                                                 
82
 Democratic and Republican Conventions (published 1960-1984), AFL-CIO Executive Council recommendations 
taken from the biannual AFL-CIO Executive Council reports 1985-1993, AFL-CIO Resolutions adopted at the AFL-
CIO biannual conventions 1995-1999, and the AFL-CIO Resolutions adopted at the AFL-CIO quadrennial 
conventions 2001. The word count for both Democratic and Republican platforms can be found in the appendix.  
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1977 19,318 Council Recommend./Resolutions  
1979 19,251 Council Recommend./Resolutions  
1980 14,988 Platform 
1981 15,537 Council Recommend./Resolutions  
1983 17,089 Council Recommend./Resolutions  
1984 7,517 Platform 
1985 19,461 Council Recommend./Resolutions  
1987 20,895 Council Recommend./Resolutions  
1989 21,374 Council Recommend./Resolutions  
1991 18,725 Council Recommend./Resolutions  
1993 19,240 Adopted Resolutions  
1995 33,202 Adopted Resolutions  
1997 26,702 Adopted Resolutions  
1999 37,100 Adopted Resolutions 
2001 8,923 Adopted Resolutions  
2005 14,788 Adopted Resolutions  
2009 19,120 Adopted Resolutions  
2013 40,426 Adopted Resolutions  
 
Although Wordfish does not require us to define the poles of the dimension we’re 
interested in, I do need to provide two documents that indicate the direction of the 
dimensionality.83 A potential problem for the analysis of both U.S. cases emerges from selecting 
a good negative document. The positive direction can be defined easily by selecting one of the 
early AFL-CIO documents. Because of that, if I define the negative direction by selecting a 
Republican Party platform, I run a risk of selecting on the dependent variable because there are 
only two parties the platforms analyzed could belong to. I wrote there is “a risk,” which is not 
the same as stating, “I will by default generate a biased analysis.” Since Wordfish is blind to the 
origin of the documents analyzed – meaning it can’t tell the difference between AFL-CIO, 
Democratic, or Republican documents – and only estimates content similarity, I still should have 
an accurate analysis, even if I define the negative direction by selecting a Republican platform. 
Unlike Wordscores and other methods, Wordfish is sensitive to the entry of new words into the 
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 As mentioned in the first section, this allows for considerable flexibility and increased accuracy of our data, as the 
two selected documents define opposing, or negative and positive, directions of a dimension, yet not its opposing 
endpoints as with Wordscores. 
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word matrix, and thus it is sufficient to select only one identifier document for each cleavage 
pole for the entire time series.  
The way I resolved this potential risk for both U.S. cases – LULAC and the AFL-CIO – 
is by running two independent analyses controlling for this potential, yet unlikely, risk. One 
analysis will encompass a negative directional document that is a Republican Party platform. The 
other analysis’s negative directional document will be a text combining Democratic and 
Republican platforms of the same year. On one hand, this second analysis could aggravate the 
distance in content between the AFL-CIO and both parties. On the other hand, it enables us to 
compare with the first analysis and to determine how significant the selection of a Republican 
document weighs. After a careful reading of the included texts, I opted to select the 1968 “AFL-
CIO platform proposals to the Democratic and Republican Conventions” as a positive identifier 
text, and a merged version of the 1968 Democratic and Republican presidential platforms and a 
1968 Republican document as negative identifiers. I also created a second version with the 1968 
Republican Party document as negative identifier. Although I have data since 1960, I opted to 
use 1968 as the  identifier year for two reasons: First, at this point, the realignment in U.S. 
politics can definitely be considered to be complete, meaning that atavisms of the prior party 
alignments will not be reflected as much in the party platforms, and second, I have more data 
points from 1968 onward for the AFL-CIO. 84  
                                                                 
84
 I was lucky in finding digitized versions of all the presidential election platforms from 1960-2012. (Wooley and 
Peters 1999) Unfortunately, only a few of the AFL-CIO documents existed in digitized versions. Only the last four 
quadrennial AFL-CIO national convention documents from 2001-2013 could be found in digitized versions. None of 
these data could be obtained in digitized form through communication with the AFL-CIO. The bulk of the used data 
could be retrieved at the University of Maryland after the transfer of the AFL-CIO George Meany Archives was 
completed in the summer of 2013. Unfortunately, because many materials still needed to be reorganized, it was 
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After all texts were spell-checked, they were saved as text files and were run in JFreq.85 
(Lowe 2011) JFreq enables us to create different versions of .csv files that serve as a basis for 
the eventual data matrix entered in Wordfish. Before I created stemmed and non-stemmed 
versions via JFreq, I loaded the program with the Porter list for English in order to remove stop 
words. (2001) For this analysis, a few more words were added to this list that were part of typical 
phrasing of resolution language used: whereas, therefore, furthermore, resolved, resolution.  
After this was done, I created two .csv files, one using the JFreq stemmer, one without a 
stemmer function. The point of having two versions is to establish to what extent stemming has a 
significant effect on the analysis results. Previous research by Slapin, Proksch, and others 
indicated that such an influence at best would be limited; however, I still wanted to make sure 
that this would also be the case here. (2008; 2009) By using the stemmer function in JFreq, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
impossible for the staff at the UMD library to also provide me with the AFL-CIO proposals of 1960-1984. Three of 
the more recent ones could be tracked down and purchased via Amazon. The remaining seven other AFL-CIO 
platform proposals were retrieved after extensive searches in cooperation with the Johns Hopkins Milton S. 
Eisenhower Libraries’ Interlibrary Loan staff. In particular, Ms. Jennifer Eidson (UMD Library) and Ms. Sharon 
Mollock (JHU ILL) were a great help to me. 
 All the platform proposal documents and other texts needed to be scanned, manually corrected, and 
spellchecked. Because the bulk of the documents were older and most are printed small on two-sided, thin, 
telephone-book-quality pages, the process of correcting sentences and words after scanning was a labor-intensive 
process. Only a negligible amount of the scanned texts ended up being corrupted. Aside from removing recurring 
formal phrases typical for resolutions as discussed above, it was necessary to also change words that had undergone 
spelling reforms. One example of an often-recurring word is employes, which has been changed to the current 
spelling employees. Whenever possible, older and/or alternative forms of spelling were changed into uniform 
spelling to ensure the analysis would yield the best possible results. 
85
 Files in .txt format with UTF-8 Ascii coding 
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words are reduced to their stems.86 Among other things, stemming could help to correct for 
possible spelling variations that were overlooked during the document-processing stage. An 
additional advantage of stemming is that the number of words used across documents is 
maximized, because all words with one stem are reduced to one word. The obvious disadvantage 
is that words with apparently the same stem, in particular compound words, might get lost in the 
process. These advantages and disadvantages are an additional reason to run all datasets in 
stemmed and non-stemmed versions. Once the different .csv files were created with JFreq, I 
ranked the word frequencies and excluded those words that did not appear in at least 20 percent 
of all documents. After this, I finally could run all files in Wordfish.  
 
2.1.3 Identity-Interest Organizations – LULAC  
Initially, the idea was to collect data since the realignment in U.S. politics about the 1960s. 
LULAC was established in 1929, so there were good reasons to expect the availability of 
sufficient data as of the 1960s. However, a number of factors made it possible to conduct a 
thorough analysis only as of the mid-1990s. There are three main reasons why there is 
                                                                 
86
 The stem of the former examples of employe and employee would be the same: employ. Although stemmer 
functions and spell-check make up for words that changed in spelling over time, exceptions occur. In other cases, 
differences in spelling could indicate a deliberate political choice. For example, in texts published before the 1980s, 
both Peking and the Wade-Giles-based transliteration Peiping were used before the Pinyin-based transliteration 
Beijing came into vogue. Through a spell-check, one could replace all mentioning of Peking and Peiping with 
Beijing. However, since it was communist China that adopted the Pinyin transliteration of Beijing as the accurate 
equivalent, it would make sense to keep all three forms of spelling, as one indeed could argue that non -usage of the 
Pinyin transliteration was in part a deliberate choice. Examples like this are rare, yet they do occur occasionally. For 
the mentioned example here, it will probably not matter that much, as the frequency with which the Chinese capital 
is mentioned will probably not be as relevant as those of many other words. 
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insufficient usable data to conduct the type of analysis this project is concerned with before that 
period. First, although LULAC was conceived as a national organization, for a very long time its 
focus was on the southwestern U.S. region, in particular from the 1960s on. Even today, despite 
a rapidly increasing presence of Latino communities across the U.S., the regional stronghold of 
the organization remains in southern and western states such as Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, 
Florida, and California. (Brown 2014; Martinez 2009)  
This regional focus in part explains why it took a long time before national legislative 
programs were created instead of a mostly regionally focused agenda. According to LULAC 
National Executive Director Brent Wilkes, LULAC did not develop any national legislat ive 
platforms before 1994.87 The earliest one is also rather short in comparison with future platforms. 
(See Table 1 below) With regard to style and themes, the LULAC legislative platforms as of the 
mid-1990s resemble closely the platforms of the two large U.S. parties and that of other 
organizations, such as the previously discussed AFL-CIO. There is also an evolution with regard 
to the adopted resolution texts from LULAC national conventions. While examining resolution 
text compilations from the 1990s compared with later decades, the resolutions appear to become 
less regional and more nationally focused. This is exemplified both by the form in which they are 
presented and the content they cover. 
The second factor that explains why only a reliable analysis of the past two decades was 
possible is the sparse availability of earlier documents. Some data prior to 1994 are available at 
the LULAC archives at the University of Texas in Austin, yet proved to be highly incomplete, 
non-uniform, sparse, and sometimes illegible. While the period is shorter than for the AFL-CIO 
case, it does cover two decades in which the segment of the Latino population as part of the total 
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 I met with Mr. Wilkes at the LULAC national office in Washington, D.C., on October 18, 2013. 
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U.S. population increased significantly, expanding the potential of the Latino vote to become the 
crucial pivot in Presidential elections. A request for the folders containing adopted resolutions of 
LULAC conventions prior to 1994 yielded no further usable data.88 On one hand, sources such as 
LULAC News back issues are relatively easily available, the content of these documents is often 
pamphleteered, non-uniform in format, and lexicographically diverse, and it summarizes and 
reduces programmatic stances of the organization too much to be useful for the ambitious, in-
depth analysis this project is concerned with.89 Adopted resolution documents for that period, on 
the other hand, are only sparsely available, and in no way are complete enough to draw reliable 
conclusions from them. On top of that, many of the data were partially illegible, as some of the 
resolutions were recorded as notes.  
I was able to obtain digitized legislative platforms and resolution texts as of 1994. In a 
conversation at the national LULAC office in Washington, D.C., Wilkes informed me that prior 
to the mid-1990s, only resolutions had been adopted at LULAC annual conventions. The 
legislative platforms that had been instituted since the '90s resembled the national political 
parties’ platforms even more than resolutions in terms of lexicographical style. While it was thus 
not possible to collect pre-1994 data as complete and comprehensive as data after that, the 
                                                                 
88
 The LULAC archives at the University of Texas -Austin consist of a collection of various smaller, donated 
archives. While they could be useful for research that is historical and more qualitative, the available data was 
unfortunately not suitable for this project. Of the 1980s resolution texts, only very few were available and often as 
handwritten copies and nonuniform formats. The dearth of resolution texts prompted me to stick with the years 
between 1994 and 2014 for this analysis, as I feared that inclusion of sporadic fragments of a resolution corpus 
might skew they results too much. 
89
 Even if I were to select elements from LULAC News iss ues that appear relevant, it would only open the door to a 
more subjective selection, something I deliberately tried to avoid for this project. 
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current corpus of documents ranges an era of two decades and 18 different data points, which are 
likely to yield some insights into the shifts and trends I am looking for.          
Two types of documents were considered for this analysis: annual national 
policy/legislative platforms from 1994-2013, and the texts of adopted resolutions at LULAC 
national conventions from 1995-2013. These two types of documents are the most detailed with 
regard to the programmatic content of the organization and are lexicographically similar to 
political party platforms. From these texts, I created two different datasets, LULAC I and 
LULAC II. As stated above, it is important to remember that despite its national agenda, the 
organization is still most visible and strong in its core region, the southwestern U.S. and Florida. 
The content of the resolutions and the national platforms reflect this bifurcation. While many of 
the LULAC resolutions have a stronger regional focus, though often with national ramifications, 
such as border control and immigration-related issues, the LULAC policy platforms reflect a 
decidedly national focus. Since both the resolutions approved at the LULAC national 
conventions and the LULAC policy platforms can be counted as the programmatic documents of 
the national organizations, it was important to create datasets that reflected this. Dataset I 
comprises LULAC national convention resolution texts and policy platforms for the years 1994-
2013. Dataset II only includes the LULAC national policy platforms for the years 1994-2013. If 
there is a difference in the results between both datasets, it then would make sense to attribute 
this difference to the inclusion of the more regionally focused resolutions in Dataset I 
For a good analysis, the word matrix drawn from the collected documents should consist 
of at least a few thousand words. (Slapin and Proksch 2008) Although the legislative platforms, 
themselves, already could be used for an analysis, as a general rule for content analysis, the more 
words, the more reliable the results. Obviously, the included documents should still meet the 
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standard of being lexicographically similar enough to documents they are compared with. For 
LULAC, the full resolution texts and legislative programs for each year were combined in one 
document to achieve this goal. Table 13 below shows the total number of words per document 
after headings, page numbers, and other minor elements not part of the resolutions/p latforms had 
been deleted. 







Platform words Total words 
1994 - - - 252 252 
1995 5,309 20 - 4,295 9,604 
1996 - - - - - 
1997 - - - 2,340 2,340 
1998 7,851 25 1 Er 2,942 10,793 
1999 16,681 59 - 3,112 19,793 
2000 10,586 42 - 2,263 12,849 
2001 12,607 44 - - 12,607 
2002 11, 921 45 3 Sp 1,851 13,772 
2003 8,914 31 1 Sp 2,370 11,284 
2004 22,019 74 1 Sp 2,759 24,778 
2005 9,109 46 1 Sp / 16 Er 3,176 12,285 
2006 9,166 34 2 Sp 3,247 12,413 
2007 15,347 45 1 Er 3,297 18,644 
2008 18,020 59 - 3,311 21,331 
2009 16,601 54 1 Sp 2,588 19,189 
2010 9,097 27 2 Sp 3,052 12,149 
2011 16,373 39 - 4,195 20,568 
2012 6,955 23 1 Sp 3,990 10,945 
2013 15,618 37 2 Sp 4,369 19,987 
Sp: Spanish 
Er: error/corrupted document 
 
As of 1994, platform texts are available and as of 1995, with some exceptions, the resolution 
texts were available.90 In a few cases, resolutions were entirely drafted in Spanish, mostly for 
those resolutions concerning Spanish-speaking U.S. territories Puerto Rico and Guam. In those 
cases, they were not considered for the analysis because the currently available content analysis 
software can’t process different languages together. A number of resolution files could not be 
                                                                 
90
 The year 1996 is missing in its entirety. Mr. Wilkes mentioned that prior to his becoming the first LULAC 
National Executive Director in 1997, record-keeping was not done as systematically as it is today.  
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processed because the files were corrupted, illegible, or both.91 However, the number of missing 
resolutions only constitutes a fraction of the total amount of data, and the effect of it can be 
expected to be marginal.  
After compiling these data in a readable electronic data format, stop words and irrelevant 
data were removed from the documents, and the words were stemmed for one version of each 
dataset. The data considered irrelevant with regard to content only encompass the final sections 
of resolutions that list names of presenters and petitioners of a resolution, the signatory formula 
of the national LULAC president, and the date and place of signing. The list used to filter out 
stop words such as “a,” “the,” etc. was the Porter stop word list, which also was used to filter out 
stop words in JFreq. (2011) Because a number of words in the documents are very specific in the 
wording of resolutions, a few additional words were added to the Porter list; these words were 
“whereas,” ”resolved,” “furthermore,” and “resolution.” Once the raw word matrices were 
created, the words were ranked by frequency and all words that appeared in less than 20 percent 
of the documents were thrown out. Just as with the AFL-CIO case, keeping words particular to a 
few documents or a few years easily could skew the results too much. After the datasets were 
pre-processed, they could be run in Wordfish. As negative and positive identifier documents, I 
once more opted to create two different versions. For the first version of each dataset (stemmed 
and not stemmed) the Republican platform of 1996 and the LULAC platform of 1995 were used 
respectively as negative and positive identifier documents.92 Given the fact that the 
overwhelming majority of Hispanic voters consistently vote Democratic, it would be reasonable 
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 In most cases, this involved defunct web links . 
92
 Note that there was no LULAC platform proposal available for 1996, which is why I opted for the closest by then 
published edition of 1995. 
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to expect the Democratic platform to be closer to the LULAC agenda.93 (Pew 2012) Although a 
more neutral proxy-negative identifier document was used for the AFL-CIO case, I included one 
such version here to for both datasets merely to reconfirm that the difference is negligible, and 
by extent also that the Wordfish method is robust as previous results suggested. The second 
version (stemmed and not stemmed) for both datasets has the LULAC 1995 document as positive 





Most of the party programs were available in digital format and, at least for those published as of 
the 1990s, they were also machine-readable. In some cases, texts had to be scanned in their 
entirety and then were corrected manually after they were reconverted from image formats into 
machine-readable text.94 Table 14 gives an overview of the party manifestos used for this project, 
including the manifestos of represented parties for all federal/general German elections since 
1961.95  
                                                                 
93
 Even with Hispanic support for Republicans at its highest for the period 1980-2012, Republicans received only 
40% of the Hispanic during the presidential election in 2004 compared with the 58% received by Democrats. (Lopez 
et Al. 2012) 
94
 The manual correction, and in some cases text reconstruction, proved to be a lengthy and extremely intensive 
process.  
95
 The two exceptions here are the 1980 maiden manifesto of the German greens, Die Grünen, and the 2013 
manifesto of the German liberal party FDP. I included both in the analysis because despite the one-time failure to 
break through the 5% threshold and the failure to obtain directly elected representatives, both parties significantly 
shaped German politics, both are well-established parts of the party system, and even their lowest scores by far 
outrank any other smaller parties.  
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Table 14: Available German national party manifestos 1961-2013 




1961 x WA x WA - - 
1965 x WA x - - - 
1969 x x x x - - 
1972 x x x - - 
1976 x x x - - 
1980 x x x x - 
1983 x x x x - 
1987 x x x x - 
1990 x x x x x x 
1994 x x x x x 
1998 x x x x x 
2002 x x x x x 
2005 x x x x x 
2009 x x x x x 
2013 x x x x x 
-: Not applicable either because party did not exist yet, or because no program or other election documents were 
published. 
WA: Only a Wahlaufruf – call to elections – or Aktionsprogram with fewer words than a regular program/manifesto 
was published.  
*: CDU/CSU only for the years 1961-69 and 1990, both parties  published separate election programs.
96
 
**: Until 1990 “Die Grünen,” renamed into “Bündnis 90/Die Grünen” after the absorption of/merger with Civil 
Rights groups in former East Germany.  
***: Until 2005 “PDS,” renamed into “PDS/Die Linke” after merger with  WASG for the Federal elections of 2005. 
Sources: Benoit et al. (2009), the Hans Seidel Stiftung (CSU), Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (CDU), Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung (SPD), Friedrich Naumann Stifftung (FDP), Heinrich Böll Stiftung (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen), Rosa 
Luxemburg Stiftung (PDS) [the party acronyms in brackets refer to the party that is affiliated with the 
aforementioned research institutes. 
 
The regular manifestos range from 50 to more than 300 pages, or between 20,000 and 100,000 
words total. The few Wahlaufrufe [Calls to vote] that were included are usually less than ten 
pages long, but in lieu of missing manifestos, even short documents are useful for analysis 
because they tend to include many of the words that can be deemed party keywords or topics. 
(Slapin and Proksch 2008; Proksch and Slapin 2011) Many of the party programs could be found 
in digitized and machine-readable format at the “Political Documents Archive” project of 
                                                                 
96
 Since 1972, CDU and CSU have joint election programs. In 1983 and 1987, both parties had a joint and a separate 
election program, yet despite some small differences, they were the same. The 1990 programs of CDU and CSU 
were once again significantly different, in part because the Bavarian CSU had considered competing with the CDU 
in the new Länder in the former GDR. (Hans Seidel Stifftung 2014) 
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Mannheim University. (Benoit et al. 2009) For many of the older manifestos, however, I needed 
to consult the research institutes affiliated with the included parties.97 Encoding of the documents 
was off in some cases, so that encoding format had to be made uniform in all texts.  
 
2.2.2 Identity-Interest Organizations – DGB 
Data collection for the DGB case would have been immensely more difficult without the help of 
the Friedrich Ebert Stifftung (FES). Through their international office in Washington, I was able 
to borrow hard copies of the entire proceedings documents for all the DGB Bundeskongresse 
[federal/national congresses/conventions] since 1960. Only for the national conventions of 2006 
and 2010 were digitized, machine readable versions available. (DGB 2013/2014) The DGB texts 
used for this project were drawn from the Ordentliche Bundeskongresse [regular national 
conventions] since 1960; from the sixth in 1962 to the 19th in 2010. Aside from the Ordentliche 
Bundeskongresse, the DGB also organized four Außerordentliche Bundeskongresse 
[extraordinary national conventions] in: 1963, 1971, 1981, and 1996. The latter four were not 
considered, as their content only covers internal DGB matters and comprehensive DGB-Satzung 
[DGB-constitution] reform. Over the years, DGB also organized a number of specialized 
conventions such as the DGB-Frauenkongresse [Women congress] or the DGB-Jugendkongresse 
[Youth congress], and Länderkongresse on the state level. Texts from the latter types of 
conventions also were not withheld for this analysis, as the topics were either too specified or 
                                                                 
97
 From some I was able to obtain new scans instead of the published scans. Some of the scans of older SPD 
programs on the FES website, for example, were so bad that it was impossible to get optical recognition software to 
read them. Upon my request, the FES kindly rescanned and republished both programs and sent me the machine-
readable output within a day. A list of the research institutes' websites/services I consulted is included in the 
bibliography. 
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only pertained to the state level, and were more irregular. From the 14 selected DGB documents 
that align to an extent with the German federal electoral cycle, a sub selection of resolution texts 
was made based on the relevance for this project and the approval status. Resolutions covering 
internal DGB organizational matters, union internal matters, and constitutional amendments are 
not considered, as these topics are not germane to this analysis. Every resolution text within the 
convention protocols also lists the Empfehlung [here: determination] regarding the approval of 
those resolutions. Only two of the seven determination categories mean that a resolution indeed 
has been approved. The German version of these categories prepared by the DGB for the 20th 
national convention can be found in the appendix.98 The two categories meaning approval of the 
resolution by the delegates are Annahme [adopted] and Annahme in geänderter Fassung 
[adopted in changed version]. The texts of resolutions that come with the determination 
Annahme are approved in their totality. For the second category the original resolution is listed, 
yet comments with regard to the parts that have been changed for acceptance are mentioned in 
the margins. In most cases, these changes are minor changes in wordings, yet in certain cases 
entire sections are deleted or parts of other resolutions are subsumed. During the pre-processing 
phase, all of these changes had to be taken into account while compiling the texts used for the 
content analysis. 
After concluding the data-collection phase, all party and DGB documents needed to be 
appropriately corrected and formatted before running Wordfish. For many of the party 
manifestos, processing went quickly because many documents already had been formatted 
                                                                 
98
 This document was not publicly available. It was provided to me after communication with the Abteilung 
Organisationspolitik und –entwicklung [Department Organisationpolitics and –development] of the DGB 
Bundesvorstand [DGB national leadership]. 
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properly; for many of the older manifestos and a significant number of newer ones, however, the 
scans needed to be processed with optical recognition software to make them machine-readable. 
After that, all the errors needed to be corrected sentence by sentence. No digitized versions were 
available for the DGB texts. Contrary to the AFL-CIO, the DGB did not publish any comparable 
platform proposals, and instead only produced adopted resolution texts.99 Aside from running 
optical recognition on small-printed, telephone-paper pages, there were a number of additional 
processing obstacles. First, I needed to select only the adopted resolutions and, if necessary, add 
the changes to the original text. After that, it was necessary to check for errors sentence by 
sentence. Given the quality of the paper, the quality of the scans was far from good, and the 
correcting process was labor-intensive. For both party manifestos and DGB resolution texts, 
spelling had to be corrected in accordance with the most recent German spelling reform. In order 
to create the word matrix, I ran all 77 documents through JFreq. (2011) To stay uniform with the 
previous analysis on LULAC and AFL-CIO, I used a Porter stop word list for German words, 
and for the stemmed version I used the JFreq stemmer. Jfreq allows for automatically changing 
upper case letters to lower case, which is a big advantage when analyzing German texts. The 
resulting.csv files formed the basis for the word matrix to be fed to Wordfish.100  
                                                                 
99
 The DGB does publish small, pamphlet-like documents that call members to vote, yet these are neither regular nor 
substantial enough to distill the organization’s policy stances on the wide aray of topics discussed in their resolutions 
and party programs.  
100
 In addition to the Porter stop words list, I added a few other unsubstantive words that frequently occurred: 
aktionsprogramm, bundeskongress, begründung, angenommen, abgelehnt, antragsteller, bundesvorstand, betr., 
ordentliche, ordentlicher, ordentlichen, dgb-bundeskongress, möge, mögen, beschliessen, beschließen, delegierten, 
seite, wortlaut, antrages, anträge, anträgen, bescluss, beschluß, antrag, erledigung, erledigt, nummer. 
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After running Wordfish a first time, I noticed that many words seemed garbled and odd. I 
checked the word matrix .csv files again and detected an encoding problem. JFreq was designed 
to read German Umlaut signs (üäö) and the Eszett sign (ß), however, the data in the word matrix 
file were not properly read. Luckily, the problem was not related to JFreq but merely to the fact 
that the original texts were encoded differently than JFreq.101 After ensuring the encoding issue 
was resolved, stemmed and non-stemmed output versions were created and processed with 
Wordfish.102  
After a reading of the used texts and weighing the extent of political dissimilarity, two 
reference texts for the DGB case were selected. For the DGB case, policies with regard to the 
redistribution of wealth and the role of the state are the largest topic clusters. I opted for the 1969 
DGB adopted resolutions as positive identifier text and the 1969 FDP program as negative 
identifier text. While the German Christian Democrats and conservatives might have been an 





                                                                 
101
 The original raw German text data was ISO-8859-1 encoded (the default in MS Word), but the default encoding 
used by Jfreq is UTF-8, and it was just splitting words on characters in the range 0x80-0xFF because it didn't 
recognize those as valid letters in UTF-8. Although many of the output results were still useful and accurate, a large 
number of unusual outputs occurred. For example, the word Beschäftigung [Occupation] would end up split up as 
Besch and ftigung, neither would make any sense in German.  
102
 In terms of data, the DGB case was the largest case with the highest number of unique words in the final word 
matrix. Not entirely surprisingly, the data had to be run on a much more powerful engine overnight. 
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2.2.3 Identity-Interest Organizations – TGD 
TGD, founded in 1995 and thereby the youngest of the six non-party organizations that will be 
analyzed, provides a number of digitized press statements and publications since 1996.103 
Lexicographically, much of the content will be similar, although there will be less data for the 
earlier years. There are two types of documents I used for this analysis. The first are the press 
statements by TGD collected in one document per publication year. The press statements provide 
comments on various policies relevant to the population in Germany with a Turkish background, 
and include the formulation of demands or suggestions by TGD with the goals of fighting 
discrimination of Turks and Muslims in Germany and fostering of integration. The bulk of the 
statements would be in response to an incident or policy implementation that attracted national 
attention. TGD will provide an analysis and suggestions for policy improvement or change. Over 
the years, the number of press statements grew significantly; while all data were collected up to 
2013, none was included for 2014. 
The second types of documents are the so called TGD-Thesen [TGD theses] that were 
published as of 2006. (2006; 2007; 2013) These theses are elaborate programmatic texts 
comparable to sections of party programs addressing a thematic cluster of policy issues, such as 
religion and gender. Because TGD is an umbrella organization that attempts to find a consensus 
between the various geographical, vocational, and other communities of Turks in Germany, the 
detail of the TGD-Thesen is remarkable. The TGD-Thesen on women and gender equality, for 
                                                                 
103
 Unfortunately, older material, in particular the TGD periodicals, is only available at the TGD archives and is not 
available to the public; several requests regarding these data were denied . 
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example, provide a well-argued, lengthy, 10-point policy program in order to address carefully 
discussed problems.104  
Part of the activity of the TGD is to promote policy change. To this end, similar to other 
interest groups, it drafts legislative proposals often based on the TGD-Thesen documents and 
points mentioned in various press statements. The way the annual data listed here were 
constructed is by the collection of the German written press statements and the valid TGD-
Thesen texts. This means that while a TGD-These may have been published years earlier, it is 
also included for those years in which it is still valid. One could compare this, for example, to a 
political party adopting programs for two elections in which certain sections don’t differ much 
from each other with regard to wording and content. I can justify including data here this way 
because the texts in question are supposed to be valid for the years under analysis, while party 
programs are only valid for one specific election. Additionally, in instances where I could trace 
changes in the content of Thesen texts, these changes were included for the relevant years. While 
the TGD-Thesen texts are definitely focused on policy at the national level, the press statements 
do deal to some extent also with more local issues – state level of the Bundesländer. 
Table 15 lists all the documents used and the total word count. In a few cases, 
comparable to Spanish resolutions for LULAC, TGD statements were only written in Turkish. 
Inclusion of these was not possible for the reason that the software used can’t be applied to two 
different languages at the same time. However, despite the exclusion of these data, I am 
                                                                 
104
 A problem with the availability of the TGD-Thesen is that the web content is periodically adapted. The 
documents listed in the table above reflect the data available during the period data were collected for the TGD case 
and may differ slightly from the current content. The current theses were last updated in 2011 and 2012. I obtained 
original copies of the theses as they were published. In 2006, the first versions of the gender-equality and religion 
policies were published, in 2007 the media thesis, and in 2013 the theses about racism and integration.  
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confident that the remaining texts are sufficient for the analysis because only a small part had to 
be excluded. None of the TGD data was corrupted nor was affected by encoding issues. After 
lecture of the used texts and weighing the extent of political dissimilarity, two reference texts for 
the TGD case I selected. For the TGD, case policies with regard to the majority-vs.-minority 
culture and immigration/integration are the largest topic clusters. I opted for the 1998 TGD press 
statements as positive identifier text and the 1998 CDU-CSU program as negative identifier text.  
Table 15: word count and document types for the TGD case 
Year Total words Type of document(s) Missing data 
1996 398 2 PR 1 TK 
1997 5,334 15 PR 3 TK 
1998 828 3PR - 
1999 1,796 5 PR - 
2000 1,821 4 PR - 
2001 3,523 8 PR - 
2002 2,183 8 PR 4 TK 
2003 2,030 8 PR 2 TK 
2004 2,177 6 PR - 
2005 2,297 7 PR 3 TK 
2006 17,674 5 PR / 2 TS 2 TK 
2007 24,243 6 PR / 3 TS 4 TK 
2008 26,532 8 PR / 3 TS 3TK 
2009 26,651 13 PR / 3 TS 5 TK 
2010 28,872 26 PR / 3 TS 4 TK 
2011 14,498 18 PR / 3 TS 5 TK 
2012 17,656 30 PR / 3 TS 6 TK 
2013 23,648 39 PR  / 5 TS 6 TK 
PR: Press release 
TK: Press release in Turkish only 




The Japanese parties considered for the analysis here are only those that have been consistently 
represented in the Japanese upper house or House of Councilors (HoC) and lower house or 
House of Representatives (HoR) since the electoral reform of the Lower House in 1993. There 
are two main reasons why I limit our analysis to the time after 1993. First, because of the 
traditionally strict electoral legislation, manifestos were a novelty in Japanese politics and 
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weren’t published until the late 1990s. Second, although a change of the electoral system was not 
the only factor, let alone the most important, the electoral reform of the HoR helped end the 
unchallenged dominance of the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party [Jiyū-Minshutō]) as the leading 
party.105 Although the earlier SNTV electoral system, itself, does not facilitate one-party 
dominance, it was a contributing factor to the clientelist relationship between voters and the LDP 
candidates of their constituencies.106 The main change in 1993 was that SNTV was replaced by a 
combination of FPTP (First Past The Post) and PR (Proportional Representation) system still 
allowing for more room for smaller parties to enter the party system, while strengthening party 
coherence. Of the current 480 seats, 180 are elected based on PR from 11 multimember districts 
spanning the entire country.107 The remaining 300 are elected based on FPTP single-seat 
constituencies comparable to British House of Commons elections or the U.S. House of 
Representatives. Similar to Germany, every voter casts two votes: a PR vote and a single 
                                                                 
105
 Cf. Baker and Scheiner 2007: While the electoral reform may have had an effect, it does not adequately explain 
LDP dominance. This would also explain why over two decades later, despite being far less d ominant, the LDP 
remains the key player in Japanese politics.  
106
 An earlier reform in 1982 had introduced partial proportional representation to the HoC. Of the 242 HoC seats, 
146 are elected in the 47 single and multiseat prefectural districts by SNTV, while 96 are elected based on PR. 
SNTV (Single Non Transferable Vote) voters cast one vote in a multiseat constituency; the seats are awarded to the 
three candidates with the highest number of votes. The level of proportionality depends on the number of seat s per 
electoral districts; if there are few seats per district, SNTV, as was the case for Japan, will tend to be less 
proportional. 
107
 Originally the number of seats was 500, with 200 PR-based seats. However, only the 1996 election was for 500 
seats; as of the 2000 HoR, 480 were elected. 
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constituency vote.108 Three changes that in part originated from the reform became visible as of 
the election of 1996 and persisted afterwards. First, the traditionally strong level of factionalism 
within parties decreased, while the parties, themselves, became stronger in the sense that 
campaigns became more party-centered and less about individual candidates, with perhaps the 
exception of party leaders.109 (Curtis 1999; Reed 2003) Second, local elites were less capable of 
gathering votes for specific candidates compared with the past. Instead, a more volatile electorate 
and decreasing electoral participation became more commonplace. (Curtis 1999) Third, a 
majority of the voters did not perceive the LDP anymore as the only party that was capable of 
governing the country.110 
The reason for not including all parties is that many of the ones that emerged in that 
period either remained unsuccessful in attracting voters, or emerged as split-offs from larger 
parties, often dissolving or merging with other parties within a few years’ time. On top of that, 
most of these parties quickly became defunct or were absorbed into other parties, making it 
difficult, if not impossible, to retrieve any of the manifesto documents. The five parties that were 
consistently represented in the Diet since the reform of 1994 are: LDP, DPJ (Democratic Party of 
Japan), SDPJ (Social Democratic Party of Japan), JCP (Japanese Communist Party), NKP (New 
Kōmeitō Party (Justice Party/Buddhist; new added to differentiate from the old Kōmeitō 
                                                                 
108
 The main difference would be that the results of the FPTP and PR votes aren’t linked as in the German case, so 
no things such as Überhangmandate occur.  
109
 As of the 2001 House of Representatives , the charisma of Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro and his internal 
reforms within the LDP only strengthened these factors. (Kabashima and Steel 2010) 
110
 Although the LDP had a few coalition experiences in 1976, 1979, and 1983, when the LDP found itself shy of a 
few seats of a majority, it wasn’t until the 1993 elections that the party fell so far behind that it was forced to form a 
coalition with its traditional opponent the JSP. 
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Party).111 LDP and JCP are the only two parties that were also present in the previous party 
system. SDPJ is a successor party of the previously second-largest party the JSP, whereas NKP 
is a merger of various smaller parties and the old Kōmeitō Party. The DPJ emerged in 1998 and 
replaced JSP/SDPJ as the second-largest party and the main challenger of the LDP. 
Table 16: retrieved election manifestos  
Year + 
Election 





NNP PNP YP Restoration 
1998* HoC X X X X NA NA NA NA 
2000 HoR X X X X NA NA NA NA 
2001 HoC X X X - NA NA NA NA 
2003 HoR X X X X NA NA NA NA 
2004 HoC X X - X NA NA NA NA 
2005 HoR X X X X NA X NA NA 
2007 HoC X X X X X X NA NA 
2009 HoR X X X - X NA NA NA 
2010 HoC X X X X NA NA X NA 
2012 HoR X X - X NA NA X - 
2013 HoC X X - - NA NA NA NA 
X: Election manifesto 
-: missing data  
*: For 1998, some parties only published a base program. As this was often also their first pro gram published, it was 
included.  
 
 For most of these parties, it was possible to retrieve manifestos in particular by searching 
on Japanese search engines and party websites, and by consulting party headquarters (cf. Table 
16).112 In some cases, there were either no manifestos published or they weren’t accessible. The 
one big missing chunk of data is the JCP manifestos. JCP does have many lengthy outside 
publications from which one could construct proxy manifestos. However, because there are too 
many formats from which to make an objective selection, it seemed best to leave JCP out 
altogether. A theoretical reason rooted in empirical fact that also makes this omission acceptable 
                                                                 
111
 The abbreviations listed here are those generally accepted in English; the “J” is added sometimes.  
112
 The “Manifesto Project Database” provides some Japanese manifestos but is highly incomplete compared with 
the data gathered here. https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/parties/540 - accessed march 2014 
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is that JCP as a party has lost most of its historical significance with regard to its presence in the 
national Diet, in particular for the period under analysis, which is integrally post-cold-war.   
While Wordfish can operate with Japanese signs, JFreq, the program I used to compute 
the data files to feed into the former program, does not read Japanese signs. Additionally, many 
of the Japanese texts use quite different forms of encoding of text documents. Encoding becomes 
relevant when preparing the data files needed to feed Wordfish. Non-uniform encoding may 
provide errors or unexpected omissions. While differences in encoding also occur with texts in 
the same language, I noticed that this was much more pronounced with the texts in Japanese. As 
a consequence, the step of translation was necessary for those texts that had no English 
equivalent authored by the organizations.  The first step then was to ensure that encoding was 
uniform for all files, where needed files were appropriately converted, in this case to UTF-8. The 
second step involved applying a tokenizer program to the Japanese election manifestos. Because 
Japanese words, unlike European languages, don’t consist of signs that are connected, only 
context allows the reader to identify the separate word meanings. A tokenizer or word-
segmentation program does just that; it will identify the words in a text by grouping the kanji, 
hiragana, and katakana characters in a way that makes contextual sense. Given the relatively 
short length of the Japanese manifestos, 30 to 40 pages, I opted for the use the Kuromoji 
morphological analyzer. (Atilika 2011-12) After applying a tokenizer, I count the word 
frequencies after which the words are translated. In order to ensure adequate translations, a 
Japanese political scientist assisted me with the translations, and a computer encoding specialist 
with knowledge of Japanese assisted me with the software.113 Where needed, texts were 
processed via Jfreq, after which the .csv files were fed into Wordfish for analysis. 
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 Hitomi Nakamura and Erik Bray. 




2.3.2 Identity-Interest Organizations - RENGO 
For a good set of data containing the programmatic positions of RENGO, I compiled texts 
organized annually from the online available press statements at the RENGO website. The 
content of the acquired mirrors the topics relevant to the Japanese workers’ movement and 
sufficiently resembles lexicography. In terms of length, all annual compilations go beyond a few 
hundred words and are at least 1,000 words long, although the average is far higher than that. 
(See Table 17)  
Table 17: total words per annually compiled RENGO document 


















While the data were available in digitized formats, it was still necessary to be 
appropriately corrected and formatted before running Wordfish. Also, encoding had to be double-
checked to ensure that the analysis wouldn’t run in error. The data included here, compilations of 
press statements from 1998 to 2013, run parallel with the period in which Japanese parties started 
publishing election manifestos on a regular basis, and coincide with the post-bubble Japanese 
party system. While our data are thus limited to the past two decades, they enable us to provide 
in-depth research on a relatively under analyzed period in Japanese politics, in particular because 
                                                                                                                        
117 
 
of the novel approach of comparing content of the relatively new and overwhelmingly dominant 
labor federation RENGO and the relevant parties.  
To stay uniform with the previous analysis on LULAC and AFL-CIO, I used a Porter 
stop word list for English words, and for the stemmed version I used the JFreq stemmer. 
Because the original texts used here were already translated by the authoring organization, the 
intermediate step of applying a tokenizer and consulting the help of translators familiar with 
political science data and coding could be skipped. The resulting.csv files formed the basis for 
the word matrix to be fed to Wordfish. An important reason why I opted to consider only 
English-written and -translated texts for the Japanese cases is the uniformity of the project 
research design. Although word frequency and stop-word/stemmer software exists for Japanese 
script, it is not compatible for other languages; the word frequency software used for this project, 
JFreq, and the stop-word list, based on Porter, are currently only applicable to a dozen European 
languages.114   
After a reading of the used texts and weighing the extent of political dissimilarity, two 
reference texts for the RENGO case were selected. For the RENGO case, policies involving the 
redistribution of wealth and the role of the state are the largest topic clusters. I opted for the 1998 
RENGO press statements as positive identifier text and the 1998 LDP program as negative 
identifier text. Compared with the other major parties, LDP appeared the least similar.115 The 
                                                                 
114
 An additional difficulty with regard to multi-case content analysis including Japanese texts is that Japanese, itself, 
employs three different character systems: kanji, hiragana, and katakana. Translation was thus inevitable for this 
project with the exception of those documents for which a translation by the original authoring organization was 
available.  
115
 The exception was the newly founded Restoration Party. However, because only one manifesto was available, 
selecting this party would skew the output too much.  
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other major parties, DPJ, JSP, and also the Buddhist- inspired New Kōmeitō Party, all appeared 
closer to RENGO, in particular JSP.  
 
2.3.3 Identity-Interest Organizations - BLL 
Of all organizations under analysis, the BLL was the by far the most obscure and the most 
difficult organization for which to find consistent data. Because they are the only regular and 
freely available publications authored by the BLL, I opted to use publications by BLL’s research 
institute, the BLHRRI (Buraku Liberation and Human Rights Research Institute). While the 
BLHRRI/BLL has several publications, the only regular publication is the bimonthly Buraku 
Liberation News, which I used for this analysis, as it adequately reflects the accents over the 
years of the BLL programmatic content.  The topics cover specific Buraku issues as well as 
Human Rights, as both topical segments became largely intertwined for the BLL, and the 
publication reflects the goals and interests of the BLL very well.   
The content of the acquired mirrors the topics relevant to the Japanese workers’ 
movement and sufficiently resembles lexicography. In terms of length, all annual compilations 
go beyond a few hundred words and are at least 1,000 words long, although the average is far 
higher than that. (See Table 18) Unfortunately, I could not obtain data past 2009.  
                              Table 18: total words per annually compiled BLL document  
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While the data were available in digitized formats, it was still necessary to be 
appropriately corrected and formatted before running Wordfish. Also encoding had to be double-
checked to ensure that the analysis wouldn’t run in error. The data included here, compilations of 
press statements from 1998 to 2009, run parallel with the period in which Japanese parties started 
publishing election manifestos on a regular basis, and coincide with the post-bubble Japanese 
party system. While our data are thus limited to an even smaller period than for RENGO, they 
still enable us to provide in-depth research. Unlike RENGO, the other extra-electoral 
organization for the Japan case, BLL is a much older organization. The publications by the 
BLHRRI used here are available as of 1981. However, because no comparable electoral 
manifestos were produced by Japanese parties prior to the late 1990s, these data unfortunately 
could not be included.  
To stay uniform with the previous analysis on LULAC, AFL-CIO, and RENGO, I also 
used the Porter stop word list for English words, and for the stemmed version I used the JFreq 
stemmer. Because the original texts used here were already translated by the authoring 
organization, the intermediate step of applying a tokenizer and consulting the help of translators 
familiar with political science data and coding could be skipped. The resulting .csv files formed 
the basis for the word matrix to be fed to Wordfish.  
After a reading of the used texts and weighing the extent of political dissimilarity, two 
reference texts for the BLL case I selected. For the BLL case, policies involving human rights 
and minority protection and discrimination are the largest topic clusters. I opted for the 1998 
BLL publications as positive identifier text and the 1998 LDP program as negative identifier text. 
Similar to the RENGO case, compared with the other major parties, LDP appeared the least 
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similar.116 The other major parties, DPJ, JSP, and also the Buddhist- inspired New Kōmeitō Party 
all appeared closer to RENGO, in particular JSP. In the case of BLL, New Kōmeitō appeared 
somewhat closer than in the RENGO case.  
 
3. Concluding remark 
In this chapter, I explained why the selected method is the best currently available one and 
adequate for the purposes of this project. For each of the selected identity- interest organizations, 
I selected documents that are both representative of the organizations’ content and that are 
sufficiently comparable to election manifestos of the national parties of the three country cases. 
Because of the infinite arena identity- interest organizations exist in, and because of practical 
limitations that were discussed above, the current selection of identity- interest organizations is 
the most optimal. The current text selection will at least be sufficient to test our hypotheses and 
to draw some general conclusions about the cleavage alignments of the populations these groups 
in represent. The following two chapters that present and provide a discussion of the research 
results will illuminate which of the three hypotheses can be confirmed, and which ones will need 
to be rejected or amended. The intensive data collection process and the rigor of the selected 
method paved the way for potential future projects addressing the findings in the following two 
chapters.  
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 The exception was the newly founded Restoration Party. However, because only one manifesto was available, 
selecting this party would skew the output too much.  
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Chapter Four: Party systems and Cleavage translation 
 
Overview 
In this chapter, I discuss the testing of the two hypotheses that relate to the characteristics of two-
party, multiparty, and dominant-party systems. The first hypothesis to be tested, responsiveness 
of parties to cleavage translation over time (H1), relates to the level of responsiveness of parties 
to cleavage translation depending on the party system. The second hypothesis, level of 
fluctuation of party translation of cleavages over time (H2), relates to the differences in cleavage 
translation among parties within the same party system.117  
H1: In a two-party system, parties will be or become less responsive to cleavage 
translation over time. In a multiparty system, parties will be more responsive to cleavage 
translation over time. In a dominant-party system, the dominant party will be less 
responsive to cleavage translation, whereas the other parties will be more responsive over 
time. 
 
H2: In a two-party system, it is likely that one party will translate one pole of a cleavage 
slightly stronger than the other. In a multiparty system, several parties will compete to 
attract the votes of a cleavage-based organization; therefore I should expect cleavage 
translation to fluctuate across parties over time. In a dominant-party system, cleavage 
translation will mainly fluctuate among opposition parties, while cleavage translation by 
the dominant party gradually erodes or remains stagnant at a low level. 
 
 H1: Responsiveness of parties to 
cleavage translation over time 
H2: level of fluctuation of party 
translation of cleavages over time 
2-party system Parties are or become less 
responsive  
One party will be slightly 
more responsive than other 
Multiparty system Parties become more 
responsive over time 
Party responsiveness will 
fluctuate over time across 
parties 
Dominant party system Dominant party is or becomes 
less responsive, other parties 
will have higher- level 
responsiveness 
Party responsiveness will 
fluctuate higher among other 
parties, but remains stagnant 
at low level for the dominant 
party 
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 The time period the hypotheses apply to is 1960 to present. 




In order to find out whether the hypotheses hold for the cases examined, and to examine whether 
they only hold for one or both cleavages analyzed in this project, I decided to devote one section 
to union federations and the other to minority group organizations.  
 
 
1. Labor Union Federations 
Below are eight figures that provide a visual representation for the Wordfish data outputs 
retrieved for the various datasets. The first two figures show the results for the two different U.S. 
datasets. (Figures 6-7) The next five figures are data from the German dataset divided for the 
sake of visual clarity. (Figures 8-12) The last figure shows the data for the Japanese dataset. 
(Figure 13) The original data output transcripts for all figures can be found in the appendix. 
Although I processed stemmed and unstemmed versions of the datasets, I opted to only use the 
unstemmed ones because there did not appear to be any significant differences between stemmed 
and unstemmed results.118 
 
1.1 AFL-CIO 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the erosion of influence on politics of organized labor would lead 
us expect that these interests became less and less translated by the two major U.S. political 
                                                                 
118
 Only for the Japanese dataset no stemmed version was created. My reasoning for doing so was threefold. First, 
stemming had no significant effect for other datasets examined so far. Second, the data available for the Japanese 
dataset was much more limited, as the documents were substantially shorter. Stemming might have simplified  the 
results too much. Third, the usage of a tokenizer and translation of texts may have caused minor changes here and 
there. Stemming would potentially inflate  these changes.  
The data in the appendix underline the relative unimportance of stemming. For more on stemming cf. Publications 
by Slapin and Proksch (2008).  
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parties – which was also reflected by our hypotheses. Our analysis indeed will have to confirm if 
this is actually the case, or if the articulation of workers’ interests by political parties goes 
against this expectation. Another expectation here is that, given the historical stance of the 
Republican Party throughout much of the twentieth century has been consistently focused on 
eroding organized labor’s power, I should expect more proximity between the Democratic 















Figure. 6: Dataset I: Position estimates for AFL-CIO documents as compared with Democratic and Republican 
platforms 1960-2013, not stemmed 
 
The results from dataset one show that the programmatic content of both parties on one hand, 
and the AFL-CIO on the other, are gradually drifting apart. For the most part, the Democratic 
Party appears to be somewhat closer to the AFL-CIO, yet in recent years it seems as if this 
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relationship was reversed, rendering the Republican platforms closer to the AFL-CIO’s. 
However, the relative closeness of one of the parties to the AFL-CIO’s content seems trivial 
when compared with the increasingly large gap between AFL-CIO and the two parties. The 
AFL-CIO’s documents appear to be very consistent with each other over time, with some smaller 
differences between the AFL-CIO’s platform proposal texts and the other documents. The period 
from 1960 to 1968 exhibits the largest fluctuations between party estimates. The data suggest 
that 1964 in particular was one of stronger polarization between Republicans and Democrats, 
whereas in 1960 and 1968, both parties’ stances on workers’ issues are almost identical.  
For both the Democrats and Republicans, the estimates appear to have gotten slightly 
more positive again in the past two decades, yet they are still far away from the positions 
recorded for the pre-Reagan era. The AFL-CIO estimates are relatively consistent with a few 
minor fluctuations. As of 1995, the year the AFL-CIO leadership was renewed and the 
organization invested highly into reconnecting with its grassroots, surprisingly, the estimate 
values decrease for three consecutive convention texts after 1995. It is not until 2005, the year 
that the CTW split off, that the profile of the AFL-CIO becomes somewhat more outspoken 
again. The general trend after 2005, possibly influenced by the economic crisis of 2007, is that 
both parties’ and AFL-CIO’s estimates appear to grow closer again, yet still not even close to the 
levels of the pre-Reagan era.     
















Figure 7: Dataset II: Position estimates for AFL-CIO platform proposals as compared with Democratic and 
Republican platforms 1960-1984, not stemmed (only platforms) 
 
The data used for dataset II only include part of the data in Dataset I, as only the AFL-CIO 
platform proposals and the party platforms for the corresponding years were analyzed. Despite 
only looking at part of the data used in Dataset I, the position estimations are almost completely 
in line with those of said Dataset II, including the larger distance between Republicans and 
Democrats for 1964. In addition, just as with the first dataset, the effects of stemming and using a 
more neutral direction document are marginal. The results of the three other versions of Dataset 
II are also included in the appendix. The only difference is that the estimates for parties and those 
for the AFL-CIO are closer to each other. This makes sense because I expected that the AFL-
CIO platform proposals, which were explicitly addressed to both parties, would be more 
compromising in terms of their content. 
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Table 19: document position estimates for both parties and results of Presidential elections 1960-2012 
Election year Democratic 
Platform 
Republican Platform Winner Loser  
1960 -0.29117 * -0.32686 Kennedy D Nixon R 
1964 -0.09747 * -0.66087 Johnson D Goldwater R 
1968 -0.36540 -0.32405 * Nixon R Humphrey D 
1972 -0.12112 -0.55083 * Nixon R McGovern D 
1976 -0.14168 * -0.59194 Carter D Ford R 
1980 -0.29487 -0.74078 * Reagan R Carter D 
1984 -0.66905 -0.94259 * Reagan R Mondale D 
1988 -0.96299 -1.14718 * H. W. Bush R Dukakis D 
1992 -1.20713 * -1.39039 Clinton D H. W. Bush R 
1996 -1.69490 * -1.39963 Clinton D Dole R 
2000 -1.34706 -1.40575 * G. W. Bush R Gore D 
2004 -1.51306 -1.65937 * G. W. Bush R Kerry D 
2008 -1.24528 * -1.24580 Obama D McCain R 
2012 -1.41265 * -1.09375 Obama D Romney R 
*: winning platform; bold + underlined: most positive platform. 
 
Table 19 provides an overview of which presidential candidates won the election and the levels 
of similarity of each party’s presidential platforms when compared to the AFL-CIO’s platform 
and resolution texts. The overall trend is that the Democrats appear to translate workers’ 
demands slightly better for most of the period from 1960 to the present. The three exceptions are 
the first Nixon platform, the second Clinton platform, and the second Obama platform.119 The 
other trend is that both parties are translating workers’ issues decreasingly during the analyzed 
period.    
With regard to incumbents running for re-election, regardless of party or outcome, the 
platforms move to a more negative position. Another potential trend – although more 
speculative – that can be inferred from table 19 is that 8 out of 14 winning platforms were those 
less representative of workers’ demands.  
                                                                 
119
 While it may appear strange that the Obama platform is scored more right two elements should be considered. 
First, these differences are very small. Second, as an incumbent, the Obama campaign may have attempted to focus 
on those voters who were deemed less of a certainty, pulling the text more to the right, whereas the Romney 
campaign may have been doing the opposite. 
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The data from Dataset III, which only includes the alternate AFL-CIO documents and 
party platforms, confirm the trends that could be observed from the analysis of both Datasets I 
and II, which contain platform proposals and resolutions. For Dataset II, I used the 1971 AFL-
CIO text as positive marker, and the 1972 Republican text as negative marker. Despite the use of 
a subset of Dataset I, and different directional documents, the results stay in line with those of 
Dataset I and II. The only difference is that the scores for both parties are slightly more positive 
for the dataset only using platform proposals, Dataset III. 
 
1.2 DGB 
Figures 8 through 12 display the estimates of the by far largest, and oldest, national labor 
advocacy organization in Germany, DGB, compared to individual party scores. 
 
Figure 8: DGB compared to CDU and CSU scores  
 




Figure 9: DGB compared to SPD scores  
 
 
Figure 10: DGB compared to FDP scores 
 




Figure 11: DGB compared to Bündnis90/Die Grünen scores  
 
 
Figure 12: DGB compared to PDS/Die Linke scores 
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What is striking is the sharp drop of the scores for the three older parties after 1976. 
CDU-CSU (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschland – Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern 
[German Christian-democratic parties: Christian-democratic union Germany – Christian-social 
union in Bavaria]), FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei [German liberal party; Free Democratic 
Party, and SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland [Social-democratic party Germany]), 
all appear to become much more distant as of 1980. While it is tempting to attribute this change 
to the entry of the Green party in 1980 and topics more emphasized by the latter party, the way 
Wordfish works wouldn’t allow this because all programs, regardless of publication year or party, 
are weighed against each other. A major difference between the party manifestos before 1980 
and after for the CDU, the CSU, and the FDP is length. Before 1980, some of the programs 
available only take up a few pages and have significantly fewer words than later manifestos, 
averaging between 459 and 2,411 words, while the SPD documents after 1976 are significantly 
longer. While an analysis comparing lengthy documents with short ones is not impossible, the 
analysis will become more accurate as the pool of potential words to compare increases. It is thus 
plausible to assume that the relative positive party scores from before 1980 can be attributed to 
the shortness of available texts. Having just a few hundred words in some texts when compared 
with more than 10,000 in others, in particular after filtering out stop words and non-substantial 
words, will reduce score accuracy because of the dearth of remaining words. 
Despite having word counts ranging between 3,423 and 25,258, the SPD also scores 
significantly more positively before 1980 than after. While some documents are significantly 
shorter, like the 1969 document that has 3,423 words, this in itself would not explain why the 
scores after 1980 become much more negative for SPD documents. In other words, these results 
indicate that the SPD must have moved away from the DGB in terms of content after 1976. A 
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number of elements explain this change in content. First, as of 1966 until 1982, the SPD governs 
in a coalition and for the first time since the foundation of the FRG, and as of 1969, as the 
leading party. Participation in governments led to a stronger internal party opposition that was 
keen on rewriting the basic SPD program; in particular it was interested in making the SPD back 
in line again with traditional Marxist ideology that had characterized the party before the 
implementation of the Godesberger Programm in 1959. In short, the 1959 Godesberger 
Programm moved the party away from a revolutionary socialist- and Marxist-inspired mass party 
toward a pluralistic, social-democratic catch-all party. (Hintersatz 2006) Indeed, a new, basic 
party document called “Orientierungsrahmen 85” [Orientation-frame 85] was adopted as new, 
guiding, base document in 1975, yet the adoption proved to be a Phyrric victory for the SPD left-
wing. On one hand, many of the proposals steering the SPD back into the pre-Godesberg 
direction were rejected. On the other hand, many of the pro-Godesberg and right-wing SPD 
cadres adopted “Orientierungsrahmen 85” in part to avoid party splits, in particular because of 
the upcoming national elections. The content of the document was soon forgotten and the party 
moved even further away from its traditional, socialist roots. While this is certainly not the only 
explanation, the combination of becoming a governing party that had to compromise with the 
two political foes to the right, and an internal defeat of the leftist SPD cadres, explains in part 
why the SPD drifted further away from DGB after 1976.  
A second element worth mentioning here is the resolution of some important issues that 
had plagued the Federal Republic since its creation: the relationship with the GDR, the 
Communist Party, and the Soviet Union. On one hand, the Ostpolitik [East-politics] of the Brandt 
governments partly defused the troubled relationships with the GDR and other Eastern bloc 
states, and paved the way for the acceptance of what is now the eastern border of the unified 
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Germany. On the other hand, it also enabled SPD leaders to treat Marxist elements within the 
party with communist sympathies as not unifiable with the SPD’s pluralist party doctrine. One 
should bear in mind that the student revolts of the late 1960s and terror attacks of radical left-
wing groups like the RAF (Rote Armee Fraktion [Red Army Faction]), all occurred during years 
with SPD-led governments. Additionally, the end of the economic boom of the 1950s and 1960s 
and the subsequent first major economic crisis in the early 1970s could also be related to this 
result.  
Lastly, and in part related to the previous two elements, certain topics receive much more 
attention after 1976, such as the environment and foreign policy. In particular, there was the 
creation of a Green party, Die Grünen, which with regard to certain topics traditionally embodied 
by the SPD, positioned themselves much more away from the center. The creation of a political 
force with a more left-leaning profile, as well as the internal defeat of traditional socialist cadres, 
may have contributed to a move of the SPD to the center after 1976. While much of the above is 
speculative, it would explain a shift in content, while length of texts would only explain a much 
smaller part for the shift in pre-1980 SPD programs when compared with post-1980 ones. As of 
the 1980 elections, the SPD is a party that has led governments and now competes with the 
CDU-CSU for the favor of voters, making it less attentive to its traditional ideological base than 
before that time, and it receives competition from the new Green party. 
Aside from the drop of scores for the three traditional parties after 1976, the shift to more 
positive scores for the 2013 election stands out. I could trace some of the changes in content to 
specific political changes of the last decade. Looking at the SPD scores since 1980 there isn’t 
really any significant difference until 2013. Even the shift from a more traditional social-
democratic ideology toward Dritter Weg politics – analogous to Tony Blair’s third way politics – 
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under Gerhard Schröder, only resulted in minimal differences. Two factors that may explain a 
partial shift in content in 2013 are on one hand the growth of other parties to the left, and on the 
other hand, the position of the SPD vis-à-vis the CDU-CSU, in particular with regard to the last 
two so-called Grand Coalitions of recent.   
The first factor is the opposition to the left. Given the appearance of the Green party in 
the 1980s and the PDS in 1990, the SPD has always dealt with some level of competition from 
parties that were considered further left. Schröder’s policies, however, led to a split within parts 
of the SPD leading to the creation of WASG (Arbeit und Soziale Gerechtigkeit – Die 
Wahlalternative [Work and Social Justice – The Electoral Alternative]) in 2004. Many of the 
WASG cadres consisted of former SPD members and labor union members. As of 2007, WASG 
fused with the former GDR communist party PDS into the new left party Die Linke. Until then, 
the PDS had only been successful in the former GDR Länder. The significance of the fusion with 
WASG lies in the fact that as Die Linke, the unified party managed to get small-yet- important 
footholds in several old Länder, resulting in a number of Länder-parliament-seats comparable to 
that of other smaller parties such as FDP or Bündnis90/Die Grünen. In particular, in the Land of 
Saarland, where Die Linke had the support of former SPD Chancellor-candidate Oskar 
Lafontaine, the party did well. For the regional elections in the Saarland in 2009, for example, 
Die Linke gained 21.3 percent of the votes coming from 2.3 percent in 2004, whereas the SPD 
had only a few percentage points more, with a total of 24.5 percent. Although Die Linke lost 
some terrain again in 2013, it remains the third-largest party in the Saarland, with 16.1 percent. 
While the success of Die Linke in the other old Länder was not as impressive as in the Saarland, 
the party managed to gain a foothold in the regional parliaments of Bremen, Hamburg, and 
Hessen.  
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The second factor is the position of the SPD versus the other larger party, the CDU-CSU, 
in particular with regard to the Grand Coalitions. The first Grand Coalition between CDU-CSU 
and SPD lasted from 1966 till 1969. The big difference with the current party system is that at 
the time, there was only one opposition party, the FDP. Additionally, the 1966 CDU-CSU-SPD 
coalition was an uneasy partnership that had originated when the FDP’s departure from the 
CDU-CSU-FDP coalition, which was created in 1963. The next two Grand Coalitions occur four 
decades later as the consequence of election results, not as a result of a coalition partner’s 
departure from the coalition. The common factor that made both large parties coalesce in 1966 
and again in 2005 and 2013 was the lack of a workable alternative. In both coalitions the SPD 
was the junior partner, leaving the prestige of the Chancellor position to the CDU-CSU’s 
candidate, Angela Merkel. The successful entry of Die Linke in the old Länder, and the lack of a 
clear, distinct profile between SPD and CDU-CSU as a result of Grand Coalitions, together 
explain sufficient pressure on the SPD to realign its program closer to the demands of its 
traditional base again. This explains in part also why the CDU-CSU’s score becomes more 
positive for 2013, yet still much less positive than the SPD score for 2013.  
Although I only have very recent evidence to support the following claim, the creation of 
Die Linke has most likely contributed to the party-program content growing closer to the DGB 
scores when compared to previous PDS scores. At first sight, it may seem odd that the scores of 
the PDS were not more positive, because after all it was supposedly a successor of a socialist 
workers’ party. What should not be forgotten, however, is that the PDS emerged as a protest 
party against the removal of all GDR remnants, was critical of the EU, and a range of other 
issues that put it at odds not only with other political parties, but to an extent also with the goals 
of the DGB. 
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Table 2 CDU-CSU SPD FDP Bündnis90/Die 
Grünen 
PDS/Die Linke Winning 
Coalition 
Opposition 
1961 0.43696 c  0.80927 b 0.91280 a   CDU-CSU, FDP SPD 





1969 0.84469 a 0.60867 c 0.83410 b    SPD, FDP CDU-CSU 
1972 0.71538 b  0.87812 a 0.51179 c   SPD, FDP CDU-CSU 
1976 0.74626 c 0.78072 b 0.89707 a   SPD, FDP CDU-CSU 
1980 -1.10318 b -1.09917 c -1.10658 a 0.96995 d *  SPD, FDP CDU-CSU 
1983 -1.08472 d -1.10242 b -1.10542 a -1.09036 c  CDU-CSU, FDP SPD, Die Grünen 
1987 -1.09724 c -1.10242 b -1.09691 d -1.14283 a  CDU-CSU, FDP SPD, Die Grünen 
1990 -1.10534 b -1.10187 c -1.09980 d -1.10960 a 0.91474 f -1.09261 e CDU-CSU, FDP SPD, 
Bündnis90/Die 
Grünen 
1994 -1.03702 a -1.02990 b -1.02791 c 0.89569 e -0.98702 d CDU-CSU, FDP SPD, 
Bündnis90/Die 
Grünen 


















2013 0.73982 b 0.83569 c -0.79037 a * 0.85477 d 0.92887 e CDU-CSU, SPD Bündnis90/Die 
Grünen, Die 
Linke 
Table 20: scores per party *Major party that did not obtain any seats for this legislature. Letters a to e indicate most negative (a) to most positive score (up to e) 
of each election year.




Table 20 above ranks the scores per party, a indicating the most negative scores in an election 
year, e or f indicating the most positive score in an election year. DGB was left because for all 
years, the DGB documents were the most positive scores. The most striking result is that the 
Bündnis90/Die Grünen (Union 90/The Greens) could claim to be the party whose program most 
closely resembles the demands of the working class as embodied by DGB.120 The PDS/Die 
Linke (Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus/The Left [Ex-communist party in the former 
GDR; Party of democratic socialism]) does obtain a number of very positive scores, but this 
appears to happen after the enlargement of the party and name change to PDS/Die Linke in 2005. 
In Table 21 below, I counted the totals per ranking for each party. The FDP manifestos 
received the most negative scores, with nine of the most negative scores for the 14 published 
manifestos. However, taken into perspective, it seems that the three older parties’ electoral 
programs’ scores evolve parallel to each other, in particular for FDP and SPD, but to a large 
extent also for CDU-CSU. The higher fluctuations among CDU-CSU manifestos could be 
attributed to differences in program accents between CDU and CSU.  
Table 21: Rankings of scores per party Germany/DGB 
 Total 
manifestos  
a < b < c < d < e < f < 
CDU-CSU 17  3 7 6 1 - - 
SPD 15 2 7 3 3 - - 
FDP 14 9 1 2 1 - - 
Bündnis90/Die 
Grünen 
10 1 - 1 3 4 1 
PDS/ Die Linke 7 - - 2 2 3 - 
 
Another trend is that the DGB estimates remain relatively constant over time, while it is the 
parties’ estimates that display fluctuation. The CDU-CSU estimates fluctuate the most heavily, 
                                                                 
120
 After the unification, a segment of the anti-GDR government protest-movement joined the Green party under the 
banner Bündnis 90, referring to the year of the union. 
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while the estimates for Bündnis90/Die Grünen remain relatively constant. Unlike the U.S. case, 
there don’t appear to be any trends related to incumbency. However, future research using the 
coalition agreement texts aside from individual party programs and DGB texts potentially could 
shed more light on this.121 Despite there being a significant gap between party and DGB 
estimates, it is not as pronounced or rather dramatic as for the U.S. case. Furthermore, there is no 
comparable downward trend.  
 
1.3 RENGO 
For the Japanese case, our data are limited to the end of the 1990s because prior to that, no real 
election platforms were produced. An advantage, however, is that because of the different 
electoral cycles for Japan’s House of Councillors and House of Representatives, I still have a 
sufficient amount of data points. As discussed in Chapter Three, Japan underwent significant 
changes in its electoral and party system that opened the way for a more competitive party 
system challenging LDP dominance (Liberal Democratic Party [Jiyūminshutō]). Although 
several authors pronounced the death of the 1955 system, so far the LDP continues to be the 
dominant force in Japanese politics, and it remains to be seen whether I can actually conclude 
that LDP isn’t the dominant party anymore. The DPJ (Democratic Party of Japan [Minshutō]) 
successfully replaced the JSP /SDP(J) (Social Democratic Party [Shakai Minshu-tō]) as largest 
competitor for the LDP, but was only in office from 2009 until 2012.122 
                                                                 
121
 What should also be taken into account here is that at least at the national level, the PDS/Die Linke is disregarded 
as a potential coalition partner for the other parties. 
122
 The DPJ-SDPJ-PNP Coalition under Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio until his resignation in 2010, and the same 
coalition led by Kan Naoto until 2012 respectively. JSP (Japan Socialist Party) was the predecessor of SDP; JSP 
imploded in 1996, leading to splits and the creation of SDP.  
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The Japanese party system has a long history of party split-offs resulting in minor 
formations in the Diet that often disappear in the coming elections or get absorbed by larger 
parties. Figure 13 includes the largest parties that had representation in the Diet for the entire 
period of the analysis, with the exception of the JCP (Japanese Communist Party [Nihon Kyōsan-
tō]) and the Japan Restoration Party (Nippon Ishin no Kai).123 For the more recent years, I could 
also find data for some smaller parties and included it, while LDP, DPJ, NK (New Komei 
[Kōmeitō; best translated as „Justice and Fairness Party“]), SDP, together with JCP represent the 
parties that have been represented consistently.124 
 
Figure 13: Japanese RENGO dataset 1998-2013. The position of the Japan Restoration Party (Nippon Ishin no Kai) 
with a score of -5.99993 had to be excluded, as it completely skewed the figure thereby defeating the purpose of 
having a figure. This extreme right party only participated in the 2012 election before dissolving like many of its 
predecessors.  
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 As discussed in Chapter Three, no information was available for the JCP. 
124
 NK is closely affiliated and inspired by Buddhist sect Sōka Gakkai following the teachings of the thirteenth 
century monk Nichiren. Although the NK programs don’t contain many religious concepts, the inspiration of the NK 
is religious. Nearly all party members are also Sōka Gakkai members.  




The texts included were all significantly shorter than for the U.S. or German case, mainly 
because the practice of writing electoral manifestos is a very recent phenomenon in Japan. 
However, the results obtained from analyzing electoral manifestos and RENGO documents did 
yield a number of significant results.    
The most obvious trend is that DPJ consistently is relatively close to RENGO, whereas 
the other parties score much more negatively. Only two younger, minor parties, NPN (New Party 
Nippon [Shintō Nippon]) and PNP (People’s New Party [Kokumin Shintō]), come anywhere 
close to the result of DPJ. With the exception of the outlier for the Restoration party (-5.9), all 
results are within the 0.5 to -0.5 range, which suggests that there is a much closer relationship 
between the union federations in Japan than in the U.S.125  
Another clear trend is that RENGO scores remain consistent over time with very little 
changes. Another trend is that the LDP does not really change its position; for 2005 and 2007, 
the scores of the LDP appear to become even more negative. While it is difficult to confirm 
whether the LDP’s scores will be increasingly distant from RENGO , it may not matter as much, 
as the scores are already very distant as is. RENGO, as a labor union federation founded in 1989, 
is relatively young. As discussed in Chapter Two, one of the goals of the fusion of previous 
union federations into RENGO was to gain more influence on politics. This led to a much greater 
independence from the SDP and JCP, and although RENGO favors DPJ, it did not tie itself as 
strongly to it as previous union federations had to parties in the past. As with Germany, the gap 
between the major union federation estimates and those of parties is by far not as dramatic as the 
gap in the U.S. case.  
                                                                 
125
 Restoration or Japan Restoration Party is a short-lived (September 2012-September 2014) far-right party; 
remnants merged with another smaller party into the Japan Innovation party (Ishin no Tō) in 2014. 
                                                                                                                        
140 
 
Election LDP DPJ NK  SDP NPN PNP YP Restoration Coalition*** 
1998 HoC -0.13248 b 0.34406 c -0.35781 a -0.13248 b - - - - LDP, SDP, 
other** 
2000 HoR -0.16248 b 0.34406 d -0.22015 a -0.06155 c - - - - LDP, other  
2001 HoC -0.13702 a 0.34802 c -0.12628 b - - - - - LDP, other 
2003HoR -0.10789 b 0.36659 d -0.43177 a -0.05690 c - - - - LDP, NK, 
other 
2004 HoC -0.06033 b 0.35846 c NA -0.35747 a - - - - LDP, NK, 
other 
2005 HoR -0.29757 b 0.36761 e -0.30596 a -0.06037 c - 0.10748 d - - LDP, NK 
2007 HoC -0.35335 b 0.37886 e -0.26385 c -0.42254 a 0.10422 d * - - LDP, NK 
2009 HoR -0.09045 b 0.35717 d -0.15946 a NA 0.04256 c NA NA - DPJ, SDP, 
PNP 
2010 HoC -0.15423 a 0.37176 e -0.15129 b -0.12395 c - NA -0.01916 d - DPJ, SDP, 
PNP 
2012 HoR -0.09456 c 0.35040 e NA -0.11520 b - NA -0.07695 d -5.99993 a LDP, NK 
2013 HoC -0.09067 a 0.35887 b NA NA - - NA NA LDP, NK 
Table 22: Estimate scores for parties present in the Japanese Diet House of Councillors and/or House of representatives for which I could obtain electoral 
manifestos. No data could be obtained for JCP despite representation in all of the above legislatures. For most of the defunc t parties, no manifesto data could be 
retrieved.  
-: party was not represented and/or did not take part in elections;  
NA: party was represented but no data were available 
* Data for the 2007 PNP manifesto ended up being corrupted due to an unknown encoding error 
** Other here refers to defunct minor coalition partners  
*** Coalitions listed for HoC election years are the coalition that was in power at the time and are not the result of that election as it is the HoR election that 
determines the governing coalition government. 
House of Councillors elections parties not included above: 2013[242]: JCP (11), others (4  seats); 2010[242]: JCP (6 seats), NRP (2 seats), Sunrise Party (3 
seats), Happiness Realization Party (1 seat), Independents (2 seats); 2007[242]:  JCP (7 seats), Independents (13 seats), 2004[242]: JCP (9 seats), others (7 seats), 
2001[247]: JCP (20 seats), Liberal Party (8 seats), New Conservative Party (5 seats), others (2 seats); 1998[252 seats]: JCP (8 seats), Liberal (6 seats), New Party 
Harbinger (3 seats), Reformers Network party (3 seats), Second Chamber Club (1 seat), Independents (26 seats). 
House of Representatives elections parties not included above: 2012[480]: JCP (8 seats), others (10 seats), independents (5 seats ); 2009[478] JCP (9 seats), 
others (2 seats), independents (9 seats); 2005[480]: JCP (9 seats), others (7 seats), independents (18 seats); 2003[480]: JCP (9 seats), others (6 seats), 
independents (11 seats); 2000[480]: JCP (20 seats), Justice Party (24 seats), Conservative Party (7 seats), Liberal Party (18 seats), others (6 seats), independents 
(15 seats).  
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Table 23: rankings of scores per party Japan/RENGO 
 Total 
Manifestos 
a < b < c < d < e < 
LDP 11 3 7 1 - - 
DPJ 11 - 1 3 3 4 
NK 8 5 2 1 - - 
SDP 8 2 2 4 - - 
NPN 2 - - 1 1 - 
PNP 1 - - - 1 - 
YP 2 - - - 2 - 
Restoration  1 1 - - - - 
Looking at Table 23, the scores of NK are the most negative and for the most part are 
much further removed from those of other parties, including LDP. In eight elections, NK has the 
five most negative scores. A potential explanation here is that the topics of the NK are 
completely different from those articulated by RENGO. Because of the religiously inspired basis 
of NK, I could even suggest that the NK positions itself perhaps more positively on a cleavage 
not under analysis in this project: the religious-vs.-secular cleavage.      
What also can be seen in the figure is that the SDP scores are very close to the LDP 
scores for virtually every election year, on average scoring a bit more positive ly, although the 
differences seem trivial. A plausible explanation for this could be that despite the successful 
entry of the DPJ to the detriment of the SDP, the SDP continues to attempt to attract voters that 
vote for LDP. One might also argue the opposite, that it is the LDP that sees the SDP voter as 
potential new LDP voter; however, given the more comfortable position of the LDP, this is 
unlikely. The scores of NK for the most part are much further removed from those of other 
parties, including LDP.
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What was briefly mentioned in Chapter Three is that the traditional left-vs.-right 
dimension used by the Manifesto Database Project, but also in other comparative projects, isn’t 
that useful in the Japanese case, because much of the policy differences evolve around 
international politics issues. (Proksch et al. 2011) The first DPJ Prime-Minister, Hatoyama 
Yukio, even formally resigned because of the inability to keep his campaign promise of revising 
the status of the U.S. base in Okinawa.126 In terms of proposals related to the economy, the DPJ 
and LDP agendas are much more similar than with those of other parties, so the different scores 
of DPJ and LDP can be explained only partly by differences in economic policy, but other policy 
issues, particularly foreign policy, are probably more important. One issue that may certainly 
contribute to differences in economic policy is the existence of a strong faction, with the LDP 
supported by local farmers and other predominantly rural interests. Reed suggested that the more 
urban-focused DPJ competition might feed into a potential existing rural-vs.-urban cleavage. 
(2003) However, Kabashima and Steel argue quite the opposite by pointing to the fact that if 
such a cleavage might have been salient at some point, the changes in Japanese politics during 
the past decades, and particularly the actions of LDP’s then-leader Koizumi Junichiro, led 
traditional rural LDP support to dwindle. (2010) 
Labor Unions H1: Responsiveness of 
parties to cleavage 
translation over time 
H2: level of fluctuation of 
party translation of 
cleavages over time 
US Hypothesis confirmed: Both 
parties display decreased 
cleavage translation over time 
Hypothesis confirmed: Both 
parties translate weakly, but a 
slightly stronger translation by 
the Democrats. 
Germany Hypothesis not confirmed: 
The parties’ estimates drop 
and only in 2013 appear to 
Hypothesis confirmed: 
fluctuation appears to be 
relatively widespread, 
                                                                 
126
 An additional and perhaps more important reason for Hatoyama’s resignation was a finance scandal that cost him 
a lot of his own and his party’s popularity. (NPR 2010) 
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resemble pre-1980 levels particularly for CDU-CSU 
Japan Hypothesis partially 
confirmed: The dominant 
party has low, stagnant 
responsiveness, but other 
parties have both higher – 
particularly NK – and lower 
levels of responsiveness 
Hypothesis confirmed: 
Dominant party has low, 
stagnant scores, while 
fluctuation is higher among 
other parties, with the 
exception that DPJ scores are 
much more constant than 
those of LDP 
 
2. Minority and Immigrant Organizations 
Below are the eight figures that provide a visual representation for the Wordfish data outputs 
retrieved for the various datasets. The first two figures show the results for the three different 
U.S. datasets. (Figures 14-15) The next five figures are in fact data from the German dataset split 
into five for the sake of visual clarity. (Figures 16-20) The last figure shows the data for the 
Japanese dataset. (Figure 21) The original data output transcripts for all figures and can be found 
in the appendix. Although I processed stemmed and unstemmed versions of the datasets, I opted 
to only use the unstemmed ones because there did not appear to be any significant differences 
between stemmed and unstemmed results. 
 
2.1 LULAC 
Figures 14 and 15 show the results for the first and second datasets for LULAC. Dataset I 
combines the LULAC resolutions of annual conferences with the LULAC platforms. The second 
dataset only represents the annual LULAC platforms. 














Figure 14: LULAC Dataset I, position estimates for LULAC compound texts (policy platforms and resolutions) and 













Figure 15: LULAC Dataset II, position estimates for LULAC policy platforms (excluding res olutions) and 
Democratic and Republican presidential platforms, not stemmed 




The most obvious conclusion to be drawn is that the gap between the LULAC estimates and the 
party estimates is that this gap is large and growing. Whether I control for regional impact of 
LULAC or not – the inclusion or exclusion of the more regionally focused resolution texts – the 
results for both parties remain between the -1.0 and -1.5 range. The data controlled for regional 
impact suggest that the Republican platforms are somewhat closer to the LULAC estimates. 
However, if I exclude resolutions, then the Democrats appear closer to LULAC. In both cases, 
however, both parties remain so far away from the LULAC estimates that these differences seem 
hardly significant. This discrepancy, as little as it may be, does suggest that one of the venues for 
future research may be to focus on specific U.S. regions with larger Latino populations.  
Comparing the first dataset with the second,  the scores for early LULAC platforms are 
significantly closer to those of both parties, and in fact are further away from most LULAC 
scores. However, this discrepancy is easily explained by pointing to the relatively short length of 
the first two LULAC platforms, with each only a few hundred words. After excluding stop words 
and other unsubstantial words, this only leaves few words that are used for computing the scores 
in Wordfish. In essence, it is unlikely that the scores of LULAC platforms for 1994 and 1995 are 
closer to the scores of both parties, but instead it is an effect of limited data. This is also 
confirmed if I look at the scores for Dataset I that comprise both platform and resolution texts.    
Table 24: document position estimates for both parties and results of Presidential elections 1960-2012 for LULAC 
dataset I. 
Election year Democratic 
Platform 
Republican Platform Winner Loser  
1992 -1.2590 * -1.2332 Clinton D H. W. Bush R 
1996 -1.3553 * -1.2102 Clinton D Dole R 
2000 -1.3166 -1.2035 * G. W. Bush R Gore D 
2004 -1.3780 -1.1683 * G. W. Bush R Kerry D 
2008 -1.2309 * -1.0877 Obama D McCain R 
2012 -1.3622 * -1.0004 Obama D Romney R 
*: winning platform; bold + underlined: most positive platform. 
 




Table 25: document position estimates for both parties and results of Presidential elections 1960-2012 for LULAC 
Dataset II. 
Election year Democratic 
Platform 
Republican Platform Winner Loser  
1992 -1.1253 * -1.2185 Clinton D H. W. Bush R 
1996 -1.1625 * -1.1797 Clinton D Dole R 
2000 -1.0918 -1.1950 * G. W. Bush R Gore D 
2004 -1.1665 -1.2717 * G. W. Bush R Kerry D 
2008 -1.0297 * -1.0784 Obama D McCain R 
2012 -1.1090 * -1.1117 Obama D Romney R 
*: winning platform; bold + underlined: most positive platform. 
 
If I look at the estimates in relation to who won the election (tables 24 and 25) I find that there is 
no evidence that suggests that incumbency or any other factors affect the estimates.  
I already touched upon the fact that while LULAC is the largest and most influential 
advocacy group for the largest minority group in the U.S., the Hispanic population, there are of 
course other advocacy groups representing that what can be described as subject population vis-
à-vis the non-Hispanic Caucasian dominant population. On one hand, an inclusion of NCLR data 
would make the data for the Latino group even more accurate. On the other hand, the most 
influential organizations advocating on behalf of other segments of the U.S. subject population, 
such as the NAACP with regard to African-Americans, or Native American organizations, could 
help complete the picture of how the subject population’s political positions differ from those of 
both major parties. Future research also including these organizations may help clarify some of 
the above results. In particular, it may help confirm whether some trends that appear trivial from 
the above data may indeed be confirmed or not. Furthermore, future research may also help us 
identify what differences exist, and what trends I can establish, between scores for advocacy 
groups of different segments of the U.S. subject population.  
 
 




Figures 16 through 20 display the estimates of the largest, and oldest, national immigrant and 
ethnic minority advocacy group in Germany, TGD, compared to individual party scores.  
 
 
Figure 16: TGD compared to CDU-CSU scores 
 
 




Figure 17: TGD compared to SPD scores  
 
 
Figure 18: TGD compared to FDP scores  




Figure 19: TGD compared to Bündnis90/Die Grünen scores  
 
 
Figure 20: TGD compared to PDS/Die Linke scores  
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No party estimate comes close to the TGD results. The only difference there seems to be among 
parties is that the estimates for two youngest parties, Bündnis90/Die Grünen and PDS/Die Linke, 
are closer to the -0.5 mark than the estimates for the other parties, which are closer to the -1 mark. 
No party exhibits a large amount of fluctuation. The data suggest that issues relevant to the 
Turkish community, and by extension many issues relevant to the immigrant population in 
Germany, are slightly more relevant to Bündnis90/Die Grünen and PDS/Die Linke, but these 
issues don’t appear to be among the highest priorities of parties.  
The estimates for TGD, itself, fluctuate more in its earlier years, in part due to the relative 
youth of the organization; however, this fluctuation remains within or near the 1-to-1.5 range. 
What may partly explain the higher fluctuation of earlier TGD scores are much shorter texts and 
the fact that elaborated policy documents of TGD – the TGD-Thesen – were not developed yet. 
Table 26: scores per party *Major party that did not obtain any seats for this legislature 
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Table 27: rankings of scores per party Germany/TGD 
 Total 
manifestos  
a < b < c < d < e < 
CDU-CSU 6 - 4 2 - - 
SPD 6 1 1 4 - - 
FDP 6 5 1 - - - 
Bündnis90/Die 
Grünen 
6 - - - 4 2 
PDS/ Die Linke 6 - - - 2 4 
 
Table 26 lists the scores per party for each election year; Table 27 ranks the scores from the most 
negative (a) to most positive (e). The most-positive and second-most-positive estimates went 
entirely to PDS/Die Linke and Bündnis90/Die Grünen. Although the content of the FDP 
programs pays more attention to individual liberties, and is more progressive with regard to 
many ethical issues – such as euthanasia and same-sex marriage, but also religious freedom and 
migration – when compared with CDU-CSU, one would expect the FDP scores to be more 
positive than the CDU-CSU scores. However, for five out of six manifestos, the FDP had the 
most negative score. While the differences between scores of parties are very low, they may 
indicate some trends that may help guide future research incorporating other minority advocacy 
groups in future analyses.  
In Chapter Two, I addressed the regional distribution of the Turkish community in 
Germany, which to an extent also applies to other immigrant groups. Populations with Turkish 
and immigrant backgrounds tend to be more present in urban centers of the former West German 
Länder and Berlin.127 Another element that is not captured by a study of party scores at the 
national level is the scores of parties that are only represented in the regional parliaments. While 
                                                                 
127
 The much smaller Vietnamese community, which is also the largest minority with a Southeast Asian background, 
is the exception. Many North Vietnamese, and later people from the unified Vietnam, came to the former GDR as of 
the 1950s. The largest Vietnamese communities in Germany are still present in the urban centres of the former GDR 
including Berlin. (Wolf 2007)   
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extreme-right parties failed to gain any representation at the national level, there have been a 
number of occasional successes in the regional Länder parliaments. Because these types of 
parties, such as the 1964 founded NPD (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands [National 
democratic party of Germany]), tend to fulminate against immigrants and people with Islamic 
faith, it would make sense to include these insofar as they are represented at the regional level. 
Adding an analysis of the regional tier may be a good way to improve results of future studies, 
and perhaps the focusing on areas with stronger minority presence may yield results that could 
help us confirm or reject the weak trends of our current analysis.     
A big difference in comparison with LULAC is that TGD is an advocacy organization for 
a population group that constitutes both the overwhelming majority within the subject population 
(Turks) and population with a non-EU immigration background. Minorities without an 
immigration background within Germany’s 1945 borders exist, but are very small and 
geographically concentrated in small areas of the country.128 In other words, this may mean that 
our findings for TGD can be assumed to be more accurate with regard to the entire subject-vs.-






                                                                 
128
 The approximately 60,000-strong Slavic Sorb-population in the Southeast corner of the former GDR, and the 
approximately 10,000-strong Danish minority in Schleswig. The German Roma and Sinti population is more 
geographically dispersed but also are very small in numbers. 




Figure 21 displays the estimates of the largest, national subject minority advocacy organization 
in Japan, BLL, compared to individual Japanese party scores. 
 
Figure 21: BLL compared to Japanese party scores  
 
For the Japanese case, our data are again limited to the end of the 1990s because prior to that, no 
real election platforms were produced. Just as in the case of RENGO, the most obvious trend is 
that DPJ consistently is relatively close to RENGO, whereas the other parties score much more 
negatively. Compared with our previous analysis with RENGO included, the earliest score of 
DPJ in 1998 is much closer to BLL than RENGO. What may explain this is that for 1998, I had 
to rely on the basic programs of parties because it wasn’t until 2000 that manifestos specially 
tailored to the upcoming election appeared. The DPJ’s basic program of 1998 scores better for 
BLL, probably because issues like human rights, equal opportunity, participatory democracy, 
and fairness are featured prominently. (DPJ 1998) 
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Election LDP DPJ NK  SDP NPN PNP YP
129
 Restoration Coalition*** 
1998 HoC -0.06896 b 0.33702 c -0.38647 a -0.06896 b - - - - LDP, SDP, 
other** 
2000 HoR -0.10357 b 0.33702 d -0.16226 a -0.01524 c - - - - LDP, other  
2001 HoC -0.07588 a 0.35631 c -0.05810 b - - - - - LDP, other 
2003HoR -0.05158 b 0.35316 d -1.2242 a -0.00735 c - - - - LDP, NK, 
other 
2004 HoC -0.04601 b 0.35503 c NA -0.40793 a - - - - LDP, NK, 
other 
2005 HoR -0.27012 b 0.35643 e -0.32637 a 0.00534 c - 0.15198 d - - LDP, NK 
2007 HoC -0.33794 b 0.35621 e -0.27312 c -0.55680 a 0.17002 d * - - LDP, NK 
2009 HoR -0.00501 b 0.33595 d -0.12548 a NA 0.09389 c NA NA - DPJ, SDP, 
PNP 
2010 HoC -0.10903 a 0.35123 e -0.10741 b -0.08334 c - NA 0.00063 d - DPJ, SDP, 
PNP 
2012 HoR -0.05418 c 0.33412 e NA -0.06228 b - NA -0.04885 d -5.99999 a LDP, NK 
2013 HoC -0.03875 a 0.35892 b NA NA - - NA NA LDP, NK 
Table 28: Estimate scores for parties present in the Japanese Diet House of Councillors and/or House of Representatives for which I could obtain electoral 
manifestos. No data could be obtained for JCP despite representation in all of the above legislatures. For most of the defunc t parties, no manifesto data could be 
retrieved.  
-: party was not represented and/or did not take part in elections;  
NA: party was represented but no data were available 
* Data for the 2007 PNP manifesto ended up being corrupted due to an unknown encoding error 
** Other here refers to defunct minor coalition partners  
*** Coalitions listed for HoC election years are the coalition that was in power at the time and are not the result of that e lection as it is the HoR election that 
determines the governing coalition government. 
 
House of Councilors elections parties not included above: 2013[242]: JCP (11), others (4  seats); 2010[242]: JCP (6 seats), NRP (2 seats), Sunris e Party (3 
seats), Happiness Realization Party (1 seat), Independents (2 seats); 2007[242]:  JCP (7 seats), NPN (1 seat), Independents (13 seats), 2004[242]: JCP (9 seats), 
others (7 seats), 2001[247]: JCP (20 seats), Liberal Party (8 seats), New Conservative Party (5 seats), others (2 seats); 1998[252 seats]: JCP (8 seats), Liberal (6 
seats), New Party Harbinger (3 seats), Reformers Network party (3 seats), Second Chamber Club (1 seat), Independents (26 seats). 
House of Representatives elections parties not included above: 2012[480]: JCP (8 seats), others (10 seats), independents (5 s eats); 2009[478] JCP (9 seats), 
others (2 seats), independents (9 seats); 2005[480]: JCP (9 seats), others (7 seats), independents (18 seats); 2003[480]: JCP (9 seats), others (6 seats), 
independents (11 seats); 2000[480]: JCP (20 seats), Justice Party (24 seats), Conservative Party (7 seats), Liberal Party (18 seats), others (6 seats), independents 
(15 seats).  
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 YP: Your Party (Minna no Tō) 




Only two younger minor parties, NPN and PNP, score anywhere near the result of DPJ. With the 
exception of the outlier for the Restoration party (-5.9), almost all results are within the 0.6 to -
0.6 range, which is a slightly larger range than for the RENGO case and suggests a generally 
closer relationship between the union federations in Japan than in the U.S. or Germany. In fact, 
unlike for the RENGO case, most party scores for BLL are about 0 or are within the 0-0.6 range. 
There are two trends that are similar to what I found for the RENGO case. First, NK scores more 
negatively than most other parties; in the BLL case, it scores even more negatively. The second 
trend that reappears is the closeness of LDP and SDP in every election despite the fact that SDP 
scores fluctuate more.    
Another trend is that BLL scores are relatively constant over time with small changes, 
something I also found for most scores of all other identity- interest organizations in all three 
cases. The exceptions to this were the earlier scores for TGD, and the second LULAC dataset 
due to significantly shorter documents. Another trend is that the LDP does not really change its 
position; for 2005 and 2007, the scores of the LDP appear to become even more negative, but the 
LDP scores are more positive when compared to the RENGO case.  





a < b < c < d < e < 
LDP 11 3 7 1 - - 
DPJ 11 - 1 3 3 4 
NK 8 5 2 1 - - 
SDP 8 2 2 4 - - 
NPN 2 - - 1 1 - 
PNP 1 - - - 1 - 
YP 2 - - - 2 - 
Restoration  1 1 - - - - 
Based on the scores per party per election in Table 28, I ranked the most negative score (a) to the 
most positive (up to e) in Table 29 above. As expected, NK has the most negative scores, with 
five out of eight programs having the most negative scores, followed by LDP.  What our data 




don’t show, similar to the TGD and LULAC data, is how the geographic distribution of the 
Buraku population affects their national political position. In Chapter Two, I mentioned that the 
BLL was mostly organized in the west and south of Japan, but also that it had no presence in the 
northern part of the country. 
 
Minority Organizations H1: Responsiveness of 
parties to cleavage 
translation over time 
H2: level of fluctuation of 
party translation of 
cleavages over time 
U.S. Hypothesis confirmed: Both 
parties display decreased 
cleavage translation over time 
Hypothesis confirmed: Both 
parties have low scores, 
Democrats have slightly 
stronger translation when not 
controlling for regional 
impact. 
Germany Hypothesis tentatively 
confirmed: Although the 
evidence is weak, there 
appears to be a general 
upward trend for parties to 
become more responsive 
Hypothesis not confirmed: 
very low level of fluctuation 
among parties 
Japan Hypothesis partially 
confirmed: Dominant party 
has low, stagnant 
responsiveness, but other 
parties have higher or lower 
levels of responsiveness 
Hypothesis confirmed: 
Dominant party has low, 
stagnant scores while 
fluctuation is higher among 
other parties, but DPJ scores 
fluctuate little 
 
3. Future research agenda considerations 
A first point to conclude is that future research will have to delve more into the hypotheses 
confirmed and address shortcomings of those that couldn’t be confirmed. The results of the data 
presented here helped to confirm some of the hypotheses posed, but it was impossible to confirm 
some hypotheses with the data available.  
For the U.S. case, I could confirm Hypotheses One and Two for both organizations I 
examined. For the German case, the first hypothesis could only be confirmed for TGD, yet had 




to be rejected for DGB. Hypothesis Two could not be confirmed for TGD but could be for DGB. 
For the Japanese case, I could confirm both hypotheses for both RENGO and BLL, yet with 
regard to the first hypothesis, I could only do so partially. While the proposed hypotheses appear 
robust for the selected two-party-system, and solid for the selected multiparty system, one aspect 
that is on the future research agenda is the formulation of both hypotheses so that I can derive 
clearer results for multiparty systems. One venue through which I might obtain even better 
results for multiparty systems could be the inclusion of coalition agreement texts aside from 
individual party programs.  
In the results I obtained for the union federations advocating on behalf of the worker side 
of the worker-vs.-owner cleavage, each case allowed for conclusive statements because it was 
possible to distinguish relatively clear directions the parties took in relation to them over time. 
For the minority organizations that represented the largest segment of the respective subject 
populations, however, the trends I could establish were very weak.  While I can expect that the 
same model will apply to similar identity- interest organizations advocating on behalf of 
segments of the subject population, the weak trends suggest that in order to confirm or reject 
these trends, I may need to seek ways to obtain data so that it better reflects the entire subject 
population instead of just the largest segment. One reason for doing so is that with the U.S. case, 
for example, minorities that are largely non-immigrant, such as African-Americans, may have 
interests that differ to an extent from those of the Latino groups, for whom large segment has a 
bigger stake in immigration issues. The point of this would be to see to what extent the various 
larger identity- interest organizations advocating on behalf of the subject minority population are 
closer to each other or not when compared to parties.  




Another aspect with regard to minority identity- interest organizations that was raised by 
examining the results for TGD, and to a lesser extent also BLL, is that an analysis such as 
provided by this project might be rendered even more complete by additionally focusing on other 
tiers aside from the national level, in particular those areas with larger concentrations of the 
subject population.  
 




Chapter Five: Sociological base and cleavage translation 
 
Overview 
In this chapter, I discuss the testing of Hypothesis Three, which relates to the sociological base of 
both the examined cleavage pole and the identity- interest organizations that were analyzed. In 
short, I will test whether a change in size of sociological cleavage-based group has an effect on 
how well parties translate the demands formulated by the identity- interest organizations 
representing that group. As mentioned in previous chapters, I opted to select the largest and most 
influential identity-interest group for this analysis because of the infinite nature of the identity-
interest organization arena compared with the electoral arena.  
For the union federations, I identify the sociological base narrowly as workers in the 
sense of traditional labor, or the segment of industrial employees active in the secondary sector. 
While I recognize that there is a potential that employees who do not fit this category also may 
identify as working class, I opted to define the sociological base more narrowly and traditional ly 
because it was also defined as such in previous literature, including Lipset and Rokkan, but also 
because the uniqueness of this project cautions against assuming a too-generous interpretation of 
a sociological base. (1967; Sartori 1990) For the minority organizations, I identify as a 
sociological base the specific minority that the selected identity- interest organization aims to 
represent.  
In the previous chapter, I tested how parties, depending on the party system, would 
perform in translating cleavages, assuming the selected identity- interest organizations are 
representative for the cleavages under analysis. Hypothesis Three addresses questions with 
regard to the change in size of the cleavage-population base and its effect on the content-




similarity relationship between parties and identity- interest groups. In other words, I examine 
whether the growth, stagnation, or decrease of the sociological base of the selected identity-
interest organizations will have an effect on the content of electoral manifestos, or whether the 
way party manifesto content remains unaffected by those conditions. The time period to which 
the following hypothesis applies is from 1960 to the present.  
H3: Political parties will be more responsive to cleavage translation if the sociological 
base of identity-interest organizations is experiencing continuous growth. Political parties 
will be less responsive to cleavage translation if the sociological base is experiencing 
stagnation or a continuous decrease in growth.  
 
 H3: Responsiveness of parties to cleavage 
translation to changes in the sociological 
basis of the identity-interest groups 
Two-party system Parties become more responsive if group grows, 
less responsive if group decreases 
Multiparty system Parties become more responsive if group grows, 
less responsive if group decreases 
Dominant-party system Dominant party will be less responsive – Other 
parties become more responsive if group grows, 
less responsive if group decreases 
 
In order to find out whether the hypothesis holds for the cases examined, and to examine whether 
they only hold for one or both cleavages analyzed in this project, I devoted one section to union 
federations and the other to minority-group organizations. The figures presented in this chapter 
will display the relationship between the discrepancy in scores between parties and identity-
interest organizations and the size of the sociological base of the identity- interest organizations 
under analysis. For reference to the discrepancy in scores between parties and identity- interest 
organizations, please see figures 6-21, and tables 20-23 and 26-29 of Chapter 4. 
 
 




1. Labor Union Federations 
1.1 AFL-CIO 
Figure 22 provides an overview of the evolution of the total employed population in the U.S. 
since 1960. For the entire period of time this number increases, which is in proportion with the 
continuous growth of the U.S. population through births and immigration. What can also be 
taken from Figure 22, however, is that the proportion of employees forming the traditional 
segment of the population represented by unions has been significantly shrinking during the 



































Figure 22: Total private goods-producing employment compared to private service-providing employment and 
government-employed 1960-2013 (in thousands, seasonally adjusted). Source: U.S. Dept. of Labor BLS 2014 
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Figure 23: Evolution of the industrial worker population as percentage of the entire U.S. private sector-employed 
population 1960-2013. Source: U.S. Dept. of Labor BLS 2014 
 
Figure 23 displays the percentages of traditional industry jobs compared to the total private 
employed population. The share of goods-producing and manufacturing industries decreases 
from about one-third of private sector-employment in 1960 to about 12 percent in 2013; the 
service-providing sector increases dramatically during the same period. While there is a segment 
of the population in the service-providing sector that is also represented by AFL-CIO, the 
amount of AFL-CIO member unions catering to this type of employee remains relatively low 
compared with unions representing traditional labor. While part of the low unionization rates 
compared with those of other OECD countries can be explained by the efforts mentioned in 
Chapter Two that companies use to undermine unionization legislation, this is also reflected in 




the unionization rates for the secondary and tertiary sectors; unionization rates for the service 
sector are half the rate for labor jobs.130 (cf. table 30)  
















2003 8185 41.5 5686 7.3 3555 14.9 
2004 8131 40.7 5523 7.0 3403 14.3 
2005 8262 40.5 5636 7.0 3295 13.6 
2006 8172 40.1 5509 6.7 3151 12.7 
2007 8373 39.8 5702 6.8 3149 12.7 
2008 8676 40.7 5885 7.0 3164 13.4 
2009 8677 41.1 5561 6.8 2651 12.7 
2010 8406 40.0 5424 6.6 2437 12.1 
2011 8321 40.7 5438 6.5 2510 12.1 
2012 8072 39.6 5440 6.4 2390 11.3 
2013 7900 38.7 5522 6.4 2592 11.9 
Source: U.S. Dept. of Labor BLS 2014 
131  
                                                                 
130
 Examin ing the unionization rates of U.S. public employees, a sector that is comparable in size to the U.S. goods-
manufacturing sector, the rates are double the average OECD rates; about 40 percent of federal, state, and local 
employees are unionized. (Table 30) In other words, the public sector, which is much better insulated from 
companies’ efforts  to circumvent organized labor, scores much higher with regard to unionization rates, suggesting 
that if a comparable level of protection existed in the private sector, one could expect higher unionization rates  there 
as well.  
131
 The number of union members is consistently about 3 percent lower than the total number of represented 
employees because a small percentage of nonmembers may still receive representation through unions. The goods -
manufacturing industry numbers are the combined totals of mining, construction, and manufacturing; manufacturing 
accounts for about two-thirds of private, nonagricultural, goods-producing employment. Although some more 
general unionization data is available as of 1983, sector-specific data only is available as of 2003. 











1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
REP
DEM
Figure 24: Discrepancy in estimates between Democratic and Republican parties and identity-interest organization 




Figure 24 displays the discrepancy in content estimates for each party, and the AFL-CIO. When 
compared to the decreasing size of the U.S. employed labor population, the discrepancy in scores 
increases continuously. Aside from the fact that the Democrats in general have slightly more 
positive scores. The major conclusion I can draw is that the generally decreasing traditional labor 
population has an effect on the direction in which party-program content evolves. The smaller 
the size of the population of the traditional-labor side of the workers-vs.-owners cleavage, the 
less the program of each party will reflect demands made by the selected identity- interest 
organizations speaking on behalf of this population.  
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 A detailed list of all discrepancy scores can be found in the appendix. 




An important caveat is that while the traditional sociological base of the cleavage 
decreased in proportion, other segments of the employed population are also partly represented 
by unions, or may be experiencing significant obstacles to becoming organized. The so-called 
pink-collar workers, for example, as well as less-educated, non-industry employees, may very 
well identify as worker despite the fact that they are employed in the service-providing sector. 
However, while I can speculate that the potential reservoir of employees identifying as working 
class is much higher than that of only the workers employed in the secondary sector, future 
research will have to provide conclusive evidence for this. 
 While one also could argue that increasing part-time employment and unemployment 
may have created a more vulnerable pool of employees that has an even lesser opportunity to 
unionize despite potentially identifying as worker, the increase of more vulnerable part-time 
positions was in proportion with the increase of the total active population. (cf. table A.1 in 
appendix) The unemployment rates vary more across the years, with a generally increasing 
tendency. However, fluctuations are much higher and also appear to be very dependent on 
economic crises. Unemployment rates for the U.S. since 1960 vary between 3.4 percent (lowest 
1969) and 10.8 percent (highest 1982) (U.S. Department of Labor BLS 2014). A more plausible 
explanation for the low unionization rate in the U.S. is the aforementioned lack of incentives for 
corporations to abide by labor regulations, particularly those allowing for organization, while  
increases in unemployment and part-time and temporary jobs only played a minor role in this.  
In other words, the current data make it difficult to make any conclusive statements on how this 
affected the relationship between organized labor and both U.S. parties. 
Aside from the observations made in Chapter Four, I can conclude for Hypothesis Three 
that I can confirm it. A decrease of the sociological base of the identity- interest organization also 




leads to increased discrepancy in content between the AFL-CIO and both parties. While there is 
a slight difference between Democrats and Republicans, the scores for both parties are becoming 
increasingly negative.  
  
1.2 DGB 
Figure 25 provides an overview of the total active German population from 1960 to 2013. While 
the employed population increased, the rate of increase is relatively low, particularly when 
compared with that of the U.S., where the employed population more than doubled in the same 
time period. The jump from the 1980s to the 1990s can be explained by the German unification 
in 1990. As with the U.S. case, the German employed population remains the same in proportion 
with its general population size, meaning that in this case, both are relatively stagnant, with only 
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Figure 25: Total German active population for election years 1960-2013 (in thousands). Source: DESTASIS 2014. 














































Figure 26: Total employed population active in secondary sector as percentage of total employed population 
Germany for election years 1961-2013. Source: DESTASIS 2014. 
 
Until 1980, the secondary sector in Germany remains above 40 percent. In the years 1950-1970, 
the size of the secondary sector fluctuates between 42.9 percent (1950 minimum) and 49.2 
percent (1965 maximum). After 1975, a steady decline set in, but the period of 1975-1980 is 
marked by a stable number about 41 percent. The big, continuous decline from 40 percent to 
about 25 percent today starts as of 1980. (cf. Table A.2 in appendix)  
As can be taken from table A.2 in the appendix, similar to the U.S., the tertiary sector 
grew enormously compared with the traditional labor sector and the now-marginal agricultural 
sector.  This change, however, was not as pronounced as for the U.S. case. The proportion of 
goods-manufacturing employees versus service-providing employees changed from a ratio of 5-
to-4 to a ratio of 1-to-4.  On one hand, the change is stronger in the German case; on the other 




hand, the amount of goods-producing jobs remains higher in Germany. The general trend toward 
a dominant service-providing sector on the labor market, however, is the same. 
Another important difference with the U.S. is the amount of service-providing employees 
who are unionized. Table 31 provides the numbers of employees unionized per sector because 
these data were recorded (1994). Additionally, as mentioned in Chapter Two, a competitor of 
DGB, DBB, did even better with regard to the representation of the service sector as well as 
public servants. In short, the DGB and German unions in general have a much better balance 
between goods-producing and service-providing sectors compared with their U.S. counterparts. 
However, the data below suggest that the secondary sector is by far still the dominant one within 
DGB.  



























1994 9768 6015 2784 762 2004 7013 2963 1729 419 1900 
1995 9354 5727 2651 748 2005 6778 5868** 489 420 
1996 8972 5449 2554 662 2006 6585 5710 483 391 
1997 8623 5205 2457 642 2007 6441 5591 473 376 
1998 8310 4960 2431 621 2008 6371 5548 464 358 
1999 8036 4854 2288 573 2009 6264 5456 460 NA 
2000 7772 4680 2222 556 2010 6193 3636 302 NA 
2001 7899 4526 2598 569 2011 6155 3579 297 NA 
2002 7699 4402 2448 548 2012 6151 3604 291 NA 
2003 7363 4217 2323 505 2013 6142 5351 445 NA 
Source: DGB (2014)  
 
As of 2005, these numbers aren’t differentiated anymore because the differentiation between 
both categories for the obligatory retirement taxation was dropped. In a nutshell, the 
differentiation between secondary and tertiary jobs for retirement purposes yielded to large 
differences, prompting the shift toward a system that provided retirement benefits based on the 
number of years employees paid into the fund. The blurring of both old categories Arbeiter 
(blue-collar-workers) and Angestellte (white-collar-workers) in the German case point to an 




evolution that may have occurred in other industrialized democracies, including the U.S., with 
regard to how class identity is experienced. While speculative, one could argue that the 
traditional Weberian link of occupation, skills, and class has weakened, whereas the Marxist 
connection between ownership of resources – the means of production – and class has increased. 
However, whether such a shift indeed has taken place can’t be confirmed based on the current 
data. What can be confirmed is that the traditional labor class is the group that is still the most 
dominant group in German union activity. Because of that, I can safely assume that DGB 
continues to predominantly represent those employees who identify as workers. 
Figure 27 provides the discrepancy in scores between DGB and party scores for the 
traditional three parties: CDU-CSU, SPD, and FDP.133 Figure 28 does the same for 
Bündnis90/Die Grünen, PDS/Die Linke, and DGB for election years 1980-2013. 
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 For brevity’s sake, Iopted for the CDU scores to establish the discrepancies for those years in which both CDU 
and CSU published manifestos  independently.  



























Figure 28: Discrepancy in scores between Bündnis90/Die Grünen, PDS/Die Linke, and DGB for election years 
1980-2013. Source: DESTASIS  





With regard to part-time, temporary employment and unemployment, the trend is that the 
segment of more vulnerable employees increases. This is worth mentioning because these trends 
will affect not only the service-providing employees, but also traditional labor. As can be seen in 
Table 32 below, the number of full-time employees decreases while the number of part-time 
employees increases. Although the unemployment rates are only a few percentage points higher 
when compared with those of the U.S., the tendency is increasing, unlike in the U.S., where the 
rates are fluctuating more across time. Until 1980, German unemployment rates remained less 
than 5 percent, and from 1980 until the present, it was between 5 percent and 12 percent. 
(Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2014) Because these trends also will have affected the traditional 
labor segment of the employed population, I can surmise that the segment of the population that 
identifies as worker may be somewhat larger than the size of employees active in the secondary 
sector.  









1976 18.520 1.419 1994 24.890 3.348 
1977 18.435 1.445 1995 24.659 3.459 
1978 18.590 1.498 1996 24.165 3.574 
1979 18.996 1.577 1997 23.660 3.620 
1980 19.289 1.665 1998 23.423 3.785 
1981 19.133 1.731 1999 23.801 3.678 
1982 18.696 1.776 2000 23.890 3.929 
1983 18.364 1.783 2001 23.689 4.120 
1984 18.205 1.835 2002 23.308 4.255 
1985 18.497 1.881 2003 22.658 4.288 
1986 18.779 1.951 2004 22.202 4.311 
1987 19.006 2.039 2005 21.802 4.365 
1988 19.148 2.117 2006 21.815 4.530 
1989 19.404 2.215 2007 22.070 4.773 
1990 19.972 2.396 2008 22.443 5.003 
1991 20.632 2.541 2009 22.165 5.202 
1992 20.850 2.680 2010 22.306 5.389 
1993 25.454 3.142 2011 22.683 5.670 




Source: BPB Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung (German Federal central for political education) 2013. The 
listed numbers are only for employees who are required to pay social security. Categories excluded here are civil 
servants, self-employed, aiding family members, professional military, and civil- and military service recruits.  
 
With regard to our hypotheses, the evolution of the population that I consider as a sociological 
base for the type of identity- interest organization like DGB has evolved in a similar way as in the 
U.S. case. Employment in the secondary sector has been significantly reduced from about 1-in-2 
to 1-in-4. Looking at discrepancies in scores, the numbers for the three traditional parties, CDU-
CSU, SPD, and FDP are markedly more positive in the economic boom years of the Federal 
Republic between 1950 and 1970, when the secondary-sector employment still constituted 40 
percent of the workforce. As the percentage of people employed in the secondary sector starts its 
freefall as of the mid-1970s, a sharp rise in discrepancies can be observed as of 1980 between the 
scores for the three previously mentioned parties on one hand and DGB scores on the other. In 
short, although the shift in discrepancies is much more abrupt as in the U.S. case, also here it 
seems that a decline in size of the sociological base of the selected identity- interest group has an 
effect on content similarity between parties and DGB. 
Looking at the scores of the Green party, and as of 2005 that of PDS/Die Linke, it 
appears that the parties perceived as being more to the left than the SPD have lower discrepancy 
rates.  For the most part, the discrepancy rates are stagnant, but both parties appear do a better 
job in translating the workers’ side of the cleavage than do the three traditional parties. In short, 
this means that I can tentatively confirm the hypothesis; in times where the labor market boomed, 
the scores of parties and DGB were much closer. As of the 1980s, the share of traditional labor 
declined, resulting in a sharp increase of discrepancy rates. The exceptions are the two younger 
parties, which appeared after the decline of the traditional working class had already set in. With 
regard to Hypothesis Three, this means that I can confirm our hypothesis. One caveat is that a 








Of the three examined union federations, RENGO is the youngest, founded in 1989. Although 
part of its roots go back to the aftermath of WWII, unlike the AFL-CIO and DGB, the 
organization is significantly younger, and in part also was an attempt to escape the deadlock the 
former union federations found themselves in during the pre-1993, LDP-dominated, clientelist 
political climate. In short, as was also discussed in Chapter Two, prior to RENGO, the influence 
of union federations on national politics was severely limited because their close connections 
with parties that were default opposition parties. Though RENGO was created a few years before 
the current Japanese party system emerged, in terms of its political significance, it is part of this 
new political arena.  
Figure 29 provides an overview of the employed population in Japan since 1989. Unlike 
the U.S. case, the employed population isn’t increasing, but instead shows signs of a decrease. 
Although the Japanese case is similar to the German case in that it is generally stagnant, the 
future trend appears to point to a structural decrease, whereas for now, the German case still 
appears to resist such a trend. A potential explanation is the relatively low rate of immigrant 
labor, in particular when compared with the U.S., but to an extent also with Germany. (cf. Chung 
2010) 
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Figure 29: Employed population in Japan from 1989 to present (in thousands). For reference, the numbers of the 






































Figure 30: Percentage of secondary sector in total employed population Japan 1989-2013. Source: JMIAC 2014. 





Figure 30 provides us with the percentage of the secondary sector of the entire employed 
population in Japan from the foundation of RENGO in 1989, a few years before the bursting of 
the asset price bubble, which led to the so-called lost 10 years (Ushinawareta Jūnen) or also the 
lost 20 years (Ushinawareta Nijūnen) until the present. (cf. table A.3 in appendix) Despite the 
economic burst-of-the-bubble crisis, the service-providing sector manages to increase, while the 
goods-producing sector is in a steady decline. Similar to Germany, but unlike the U.S., is that the 
total employed population stagnates in part as a result of a stagnated population growth. A factor 
that potentially explains the already-visible trend of a decrease in population could be attributed 
to the relatively low contingents of immigrant workers on Japanese soil as an effect of the still-
relatively-closed immigration policies that severely limit the expansion of immigrant labor. 
While there are signs of a decrease in the entire employed population, a clearly decreasing trend 
can be observed for those employed in the secondary sector. At the start of our measurements in 
1998, the percentage of the secondary sector is still 31.67 percent; by 2013, this proportion has 
continuously shrunk to 24.22 percent, comparable to the size of the same sector in Germany. 










































Figure 31: Discrepancy in scores between the four larger parties and RENGO compared with the Japanese active 













Figure 31bis: Discrepancy in scores between the three smaller parties and RENGO compared with the Japanese 
active population during election years 1998-2012 (in thousands).
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 Source: JMIAC (2014)  
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 The position of the Japan Restoration Party (Nippon Ishin no Kai) was excluded, as its score of -5.99993 
dramatically skewed the graph, thereby preventing the figure from adequately demonstrating the differences 
between the other parties .  






Figures 31 and 31bis display the discrepancy in scores between parties and RENGO in relation 
to the size of the active population during the election years for HoR and HoC from 1998 to 
2012.  
A first observation is that the discrepancies in scores for the three smaller parties listed in 
Figure 31bis are smaller than for the three older Japanese parties, LDP, SDP, and NK. The more 
important observations, however, can be drawn from Figure 31. For none of the four parties 
could I argue that there is a connection between the size of secondary-sector population and 
score discrepancies. Indeed, looking at the shape of the population stacks of Figure 30 and 
compare for these parties, there are no recognizable patterns. Even the one party that has at least 
part of its origins in the labor movement, the SDP, doesn’t follow a clear pattern. Another 
important observation is that the discrepancy in scores for DPJ remains low, regardless of the 
decrease in size observed in Figure 30. DPJ’s discrepancy in scores appears unaffected, but the 
DPJ program content may have come so close to RENGO that a point of saturation could have 
been reached.  
 Unemployment rates remain low when compared to those of the U.S. and Germany, yet a 
general increase from below 3 percent before 1994 to a rate between 3 percent and 5 percent 
occurs, peaking at 5.3 percent in 2002. (JMIAC 2014) After 2012, unemployment rates are less 
than 4 percent again. While unemployment could have had an effect on the reservoir of potential 
secondary-industry workers, the average unemployment rate of about 4 percent for the time 
period under analysis seems too low to have any significant effect on this. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 




Table 33: Upper rows display the number of workers in industrial unions, lower rows in italics display the total of 
industrial and service-sector unions. 
  2000 (12) 2001 (13) 2002 (14) 2003 (15) 2004 (16) 2005 (17) 2006 (18) 
RENGO 7,173,000 7,001,000 6,829,000 6,694,000 6,595,000 6,543,000 6,522,000 
  7,314,000 7,120,000 6,945,000 6,807,000 6,726,000 6,672,000 6,649,000 
ZENROREN 802,000 780,000 787,000 764,000 745,000 723,000 701,000 
  1,036,000 1,012,000 1,018,000 993,000 978,000 954,000 932,000 

















  2007 (19) 2008 (20) 2009 (21) 2010 (22) 2011 (23) 2012 (24) 2013 (25) 
RENGO 6,622,000 6,623,000 6,687,000 6,732,000 6,699,000 6,693,000 6,706,000 
  6,750,000 6,761,000 6,832,000 6,876,000 6,839,000 6,839,000 6,844,000 
ZENROREN 684,000 663,000 647,000 635,000 620,000 607,000 592,000 
  911,000 894,000 883,000 869,000 860,000 837,000 827,000 
ZENROKYO 132,000 128,000 124,000 118,000 113,000 110,000 109,000 
  150,000 144,000 140,000 133,000 128,000 125,000 124,000 
Source: JMIAC (Japan Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications – Statistics Bureau) 
 
Table 33 provides an overview of the proportion of industrial workers compared with service-
providing sectors for the three larger Japanese union federations, including RENGO. While 
RENGO was created in part to respond to the changes in the labor market, the number of service-
providing employees remains relatively low; this is also the case for the two other larger union 
federations. In other words, the largest Japanese union federation continues to be dominated by 
its traditional sociological base. While a segment of the service-providing employees is 
unionized through company unions not affiliated with any of the three large federations, the 
trend of service-employee unionization in Japan is more similar to that of the U.S. than 
Germany, in the sense that the rates are much lower. However, I also should consider that the 
goods-providing sector in Japan is still much larger in proportion compared to the service-
providing sector in the U.S. or Germany.   




With regard to Hypothesis Three, a general conclusion I can draw is that the continuously 
decreasing sociological base for the worker-vs.-owner cleavage was not reflected by any 
discernible trends as to how political parties’ content evolved vis-à-vis RENGO. DPJ is the 
exception in the sense that the scores are the lowest and remain constant, regardless of the 
continuous decrease of the importance of the secondary sector. 
Labor Unions H3: Responsiveness of parties to cleavage translation to 
changes in the sociological basis of the identity-interest 
groups 
U.S. Hypothesis confirmed: The decrease of sociological basis of the 
cleavage translates into decreased party scores compared with 
AFL-CIO 
Germany Hypothesis confirmed: Higher party scores during times of 
expansion of the sociological-basis cleavage, decline and 
stagnation during times of decline and stagnation 
Japan Hypothesis rejected: With the exception of a relatively constant 
score for DPJ, no trends could be identified despite a continuous 
decrease of the sociological basis of the cleavage. 
 
2. Minority and Immigrant Organizations 
2.1 LULAC 
Before testing our hypothesis, I first should have an idea of the evolution in size of both the 
dominant U.S. population and the selected segment of the subject population. If I were to take 
the entire population that would fit the subject-population category for the U.S., it would consist 
of all groups that are not non-Hispanic whites. As discussed in earlier chapters, for the purposes 
of this analysis, I decided to focus on the largest and fastest-growing segment of the U.S. subject 
population because it is most likely to yield results from which I can at least in part make 
inferences for the entire subject population. Table 34 provides an overview of the proportion of 
said groups compared with the total U.S. population. 
 




Table 34: U.S. Population by race 1950-2010 (in thousands). 
 1950  1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Total 
Population 
150697 179323 203210 226545 248709 281421 308745 
White 134942 158831 178119 188371 199686 211460 223553 
Black 15042 18871 22539 26495 29986 34658 38929 









321 980 1526 3500 7273 10641 15214 
Some other 
race 
48 87 230 6758 9804 15359 19107 
Two other 
races 
- - - - - 6826 9009 
























































































































Figure 32: Discrepancy in scores between parties and identity-interest organization for LULAC Dataset I comparing 
U.S. Hispanic population from 1994 to present (in thousands)
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 Source: U.S. Census Bureau 
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 To calculate the discrepancy in scores , the annual LULAC score was calculated together with the most recent 
available presidential platform. 




Because the U.S. census data are limited, in the sense that I only have new data for each 
beginning decade, I listed the same number for all years per decade. Obviously, the real numbers 
will be in between those numbers, and particularly for the Hispanic population, it would be fair 
to assume that there is a sharply increasing trend.  
Table 35: Presidential election participation rates by race. 
 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 
White 64% 66% 66% 64% 70% 61% 62% 67% 66% 64% 
Asian NA NA NA NA 54% 46% 43% 45% 47% 48% 
Black 51% 54% 61% 55% 59% 53% 57% 60% 65% 67% 
Hispanic 43% 46% 50% 48% 52% 44% 46% 47% 50% 47% 
Source (incl. Category descriptions): Pew Research (2013) 
 
Table 35 above displays the participation rates of major racial groups in the U.S. presidential 
elections since 1976. While the electoral participation is lower than for the African-American 
segment of the subject population, the rate of electoral participation of Latino voters is still 
significantly higher in terms of absolute numbers when compared to other minorities.  
What can be surmised from tables 34 and 35 and Figure 32 is that despite the enormous 
increase of the Latino population, both parties have done little with regard to their platforms to 
address the demands of this group. What remains a consistent finding for both datasets is that 
neither party translates the demands on behalf of the Latino community by LULAC very well. 
One reason that might explain the relative lack of inclusivity toward demands from the Hispanic 
community is that they still “punch below their weight,” meaning that despite a rapidly 
increasing number of Hispanic citizens and voters (and by extension an increasing group of 
illegal Latino residents), the number of eligible voters is still much higher than the number of 
Hispanic voters who do participate, still lagging behind the presidential and midterm election 
participation rates of African-Americans and Caucasian-Americans. (Krogstad 2014; Taylor et al. 
2012) However, the argument that parties ignore the Latino population because their electoral 




participation rate is lower is invalidated because the dramatic increase also results in a higher 
Latino vote despite an electoral participation rate that is lower than for African-Americans or the 
non-Hispanic white majority. While our hypothesis only takes into account size of the group, and 
not political engagement, it is nonetheless an important element that should be pointed out.  
During the 1990s, the Hispanic minority became the largest minority group, during a 
pace of expansion only equaled by the Asian-American population, while the growth rates of 
whites and African-Americans remained relatively modest. These shifts within the U.S. 
population have important implications for our hypothesis. While it is true that a party can’t 
address the demands of all identity-interest organizations, particularly if there are incompatible 
issues, this is very different from parties’ not reflecting most of the demands of the largest of 
such identity- interest organizations representing the largest segment within the subject 
population. With regard to the comparatively high electoral participation rates of African-
Americans, however, future research should include identity-interest organizations, in particular 
NAACP, to determine whether electoral participation rate or subject population size matter more. 
 On the basis of the data presented here, Hypothesis Three has to be rejected. The 
demands of the selected identity-organization are not well translated by parties despite the 
dramatic growth of the Hispanic population. An important caveat is that the inclusion of other 
identity- interest groups might yield more positive results for parties. However, even if other 
organizations like NAACP or NCLR were to be included, it is unlikely that parties would be 
more responsive, at least not because of the size of the respective subject population.  
While outside of the scope of this project, the analysis of the above case suggests that the 
inclusion of other identity- interest organizations representing other segments of the subject 
population, in particular African-Americans, may yield more insight into their validity. Not only 




is the latter minority much older, but the roots of a national organizational translation reach back 
much further. Additionally, an analysis of lower-tier levels – in this case, states with high 
concentrations of minorities – and the inclusion of other significant identity-interest 
organizations may help to test and reformulate our hypothesis. 
 
2.2 TGD 
Figures 33 displays discrepancies in scores between the five German parties and the largest, and 
oldest, national immigrant and ethnic minority advocacy group in Germany, TGD, compared 
with the size of the Turkish-German population since 1994. The numbers on the horizontal are 
based on the number of Turkish nationalizations plus the cumulative total of Turkish citizens 
naturalized since 1998. (cf. tables 36 and 37 below) The pre-1998 Turkish naturalizations were 
not included, meaning that the actual numbers will be even higher than those displayed here. 








































































































Figure 33: Discrepancy in scores between German parties and TGD compared with the Turkish-German population 
1996-2013 (in thousands).
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 Source: DESTASIS (2014) 
 
Table 36: Naturalizations of Turkish citizens since the revision of the German citizenship and na tionality legislation 











1998 56,994 NA 2006 33,388 549141 
1999 100,324 157318 2007 28,861 578002 
2000 82,861 240179 2008 24,449 602451 
2001 76,573 316752 2009 24,647 627098 
2002 64,631 381383 2010 26,192 653290 
2003 56,244 437627 2011 28,103 681393 
2004 44,465 482092 2012 33,246 714639 
2005 32,661 515753 2013 NA NA 
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 Analogous to the way the discrepancies in scores were calculated for LULAC, the closest available electoral 
platform was compared to the respective TGD score. A list with all numbers of discrepancies in scores can be found 
in the appendix.  




Source: BAMF (Bundesamt fur Migration und Flüchtlinge) and DESTATIS Statistisches Bundesamt and German 
Ministry of the Interior. 
Table 37: Total population including foreigners compared to foreign, EU (and prior to that European Community), 










1967 59948 1806 596 172 1991 80275 6067 1698 1779 
1968 60463 1924 641 205 1992 80975 6670 1719 1854 
1969 61195 2381 709 322 1993 81338 6977 1750 1918 
1970 61001 2738 784 469 1994 81539 7118 1779 1965 
1971 61503 3188 1215 652 1995 81817 7343 1811 2014 
1972 61809 3554 1187 712 1996 82012 7492 1839 2049 
1973 62101 3991 1278 910 1997 82057 7419 1850 2107 
1974 61991 4051 1288 1028 1998 82037 7308 1854 2110 
1975 61645 3900 1250 1077 1999 82163 7336 2299 2053 
1976 61442 3852 1180 1079 2000 82260 7268 2329 1998 
1977 61353 3892 1163 1118 2001 82440 7318 2343 1947 
1978 61322 4006 1145 1165 2002 82537 7348 2299 1912 
1979 61439 4251 1169 1268 2003 82532 7342 2346 1877 
1980 61658 4566 1211 1462 2004 82501 7288 2108 1764 
1981 61713 4721 1234 1546 2005 82439 7289 2144 1764 
1982 61546 4672 1216 1580 2006 82315 7256 2523 1738 
1983 61307 4574 1167 1552 2007 82218 7255 2562 1713 
1984 61049 4405 1142 1425 2008 82002 7186 2584 1688 
1985 61020 4482 1549* 1402 2009 81802 7131 2589 1658 
1986 61140 4662 1560 1434 2010 81752 7199 2663 1629 
1987 61238 4286 1408 1453 2011 80328 7339 2822 1607 
1988 61715 4624 1449 1523 2012 80524 6640 3050 1575 
1989 62679 5007 1516 1612 2013 80767 7012 3366 1549 
1990 79753** 5582 1644 1694      
*First year including the 15 EU member state nationals. 
** Reunification year. Source: DESTATIS Statistisches Bundesamt and German Ministry of the Interior.  
 
The slightly more positive and slightly increasing respective scores for Bündnis90/Die Grünen 
and PDS/Die Linke indicate that the presence of people with Turkish backgrounds may have 
some effect on policy proposals of both parties. On average, the scores for all German parties are 
closer to the TGD scores in contrast to the difference between LULAC and both major U.S. 
parties. TGD is relatively young as an organization, yet the sociological base has been 
consistently present in German society since the 1970s. The lack of a national organization until 
the mid-1990s in part explains the late politization of issues relevant to the population in 
Germany with an immigrant background, particularly the Turkish-German community.  




Table 37 displays the number of foreign nationals compared with German and EU 
citizens. Until the late 1990s, the number of Turkish citizens increases; indeed, a look at more 
detailed data from the German federal statistical bureau confirms that Turkish citizens remain by 
far the largest non-German population group in Germany. As mentioned in Chapter Two, the 
decline in the number of Turkish citizens after that is explained by the new citizenship legislation 
and sharply increased numbers of naturalization of Turks. For Hypothesis Three, the data suggest 
that size of the sociological base of TGD has only little bearing on the translation of issues 
relevant to the Turkish community, and by extension, that many issues relevant to the immigrant 
population in Germany are slightly more relevant to Bündnis90/Die Grünen and PDS/Die Linke, 
but that overall immigrant/minority issues are not among the highest priorities of parties. While 
there appears to be a slight increase in importance for other parties, this increase is very small.  
I can tentatively confirm Hypothesis Three, meaning that the discrepancies in scores 
become smaller as the size of the sociological base of the group increases. While the size of the 
Turkish minority has increased, the group also experienced a number of significant changes for 
the time period under analysis. On one hand, the increase rates of the 1990s is dwarfed by those 
of the 1970s and 1980s, now more or less remaining stagnant, which is true for the general 
immigrant population. On the other hand, a large number of Turks acquired German citizenship, 
which in part blurred our data. Additional research focused on regional levels where migrant 
minority populations are larger, and on additional immigrant and minority organizations, needs 
to be conducted to bring data that could allow for a stronger confirmation. Complementary to the 
analysis of lower-tier levels, I should attempt to include identity- interest organizations that 
predate TGD even if they never managed to grow beyond the local scope.  
 





Figure 34 displays the discrepancies in scores between Japan’s four main parties and BLL per 






























Figure 34bis: Discrepancy in scores between the smaller Japanese parties and BLL for years 2005-2012. 





As discussed in Chapter Two, the exact size of the Buraku population is unknown. One of the 
major elements that Chung pointed out in explaining why Japan is the only industrialized country 
with a fourth-generation immigrant problem is the fact that phenotypically speaking, almost all 
immigrants are indistinguishable with the majority of ethnic Japanese. (2010) This invisibility 
also applies to the Buraku population, contrasting sharply with many minorities in Western 
European countries and the U.S. While an estimation, let alone time-series data, for the Buraku 
population isn’t available, I can assume that this population has remained relatively constant for 
the time period under analysis. The total size of the subject population did increase since the 
mid-1980s, but despite this increase, particularly for immigrants from China, the Philippines, and 
Brazil, the proportion of foreign residents as part of the total population remains less than 2 
percent.  (JMIAC 2014) The Buraku population thus remains by far the largest segment of the 
subject population. 
Because the Buraku population over the centuries evolved together with the general 
population, I surmise that it makes sense to assume that the current Buraku population has 
reached a level of stagnation similar to that of the general population. Consequently, I opted not 
to include a population number here, and instead listed the discrepancies in scores per election 
year for HoR and HoC 1998-2012. Figures 34 and 34bis are based on the assumption that the 
Buraku population remained stagnant, at least for the two decades under analysis. Even if I had 
the opportunity of including data from other identity-interest organizations, in particular those 
advocating on behalf of the second-largest segment of what can be described as the subject 
population of Japan, the resident Korean minority, the latter group only represents a very small 




share of the total population of 127 million, and its size is also stagnant in proportion to the 
general population. (JMIAC 2014) 
With regard to Hypothesis Three, I should then expect a stagnation of the positions of 
political parties, because the Buraku population and also other categories that could be seen as 
ethnic minorities underwent no significant levels of expansion for the time period under analysis. 
Significant levels of fluctuation, or the absence of any trends that reflect this stagnation, suggest 
that the political importance of issues translated by the BLL has little or no effect on party 
programs. Indeed, looking at the scores for all parties, I cannot distinguish any trend that is either 
increasing or decreasing. The discrepancies in scores for the three smaller parties are much 
higher than in the RENGO case, and are more in line with the discrepancies in scores of the other 
parties. Although the DPJ appears to have the most constant discrepancies in scores, also here 
the fluctuations are much more pronounced. 
In those instances in which there is fluctuation, the fluctuation appears to be independent 
of the size of the subject population but remains, save for a few exceptions, within a relatively 
small range. Hypothesis Three can be tentatively confirmed because despite some fluctuation, 
these fluctuations appear to be small overall. An additional caveat is the absence of any trends, 
which would caution us to revise our hypothesis. However, more research, particular ly with 
regard to the potential effects of future immigration on politics, will be necessary to conclusively 
confirm this. Similarly for the two German and U.S. ethnic minorities, the Buraku in particular 
tend to concentrate in specific regions and urban centers, in this case, the urban areas of western 
and southern Japan. An analysis of different administrative tiers, both locally and regionally, 
compared with the national level also may yield more conclusive results.  
 




Minority Organizations H3: Responsiveness of parties to cleavage translation to 
changes in the sociological basis of the identity-interest 
groups 
US Hypothesis rejected: Growth population-basis cleavage does not 
translate into increase party scores 
Germany Hypothesis tentatively confirmed 
Japan Hypothesis tentatively confirmed: Stagnation is reflected in 
stagnation of party scores 
  
3. Future research agenda considerations 
With regard to the union federation data, it appears that the selection of the largest and most 
influential union federations provided a solid set to see to what extent parties did indeed translate 
the interests of the secondary-sector employees, or the traditional sociological base of the 
worker-vs.-owner cleavage. However, the results only partially confirmed the hypothesis. 
Because this project is laying the foundation for a larger future research projects, I deliberately 
defined the worker side of the cleavage conservatively as only the segment of traditional 
industrial workers. Future research will have to expand on this by examining how and whether 
other segments of the employed population also could be argued to identify as those on the 
worker side, particularly in the light of increased unionization rates among tertiary-sector 
employees. 
With regard to the selection of minority organizations, one conclusion I can draw is that 
in order to have more conclusive results for all three cases, additional identity- interest 
organizations need to be included. Additionally, I should complement research with regard to the 
relevance of minority groups on politics by including an analysis of the regional and/or local 
tiers, depending on the concentration of the respective minority groups. However, particularly 
for the U.S. case, it appears unlikely that the inclusion of additional identity- interest 
organizations translating demands made by subject minorities would be much different from the 




results I obtained for LULAC. If both U.S. parties ignore demands from the largest Latino 
advocacy organization, which not only represents the largest, but also the fastest-growing 
minority group in the U.S., I can speculate that it is unlikely that either party would do better for 
smaller segments of the subject population.   






This project has addressed the question of what causing this dysfunction of representation 
through political parties. In particular, I analyzed how well parties translate cleavages by 
focusing on two specific cleavages, worker-vs.-owner and subject-vs.-dominant population. I did 
this by examining the relationship trends between two categories of the most tractable social 
movement organization types, political parties and the largest and most influential identity-
interest organizations translating one pole of the two cleavages under analysis. To do so, the 
programmatic content of party manifestos spanning several decades was compared with 
programmatic documents of major interest groups representing large segments of a population 
with cleavage-based identities.  
By selecting the largest and most influential identity- interest organizations advocating on 
behalf of the largest segments of a distinct sociological group at one pole of a cleavage, I argued 
that such a selection would at least be sufficiently indicative of the interests of that specific 
segment, and perhaps also indicative of the mechanisms at work with regard to the entire 
population on that pole.  
In this final chapter, I discuss the theoretical implications and the main findings, and 
case-specific findings, and I address future research agenda concerns. Below is a summary of the 
hypotheses and expectations formulated in Chapter One that were tested in the two previous 
chapters.  
H1 - Responsiveness of parties to cleavage translation over time:  
In a two-party system, parties become less responsive to cleavage translation over 
time. In a multiparty system, parties will be more responsive to cleavage translation 
over time. In a dominant-party system, the dominant party will be less responsive to 
cleavage translation, whereas the other parties will be more responsive over time. 





H2 - Level of fluctuation of party translation of cleavages over time:  
In a two-party system, it is likely that one party will translate one pole of a cleavage 
slightly stronger than the other. In a multiparty system, several parties will compete to 
attract the votes of a cleavage-based organization; therefore I should expect cleavage 
translation to fluctuate across parties over time. In a dominant-party system, cleavage 
translation will mainly fluctuate among opposition parties, while cleavage translation 
by the dominant party gradually erodes or remains stagnant at a low level. 
 
H3 - Responsiveness of parties to cleavage translation related to changes in the 
sociological basis of the identity- interest groups:  
Political parties will be more responsive to cleavage translation if the sociological 
base of identity-interest organizations is experiencing continuous growth. Political 
parties will be less responsive to cleavage translation if the sociological base is 
experiencing stagnation or a continuous decrease in growth. 
 
 H1: Responsiveness of parties to 
cleavage translation over time 
H2: level of fluctuation of party 
translation of cleavages over time 
2-party system Parties become less responsive  One party will be slightly more 
responsive than the other 
Multiparty system Parties become more responsive 
over time 
Party responsiveness will fluctuate 
over time across parties  
Dominant party system Dominant party becomes less 
responsive, other parties will be 
more responsive 
Party responsiveness will fluctuate 
higher among other parties while it 
remains stagnant at low level for the 
dominant party 
Table 1: expectations H1 and H2 
 
 H3: Responsiveness of parties to cleavage translation 
to changes in the sociological basis of the identity-
interest groups 
Two-party system Parties become more responsive if group grows, less 
responsive if group decreases  
Multiparty system Parties become more responsive if group grows, less 
responsive if group decreases  
Dominant-party system Dominant party will be less responsive; other parties 
become more responsive if group grows, less responsive 
if group decreases 
Table 2: expectations H3 
 
1. Theoretical implications and main findings 
I want to start by pointing out that any future research based on this project will have to take into 
account that an expansion of the cleavages under analysis, but also the addition of more identity-
interest organizations – just as in the case of this project – likely will require intensive data 




collection and processing. This section will point out some general findings and implications, 
while I reserve the case-specific issues for the next section. In terms of general tendencies, there 
are several elements I could establish.  
First, the body of literature on social cleavages suggests that for many cases, the worker-
vs.-owner cleavage remains relatively salient, despite a decrease in salience. Perhaps our most 
important finding is that the data from this study suggests otherwise. Either this cleavage had 
been conflated with a general left-vs.-right division – which actually doesn’t say much about 
politics, as it may mean different things in different contexts – or other cleavages became more 
salient, or all cleavages lost salience. While this conclusion is not completely original, because at 
least some scholars studying parties have argued as much, it is nonetheless significant because 
this study is the first to actually create a more solid evidence base rooted in a complementary 
basis of party and identity- interest group research.   
Second, the scores of all identity- interest organizations remain relatively constant over 
time, with the exceptions of TGD and LULAC. However, in contrast with the estimates for party 
manifestos for the same party, which generally display a much higher level of fluctuation, these 
fluctuations appear less significant. For the earlier TGD and LULAC texts, I could attribute the 
higher fluctuation levels to the shorter text amounts available. But even these fluctuations 
remained modest when compared with parties. Parties, on the other hand, exhibit much higher 
levels of fluctuation across all three cases, with only few exceptions. With regard to the U.S. 
scores, it appears that the scores of Democrats and Republicans are very close, yet still fluctuate 
at about the same rate together. For the German case, all parties, even the smaller ones, exhibit 
considerable levels of estimate fluctuation over time. The only exception seems to be DPJ in 
Japan. Unlike parties, they consistently translate similar, yet not identical, interests of 




sociological groups much better over time. This finding supports my argument that identity-
interest groups are a much better vehicle for cleavage expressions than parties. 
The third and fourth findings relate to the findings for organizations translating the 
worker-vs.-owner cleavage compared with those for the subject-vs.-dominant population 
cleavage. For the results I obtained for the union federations advocating on behalf of the worker 
side of the worker-vs.-owner cleavage, each case allowed for relatively conclusive statements 
because it was possible to distinguish relatively clear directions the parties took in relation to 
them over time. Granted, this was less the case for the Japanese data, yet also here I could at least 
observe some tendencies. 
Our fourth finding is that for the minority organizations that represented the largest 
segment of the respective subject populations, however, the trends I could establish proved to be 
relatively weak.  While I can expect that the same model will apply similar identity- interest 
organizations advocating on behalf of segments of the subject population, the weak trends 
suggest that in order to confirm or reject these trends, I may need to seek ways to obtain data that 
better reflects the entire subject population instead of just the largest segment. One reason for 
doing so is that with the U.S. case, for example, minorities that are largely non-immigrant, such 
as African-Americans, to an extent may have interests that differ from those of Latino groups, in 
which a large segment has a bigger stake in immigration issues. The point of this would be to see 
how close the various larger identity- interest organizations advocating on behalf of the subject 
minority population are to each other compared with parties.  
A fifth main finding, again with regard to minority identity- interest organizations, that 
was raised by examining the results for TGD, and to a lesser extent BLL, is that an analysis such 
as that provided by this project might be rendered even more complete by additionally focusing 




on other tiers aside from the national level, in particular those areas with larger concentrations of 
the subject population. Given the long history of LULAC’s presence in the southwestern U.S., an 
examination of state-level political texts also might yield results complementary to the national 
data.  
With regard to the union federation data, it appears that the selection of the largest and 
most influential union federations provided a solid set to see how far parties did indeed translate 
the interests of the working class. However, the results only partially confirmed the hypothesis. 
With regard to the selection of minority organizations, one conclusion I can draw is that in order 
to have more conclusive results for all three cases, additional identity- interest organizations must 
to be included. Additionally, I should complement research with regard to the relevance of 
minority groups on politics by including an analysis of regional tiers, local tiers, or both, 
depending on the concentration of the respective groups. 
Also, the relative size of the demographic base of cleavage-identity organizations may 
explain why the workers-vs.-owners cleavage appeared better translated by parties than the 
subject-vs.-dominant population cleavage. One reason to select the worker-vs.-owner and 
subject-vs.-dominant population cleavage was that with the exception of some cases like 
Belgium, Canada, or Switzerland, the second cleavage is assumed to be less salient in the 
majority of the cases, whereas the first is more salient. However, with the advent of global 
immigration, the second cleavage may become salient even in those cases that traditionally had 
no subject population or only a very small one. However, while immigration figures in some 
countries are rapidly increasing, the question remains whether this increase in size actually did 
have any effect on party politics. In particular, I looked at the largest minority groups in the U.S., 
Germany, and Japan. In the first case, immigration of the Hispanic group has been continuous 




and they became the second-largest segment of the population before the dominant population. 
In Germany, the Turkish population grew significantly between the 1970s and the 1990s and is 
now slowly at a point of stagnation in line with a general stagnation of the German population. In 
Japan, I analyzed the Buraku minority because immigration, while slightly increased in recent 
decades, remains relatively insignificant. For the Buraku group, I could assume that the 
proportion of the total population remains the same. Contrary to the union federation data, the 
general trend I could observe is that regardless of the case and minority group analyzed, the 
effects of changes or stagnation of the minority group appeared to have only modest, if not trivial, 
effects upon party political agendas compared with similar evolutions among the traditional 
worker population. While our data suggest that the relatively small proportion of the population 
segment may be an important, if not the most important, factor in why the subject-vs.-dominant 
population cleavage wasn’t translated well by parties, I should acknowledge that in those two 
cases in which considerable growth of the subject population segment under analysis occurred, 
the Turks in Germany and the Latino population in the U.S., the parties’ positions did not change 
that much. A caveat is that at least for the German case, I could argue that there is a weak 
tendency for the Green party and the left fringe to be more attentive to the interests of the 
Turkish community. This very much in contrast to the U.S., where despite a rapidly increasing 
proportion of the Latino population and increased expansion and professionalization of LULAC 
appear to have little or no effect on both parties. These two former elements suggest that party 
systems do matter with regard to how well cleavages can become translated. The literature on 
this, particularly the work by Arend Lijphart, suggested as much, yet so far, identity- interest 
organizations were not included in the evidence presented. Although future research will have to 




confirm this, these differences suggest that proportional representation systems are indeed better 
than two-party majoritarian party systems.   
In Chapter One, I briefly touched about the potential increase of political apathy in 
established democracies. While it was not part of the hypotheses formulated, it was a 
consideration that deserved the type of preliminary research conducted for this project before I 
am also able to have a better idea to successfully explore the problem of political apathy. What 
was meant is that the disconnection from political parties might also occur in the arena of 
identity- interest organizations. Political apathy thus not only means a retreat from electoral 
politics, but also from political involvement of the masses in democracy as such. The current 
data I obtained from the three cases under examination did not provide a clear answer to this 
question. On one hand, the union data in all three cases seem to confirm that there is also a 
general decline in union membership. However, I need to be careful with surmising that this is 
the result of political apathy. First, there is the original focus of unions on traditional workers in 
the secondary economy. While there is a modestly increasing unionization happening in the 
tertiary sector, it is too soon to tell whether we’re in a period of transition or decline of unions. 
Second, regardless of the loss of importance of traditional manufacturing labor, in particular in 
the German and Japanese cases, unionization rates remained relatively stable during the past few 
decades. An additional caveat is that in as far as I was able to track membership for the subject-
population identity- interest organizations, particularly LULAC and TGD, it appears that these 
organizations increased their membership bases. It is of course possible that there is no apathy at 
all, but instead one cleavage is in decline and one is expanding, at least in terms of the number of 
people actively supporting it by joining and/or supporting an identity- interest organization.  
 




2. Case-specific findings 
Below are the summaries of the findings for all hypotheses from Chapters Four and Five. For the 
German case, the first hypothesis could only be confirmed for TGD, yet had to be rejected for 
DGB. Hypothesis Two could not be confirmed for TGD but could be for DGB. For the Japanese 
case, I could confirm both hypotheses for both RENGO and BLL, yet with regard to the first 
hypothesis, I could only partially do so. While the proposed hypotheses appear robust for the 
selected two-party system and solid for the selected multiparty system, one aspect that should be 
on a future research agenda is the formulation of both hypotheses so that I can derive clearer 
results for multiparty systems. For Hypothesis Three, there appears to be a difference between 
the data I obtained for the union federation organizations and that of the minority organizations. 
The size of the sociological basis appears to only have had a significant impact on the 
relationship between parties and union federations, yet little to modest effect on the relationship 
between subject-group organizations and parties. 
Labor Unions H1: Responsiveness of 
parties to cleavage 
translation over time 
H2: level of fluctuation of 
party translation of 
cleavages over time 
U.S. Hypothesis confirmed: Both 
parties display decreased 
cleavage translation over time 
Hypothesis confirmed: Both 
parties translate weakly, but a 
slightly stronger translation by 
the Democrats. 
Germany Hypothesis not confirmed: 
The parties’ estimates drop 
and only in 2013 appear to 
resemble pre-1980 levels 
Hypothesis confirmed: 
fluctuation appears to be 
relatively widespread, 
particularly for CDU-CSU 
Japan Hypothesis partially 
confirmed: The dominant 
party has low, stagnant 
responsiveness, but other 
parties have both higher - 
particularly NK – and lower 
levels of responsiveness 
Hypothesis confirmed: 
dominant party has low, 
stagnant scores, while 
fluctuation is higher among 
other parties, with the 
exception that DPJ scores are 
much more constant than 
those of LDP 







Minority Organizations H1: Responsiveness of 
parties to cleavage 
translation over time 
H2: level of fluctuation of 
party translation of 
cleavages over time 
US Hypothesis confirmed: Both 
parties display decreased 
cleavage translation over time 
Hypothesis confirmed: Both 
parties have low scores, 
Democrats have slightly 
stronger translation when not 
controlling for regional 
impact. 
Germany Hypothesis tentatively 
confirmed: Although the 
evidence is weak, there 
appears to be a general 
upward trend for parties to 
become more responsive 
Hypothesis not confirmed: 
very low level of fluctuation 
among parties 
Japan Hypothesis partially 
confirmed: Dominant party 
has low, stagnant 
responsiveness, but other 
parties have higher or lower 
levels of responsiveness 
Hypothesis confirmed: 
Dominant party has low, 
stagnant scores while 
fluctuation is higher among 
other parties, but DPJ scores 
fluctuate little 
 
Labor Unions H3: Responsiveness of parties to cleavage translation to 
changes in the sociological basis of the identity-interest 
groups 
US Hypothesis confirmed: The decrease of sociological basis of the 
cleavage translates into decreased party scores compared with 
AFL-CIO 
Germany Hypothesis confirmed: Higher party scores during times of 
expansion of the sociological-basis cleavage, decline and 
stagnation during times of decline and stagnation 
Japan Hypothesis rejected: With the exception of a relatively constant 
score for DPJ, no trends could be identified despite a continuous 
decrease of the sociological basis of the cleavage. 
 
Minority Organizations  H3: Responsiveness of parties to cleavage translation to 
changes in the sociological basis of the identity-interest 
groups 
US Hypothesis rejected: Growth population-basis cleavage does not 
translate into increase party scores 
Germany Hypothesis tentatively confirmed 
Japan Hypothesis tentatively confirmed: Stagnation is reflected in 
stagnation of party scores 





For the U.S. case, I could confirm Hypotheses One and Two for both organizations I 
examined. Hypothesis Three could only be confirmed for the AFL-CIO data. On one hand, I 
could conclude that size of the sociological basis of a cleavage only becomes relevant when a 
certain threshold size is reached, implying that the reason why LULAC does not appear to weigh 
on parties’ manifestos is because the Latino population it represents has not yet reached a large 
enough size. However, what is also possible is that the mechanism of size only works in one 
direction for the U.S. case, meaning that only when the sociological basis of an identity-interest 
organization declines will a party’s position change, but not the other way around. 
In their study testing and comparing the impact of different sets of actors on politics as 
suggested by four theoretical models explaining U.S. democracy, Gillens and Page found that it 
is mostly the preferences of economic elites and non-identity, or what they termed “business 
interest groups,” that are being reflected by American policy making. (2014) Although their 
method and theoretical framework differ from the one used here, their findings confirm some of 
the trends of this project. One of the main findings of my study is that the U.S. appears to 
perform significantly worse compared with the two different liberal democracies under 
examination with regard to the translation of cleavage demands. Both the AFL-CIO and LULAC 
are the types of organizations that Gillens and Page classify as “mass-based” interest groups, 
which together with ordinary, individual citizens are found to have little influence on U.S. policy 
making. For both organizations, I could establish that the presidential platforms did not reflect 
the policy stances much, to say the least.  
While I could establish that a decrease of AFL-CIO influence was highly correlated to a 
decrease of the traditional industrial worker population, one has to wonder what replaced it. Did 




another cleavage become more important, or did both parties increasingly distance themselves 
from the masses in favor of corporate interests and wealthy individuals, as Gillens and Page 
suggest? The evidence I collected for LULAC at least suggests that one cleavage that has always 
been present in U.S. politics, and in which at least part of the subject population dramatically 
increases in the past few decades, remains under-articulated by both parties.   
Despite this continuous increase of the Hispanic population in the U.S. and organizational 
growth and professionalization of LULAC, the impact of LULAC on national policy is at best 
modest, and at worst insignificant. Looking at AFL-CIO, I could establish that both major parties 
did reflect the policy positions of the AFL-CIO significantly more prior to the 1980s. Although 
AFL-CIO’s positions on policy did not change significantly over time, as was the case with 
LULAC, the distance between AFL-CIO policy positions and those of both parties increase 
dramatically, to the point where it is correct to state that neither party reflects the policy position 
of the employed any longer. The small difference between Republicans and Democrats with 
regard to this is negligible. A question that did come up after weighing the results of this analysis 
was who, exactly, is being represented by U.S. political parties, if not the ordinary citizens and 
the identity- interest groups they organized in? The main difference between what Gillens and 
Page termed “business interest group” and our “identity- interest group” is that the former lacks 
popular legitimacy, as it only reflects the demands of a small percentage of the population, or at 
least a percentage much smaller than either the traditional industrial worker group or the Latino 
population.  
Both the German and Japanese cases yielded mixed results for both union federation and 
identity- interest organizations. The German system appears to perform somewhat better in terms 
of translating the demands of both cleavages under analysis, at least with regard to the groups 




represented by the identity- interest organizations under analysis. Whereas German parties used 
to better translate demands of DGB in earlier decades, it appears that after 1980, this function 
was taken over by two other parties traditionally counted as left of the center, the Greens and Die 
Linke. On one hand, Germany’s traditional working class underwent the same changes as in the 
U.S., albeit slightly less pronounced. On the other hand, the neo-corporatist bargaining system 
made it more difficult for unions to be undermined, as in the U.S. case. Both factors combined 
explain why Germany’s traditional working class continues to be relevant for political parties, 
particularly when compared to the U.S.  
For the Japanese case, the evidence is much less conclusive, yet there are a few items that 
are worth mentioning. First, those parties that were present since 1955 remained seemingly 
unaffected by both identity- interest organizations. Indeed, it seems as if the content of LDP, SDP, 
and to a lesser extent NK, are rather close compared with both identity- interest groups. Only DPJ 
and a few younger, newer parties appear to be somewhat affected by both identity-groups. This 
is a trend Japan shares with the German case; in both, the traditional parties that were present 
from the onset of the party system translated the interests of the examined identity- interest 
organizations less well than newer parties. There are several conclusions I can draw from this. 
First, both systems appear to provide some level of insulation from the voter, in the sense that 
even if parties translate the interests of certain cleavage-based groups less well, it may result in 
lower party membership numbers and votes, but not in a demise of these parties. Also, much 
unlike the U.S. system, both systems allow for new parties to enter the system. In both cases, 
some of these newer parties focused on voter bases originally associated with one of the older 
parties. An important difference with the German case is that within Japan’s LDP-dominated 
system, it is still difficult to influence politics without access to the LDP. The creation of 




RENGO, for example, was inspired in part by the ambition to weigh more heavily on all 
Japanese parties, including LDP. While this effort appears to have borne some fruit, the 
differences between the BLL estimate results and RENGO results remain relatively small.  
Unlike the U.S. case, our data did not suggest any trends with regard to incumbency of 
parties in Japanese or German government. Also unlike the U.S., the possibility of more than two 
parties entering the political arena creates the possibility of having pariah parties, whose 
positions are considered too controversial or extremist for other parties and result in their 
exclusion from potential coalitions.  
Our study in part hinged on the assumption that political parties, including those in the 
U.S., should reflect the demands of the overwhelming majority of the people, and by extension, 
the demands of large cleavage-based-groups’ interests. The central problem of the current U.S. 
political party system, then, is its decreasing lack of legitimacy and its inability to reflect the 
wishes and desires of a substantial segment of its voters. Granted, future research will have to 
show whether other cleavages became more relevant, or that Republicans and Democrats instead 
did, as suggested by Gillens and Page, and stopped reflecting the interests of the masses. It 
appears that U.S. parties have almost completely lost their ability to represent the people, a task 
now increasingly performed by identity- interest groups that lack the access to gain significant 
influence on policy making. From a comparative point of view, then, it appears the U.S. type 
model, with regard to its party system and integration of identity- interest groups into the political 
system – or lack of the latter – is not as successful with regard to citizen representation as the 
two other cases under examination.  
 
 




3 Future research agenda considerations 
While our analysis yielded mixed results, it also laid a foundation for what promise to be 
interesting future research projects. A first point to conclude is that future research will have to 
delve deeper into the hypotheses confirmed and to address shortcomings of those that couldn’t be 
confirmed. The results of the data presented here helped to confirm some of the hypotheses 
posed, but it was impossible to confirm some hypotheses with the data available.  
As pointed out in the first section, it appears that if the worker-vs.-owner cleavage at 
some place at some point in time was the most salient one, decreased unionization rates and a 
significantly decreased reduction of the traditional worker base suggest that this cleavage did 
lose a lot of salience during the past few decades. What seems certain is that in all three cases, 
despite the loss of salience, this cleavage is still being politicized and is relevant.  However, to 
confirm this finding, I have to explore the question of whether this is just because some authors 
conflated workers-vs.-owners with a general left-vs.-right division, or whether other cleavages 
became more salient, or whether all cleavages lost salience.  
With regard to the union federation data, it appears that the selection of the largest and 
most influential union federations provided a solid set to see to what extent parties did indeed 
translate the interests of the secondary-sector employees, or the traditional sociological base of 
the worker-vs.-owner cleavage. However, the results only partially confirmed the hypothesis. 
Because this project is laying the foundation for larger future research projects, I deliberately 
defined the worker side of the cleavage conservatively as only the segment of traditional 
industrial workers. Future research will have to expand on this by examining how and whether 
other segments of the employed population also could be argued to identify as those on the 




worker side, particularly in light of increased unionization rates among tertiary-sector 
employees.  
With regard to the selection of minority organizations, one conclusion I can draw is that 
in order to have more conclusive results for all three cases, additional identity- interest 
organizations need to be included. Additionally, I should complement research with regard to the 
relevance of minority groups on politics by including an analysis of regional and/or local tiers, 
depending on the concentration of the respective minority groups. However, particularly for the 
U.S. case, it appears unlikely that the inclusion of additional identity- interest organizations 
translating demands made by subject minorities would be much different from the results I 
obtained for LULAC. If both U.S. parties remain relatively ignorant of demands from the largest 
Latino advocacy organization, which not only represents the largest, but also the fastest-growing 
minority group in the U.S., I can speculate that it is unlikely that either party would do better for 
smaller segments of the subject population.   
The results for the two cleavages in the three cases examined suggest that it would be 
worthwhile to conduct a similar analysis for the two other cleavages mentioned in Chapter One: 
the rural-vs.-urban and the religious-vs.-secular cleavages. On one hand, it may appear as if these 
are not as relevant as the two analyzed for this project, which would be in line with what most 
party-centered cleavage literature agrees upon. On the other hand, this study suggests a 
complementary approach including data from both parties and extra-electoral organizations that 
may bring more conclusive answers to these questions. Particularly for the U.S. case, the 
religious-vs.-secular cleavage in fact may have become more salient in politics. For Japan, 
especially considering the fact that some authors did make mention of the possibility of a rural-




vs.-urban cleavage in connection with the position of the LDP, the latter cleavage would be an 
interesting research objective. 
A minor consideration relates to the lack of findings related to incumbency of parties in 
government for both Germany and Japan. Because I could at least identify some trends for the 
U.S., albeit weak ones for incumbency, it would make sense to add coalition agreement texts to 
the analysis in order to see how they compare with the party manifestos and the identity- interest 














1.1 Results for dataset I, Position estimates for AFL-CIO documents as compared with 






        wordfish(wfm = aflcio1nocontroldata, dir = c(1, 2)) 
 
Document Positions: 
                         Estimate Std. Error   Lower    Upper 
NEGATIVE_REP.1968.txt    -0.32405    0.03633 -0.3953 -0.25284 
POSITIVE_AFLCIO.1968.txt  0.74817    0.01759  0.7137  0.78264 
DEM.1960.txt             -0.29117    0.02884 -0.3477 -0.23465 
DEM.1964.txt             -0.09747    0.02624 -0.1489 -0.04605 
DEM.1968.txt             -0.36540    0.02861 -0.4215 -0.30933 
DEM.1972.txt             -0.12112    0.02272 -0.1656 -0.07659 
DEM.1976.txt             -0.14168    0.02479 -0.1903 -0.09309 
DEM.1980.txt             -0.29487    0.01860 -0.3313 -0.25842 
DEM.1984.txt             -0.66905    0.01913 -0.7065 -0.63155 
DEM.1988.txt             -0.96299    0.05147 -1.0639 -0.86212 
DEM.1992.txt             -1.20713    0.03662 -1.2789 -1.13535 
DEM.1996.txt             -1.69490    0.02275 -1.7395 -1.65031 
DEM.2000.txt             -1.34706    0.02216 -1.3905 -1.30363 
DEM.2004.txt             -1.51306    0.02417 -1.5604 -1.46569 
DEM.2008.txt             -1.24528    0.02129 -1.2870 -1.20354 
DEM.2012.txt             -1.41265    0.02038 -1.4526 -1.37271 
REP.1960.txt             -0.32686    0.03597 -0.3974 -0.25636 
REP.1964.txt             -0.66087    0.03989 -0.7391 -0.58269 
REP.1972.txt             -0.55083    0.02372 -0.5973 -0.50433 
REP.1976.txt             -0.59194    0.02593 -0.6428 -0.54111 
REP.1980.txt             -0.74078    0.01964 -0.7793 -0.70228 
REP.1984.txt             -0.94259    0.02184 -0.9854 -0.89979 
REP.1988.txt             -1.14718    0.01841 -1.1833 -1.11109 
REP.1992.txt             -1.39039    0.01987 -1.4293 -1.35145 
REP.1996.txt             -1.39963    0.02021 -1.4392 -1.36002 
REP.2000.txt             -1.40575    0.01802 -1.4411 -1.37043 
REP.2004.txt             -1.65937    0.01519 -1.6891 -1.62961 
REP.2008.txt             -1.24580    0.02245 -1.2898 -1.20179 
REP.2012.txt             -1.09375    0.02036 -1.1337 -1.05384 
AFLCIO.1960.txt           0.64679    0.02702  0.5938  0.69975 
AFLCIO.1964.txt           0.73350    0.01983  0.6946  0.77235 
AFLCIO.1971.txt           1.02882    0.01750  0.9945  1.06311 
AFLCIO.1972.txt           0.72950    0.01588  0.6984  0.76062 
AFLCIO.1973.txt           1.01593    0.01585  0.9849  1.04699 
AFLCIO.1975.txt           1.07703    0.01470  1.0482  1.10585 
AFLCIO.1976.txt           0.79428    0.01254  0.7697  0.81887 
AFLCIO.1977.txt           1.01349    0.01426  0.9855  1.04145 
AFLCIO.1979.txt           1.02050    0.01421  0.9926  1.04835 
AFLCIO.1980.txt           0.70320    0.02210  0.6599  0.74652 
AFLCIO.1981.txt           1.02654    0.01566  0.9959  1.05723 
AFLCIO.1983.txt           1.07691    0.01388  1.0497  1.10411 
AFLCIO.1984.txt           0.76693    0.03092  0.7063  0.82754 




AFLCIO.1985.txt           1.03129    0.01384  1.0042  1.05842 
AFLCIO.1987.txt           1.03939    0.01329  1.0133  1.06544 
AFLCIO.1989.txt           1.06381    0.01272  1.0389  1.08873 
AFLCIO.1991.txt           1.04850    0.01372  1.0216  1.07540 
AFLCIO.1993.txt           1.03886    0.01380  1.0118  1.06592 
AFLCIO.1995.txt           1.09630    0.01000  1.0767  1.11590 
AFLCIO.1997.txt           0.99818    0.01252  0.9737  1.02272 
AFLCIO.1999.txt           0.92418    0.01164  0.9014  0.94700 
AFLCIO.2001.txt           0.84767    0.02691  0.7949  0.90043 
AFLCIO.2005.txt           1.17346    0.01341  1.1472  1.19975 
AFLCIO.2009.txt           1.06698    0.01406  1.0394  1.09454 
AFLCIO.2013.txt           0.96286    0.01079  0.9417  0.98402 
 
1.2 Results for dataset II: Position estimates for AFL-CIO platform proposals as compared 






        wordfish(wfm = aflcio2nocontroldata, dir = c(1, 2)) 
 
Document Positions: 
                         Estimate Std. Error    Lower   Upper 
NEGATIVE_REP.1968.txt    -0.51937   0.037085 -0.59205 -0.4467 
POSITIVE_AFLCIO.1968.txt  1.56675   0.026337  1.51513  1.6184 
DEM.1960.txt             -0.39044   0.030467 -0.45016 -0.3307 
DEM.1964.txt              0.08755   0.030239  0.02828  0.1468 
DEM.1968.txt             -0.50688   0.029298 -0.56430 -0.4495 
DEM.1972.txt             -0.25062   0.025062 -0.29973 -0.2015 
DEM.1976.txt             -0.57469   0.025142 -0.62397 -0.5254 
DEM.1980.txt             -0.93367   0.014703 -0.96249 -0.9049 
DEM.1984.txt             -0.89805   0.015948 -0.92930 -0.8668 
REP.1960.txt             -0.45792   0.037344 -0.53111 -0.3847 
REP.1964.txt             -0.93400   0.031400 -0.99554 -0.8725 
REP.1972.txt             -0.63446   0.023318 -0.68016 -0.5888 
REP.1976.txt             -0.90079   0.021274 -0.94248 -0.8591 
REP.1980.txt             -1.18666   0.009463 -1.20521 -1.1681 
REP.1984.txt             -1.07662   0.014068 -1.10419 -1.0490 
AFLCIO.1960.txt           0.81670   0.039984  0.73834  0.8951 
AFLCIO.1964.txt           1.50074   0.029613  1.44270  1.5588 
AFLCIO.1972.txt           1.65398   0.023157  1.60860  1.6994 
AFLCIO.1976.txt           1.58861   0.019617  1.55016  1.6271 
AFLCIO.1980.txt           0.82586   0.034224  0.75878  0.8929 
AFLCIO.1984.txt           1.17839   0.049612  1.08115  1.2756 
 
1.3 Dataset III: Position estimates for AFL-CIO documents excluding AFL-CIO platform 






        wordfish(wfm = AFLCIO3data, dir = c(1, 2)) 
 
Document Positions: 
                         Estimate Std. Error   Lower    Upper 
NEGATIVE_REP.1972.txt    -0.51889    0.02286 -0.5637 -0.47409 
POSITIVE_AFLCIO.1971.txt  1.08944    0.02053  1.0492  1.12967 
DEM.1960.txt             -0.30055    0.02815 -0.3557 -0.24538 




DEM.1964.txt             -0.13013    0.02581 -0.1807 -0.07953 
DEM.1968.txt             -0.33219    0.02777 -0.3866 -0.27776 
DEM.1972.txt             -0.07779    0.02227 -0.1214 -0.03414 
DEM.1976.txt             -0.08235    0.02423 -0.1298 -0.03486 
DEM.1980.txt             -0.18377    0.01808 -0.2192 -0.14833 
DEM.1984.txt             -0.53041    0.01847 -0.5666 -0.49422 
DEM.1988.txt             -0.82625    0.04899 -0.9223 -0.73024 
DEM.1992.txt             -1.00964    0.03475 -1.0778 -0.94153 
DEM.1996.txt             -1.45578    0.02119 -1.4973 -1.41425 
DEM.2000.txt             -1.11918    0.02104 -1.1604 -1.07794 
DEM.2004.txt             -1.25986    0.02289 -1.3047 -1.21500 
DEM.2008.txt             -1.00209    0.02039 -1.0420 -0.96213 
DEM.2012.txt             -1.14480    0.01950 -1.1830 -1.10658 
REP.1960.txt             -0.35193    0.03498 -0.4205 -0.28338 
REP.1964.txt             -0.66256    0.03802 -0.7371 -0.58804 
REP.1968.txt             -0.35265    0.03533 -0.4219 -0.28341 
REP.1976.txt             -0.52616    0.02495 -0.5751 -0.47725 
REP.1980.txt             -0.66050    0.01879 -0.6973 -0.62367 
REP.1984.txt             -0.83721    0.02069 -0.8778 -0.79666 
REP.1988.txt             -1.00906    0.01732 -1.0430 -0.97511 
REP.1992.txt             -1.22654    0.01846 -1.2627 -1.19037 
REP.1996.txt             -1.24047    0.01872 -1.2772 -1.20378 
REP.2000.txt             -1.23605    0.01674 -1.2689 -1.20324 
REP.2004.txt             -1.45139    0.01399 -1.4788 -1.42397 
REP.2008.txt             -1.06492    0.02115 -1.1064 -1.02346 
REP.2012.txt             -0.94293    0.01925 -0.9807 -0.90520 
AFLCIO.1973.txt           1.04837    0.01893  1.0113  1.08548 
AFLCIO.1975.txt           1.13283    0.01762  1.0983  1.16737 
AFLCIO.1977.txt           1.06103    0.01678  1.0281  1.09392 
AFLCIO.1979.txt           1.07861    0.01662  1.0460  1.11118 
AFLCIO.1981.txt           1.10830    0.01791  1.0732  1.14340 
AFLCIO.1983.txt           1.16989    0.01595  1.1386  1.20116 
AFLCIO.1985.txt           1.11875    0.01577  1.0878  1.14967 
AFLCIO.1987.txt           1.13498    0.01505  1.1055  1.16449 
AFLCIO.1989.txt           1.17147    0.01431  1.1434  1.19952 
AFLCIO.1991.txt           1.15668    0.01537  1.1265  1.18681 
AFLCIO.1993.txt           1.15654    0.01526  1.1266  1.18646 
AFLCIO.1995.txt           1.22588    0.01107  1.2042  1.24757 
AFLCIO.1997.txt           1.13366    0.01343  1.1073  1.15998 
AFLCIO.1999.txt           1.06800    0.01216  1.0442  1.09183 
AFLCIO.2001.txt           0.96857    0.02805  0.9136  1.02356 
AFLCIO.2005.txt           1.35563    0.01379  1.3286  1.38266 
AFLCIO.2009.txt           1.24033    0.01463  1.2117  1.26901 
AFLCIO.2013.txt           1.10400    0.01141  1.0816  1.12636 
 
1.4 Dataset I: Position estimates for AFL-CIO documents as compared with Democratic and 






        wordfish(wfm = aflcio1stemmednocontroldata, dir = c(1, 2)) 
 
Document Positions: 
                         Estimate Std. Error   Lower   Upper 
NEGATIVE_REP.1968.txt     -0.3656    0.03861 -0.4413 -0.2899 
POSITIVE_AFLCIO.1968.txt   0.7793    0.01896  0.7422  0.8165 
DEM.1960.txt              -0.3477    0.03069 -0.4079 -0.2876 
DEM.1964.txt              -0.1596    0.02810 -0.2147 -0.1045 
DEM.1968.txt              -0.3974    0.03044 -0.4570 -0.3377 




DEM.1972.txt              -0.1596    0.02428 -0.2072 -0.1120 
DEM.1976.txt              -0.1790    0.02653 -0.2310 -0.1270 
DEM.1980.txt              -0.3503    0.01990 -0.3893 -0.3113 
DEM.1984.txt              -0.7325    0.02021 -0.7721 -0.6929 
DEM.1988.txt              -0.9750    0.05427 -1.0813 -0.8686 
DEM.1992.txt              -1.1985    0.03879 -1.2745 -1.1224 
DEM.1996.txt              -1.7123    0.02389 -1.7591 -1.6655 
DEM.2000.txt              -1.3025    0.02355 -1.3486 -1.2563 
DEM.2004.txt              -1.4972    0.02559 -1.5474 -1.4470 
DEM.2008.txt              -1.2118    0.02256 -1.2561 -1.1676 
DEM.2012.txt              -1.3732    0.02171 -1.4158 -1.3307 
REP.1960.txt              -0.3588    0.03822 -0.4337 -0.2838 
REP.1964.txt              -0.6620    0.04192 -0.7442 -0.5799 
REP.1972.txt              -0.5800    0.02511 -0.6292 -0.5308 
REP.1976.txt              -0.5721    0.02750 -0.6260 -0.5182 
REP.1980.txt              -0.7643    0.02077 -0.8050 -0.7236 
REP.1984.txt              -0.9550    0.02297 -1.0000 -0.9099 
REP.1988.txt              -1.1280    0.01950 -1.1662 -1.0898 
REP.1992.txt              -1.3636    0.02095 -1.4047 -1.3226 
REP.1996.txt              -1.3859    0.02127 -1.4276 -1.3442 
REP.2000.txt              -1.3816    0.01904 -1.4189 -1.3442 
REP.2004.txt              -1.6756    0.01588 -1.7067 -1.6444 
REP.2008.txt              -1.1831    0.02387 -1.2299 -1.1363 
REP.2012.txt              -1.0571    0.02151 -1.0992 -1.0149 
AFLCIO.1960.txt            0.4785    0.03226  0.4152  0.5417 
AFLCIO.1964.txt            0.7426    0.02180  0.6998  0.7853 
AFLCIO.1971.txt            1.0577    0.01907  1.0204  1.0951 
AFLCIO.1972.txt            0.7476    0.01727  0.7138  0.7815 
AFLCIO.1973.txt            1.0207    0.01782  0.9858  1.0556 
AFLCIO.1975.txt            1.0879    0.01645  1.0557  1.1202 
AFLCIO.1976.txt            0.8092    0.01377  0.7822  0.8362 
AFLCIO.1977.txt            1.0207    0.01600  0.9893  1.0520 
AFLCIO.1979.txt            1.0270    0.01597  0.9957  1.0583 
AFLCIO.1980.txt            0.7042    0.02445  0.6563  0.7521 
AFLCIO.1981.txt            1.0387    0.01748  1.0044  1.0729 
AFLCIO.1983.txt            1.0750    0.01586  1.0439  1.1060 
AFLCIO.1984.txt            0.7652    0.03432  0.6979  0.8324 
AFLCIO.1985.txt            1.0372    0.01557  1.0067  1.0677 
AFLCIO.1987.txt            1.0438    0.01496  1.0145  1.0731 
AFLCIO.1989.txt            1.0819    0.01404  1.0543  1.1094 
AFLCIO.1991.txt            1.0725    0.01506  1.0430  1.1020 
AFLCIO.1993.txt            1.0531    0.01532  1.0231  1.0831 
AFLCIO.1995.txt            1.1391    0.01064  1.1183  1.1600 
AFLCIO.1997.txt            0.9974    0.01407  0.9698  1.0250 
AFLCIO.1999.txt            0.9429    0.01279  0.9179  0.9680 
AFLCIO.2001.txt            0.8993    0.02817  0.8441  0.9545 
AFLCIO.2005.txt            1.1505    0.01569  1.1197  1.1812 
AFLCIO.2009.txt            1.0382    0.01644  1.0059  1.0704 
AFLCIO.2013.txt            0.9827    0.01181  0.9595  1.0058 
 
1.5 Dataset IA: Position estimates for AFL-CIO documents as compared with Democratic 







        wordfish(wfm = aflcio1stemmeddata, dir = c(1, 2)) 
 
Document Positions:      Estimate Std. Error   Lower   Upper 




NEGATIVE.1968.txt         -0.4488    0.02398 -0.4958 -0.4018 
POSITIVE_AFLCIO.1968.txt   0.7859    0.01956  0.7475  0.8242 
DEM.1960.txt              -0.3772    0.03083 -0.4376 -0.3168 
DEM.1964.txt              -0.1807    0.02832 -0.2362 -0.1252 
DEM.1968.txt              -0.4455    0.03054 -0.5054 -0.3857 
DEM.1972.txt              -0.1695    0.02446 -0.2175 -0.1216 
DEM.1976.txt              -0.1889    0.02672 -0.2413 -0.1365 
DEM.1980.txt              -0.3552    0.01999 -0.3944 -0.3160 
DEM.1984.txt              -0.7235    0.02021 -0.7631 -0.6839 
DEM.1988.txt              -0.9655    0.05405 -1.0714 -0.8596 
DEM.1992.txt              -1.1804    0.03849 -1.2558 -1.1049 
DEM.1996.txt              -1.6713    0.02350 -1.7173 -1.6252 
DEM.2000.txt              -1.2724    0.02338 -1.3182 -1.2266 
DEM.2004.txt              -1.4665    0.02527 -1.5160 -1.4170 
DEM.2008.txt              -1.1866    0.02242 -1.2306 -1.1427 
DEM.2012.txt              -1.3389    0.02153 -1.3811 -1.2967 
REP.1960.txt              -0.3903    0.03839 -0.4656 -0.3151 
REP.1964.txt              -0.6941    0.04183 -0.7761 -0.6121 
REP.1968.txt              -0.4542    0.03873 -0.5301 -0.3783 
REP.1972.txt              -0.5961    0.02513 -0.6453 -0.5468 
REP.1976.txt              -0.5817    0.02753 -0.6356 -0.5277 
REP.1980.txt              -0.7733    0.02073 -0.8139 -0.7327 
REP.1984.txt              -0.9555    0.02285 -1.0003 -0.9107 
REP.1988.txt              -1.1241    0.01934 -1.1620 -1.0862 
REP.1992.txt              -1.3464    0.02069 -1.3869 -1.3058 
REP.1996.txt              -1.3692    0.02099 -1.4103 -1.3281 
REP.2000.txt              -1.3647    0.01880 -1.4015 -1.3278 
REP.2004.txt              -1.6533    0.01554 -1.6837 -1.6228 
REP.2008.txt              -1.1652    0.02369 -1.2117 -1.1188 
REP.2012.txt              -1.0420    0.02140 -1.0839 -1.0000 
AFLCIO.1960.txt            0.4652    0.03301  0.4005  0.5299 
AFLCIO.1964.txt            0.7483    0.02244  0.7043  0.7923 
AFLCIO.1971.txt            1.0823    0.01976  1.0436  1.1210 
AFLCIO.1972.txt            0.7631    0.01766  0.7285  0.7978 
AFLCIO.1973.txt            1.0422    0.01848  1.0059  1.0784 
AFLCIO.1975.txt            1.1159    0.01701  1.0826  1.1493 
AFLCIO.1976.txt            0.8289    0.01409  0.8013  0.8565 
AFLCIO.1977.txt            1.0453    0.01653  1.0129  1.0777 
AFLCIO.1979.txt            1.0551    0.01644  1.0229  1.0873 
AFLCIO.1980.txt            0.7213    0.02492  0.6724  0.7701 
AFLCIO.1981.txt            1.0693    0.01795  1.0341  1.1045 
AFLCIO.1983.txt            1.1068    0.01630  1.0748  1.1388 
AFLCIO.1984.txt            0.7897    0.03490  0.7213  0.8581 
AFLCIO.1985.txt            1.0680    0.01598  1.0366  1.0993 
AFLCIO.1987.txt            1.0744    0.01536  1.0443  1.1045 
AFLCIO.1989.txt            1.1138    0.01444  1.0855  1.1421 
AFLCIO.1991.txt            1.1053    0.01546  1.0750  1.1356 
AFLCIO.1993.txt            1.0864    0.01569  1.0556  1.1171 
AFLCIO.1995.txt            1.1761    0.01091  1.1547  1.1975 
AFLCIO.1997.txt            1.0347    0.01429  1.0067  1.0628 
AFLCIO.1999.txt            0.9820    0.01293  0.9566  1.0073 
AFLCIO.2001.txt            0.9336    0.02857  0.8776  0.9896 
AFLCIO.2005.txt            1.1914    0.01602  1.1600  1.2228 
AFLCIO.2009.txt            1.0739    0.01678  1.0410  1.1068 
AFLCIO.2013.txt            1.0199    0.01199  0.9964  1.0434 
 
1.6 Dataset IA: Position estimates for AFL-CIO documents as compared with Democratic 
and Republican platforms 1960-2013, stemmed (“NEGATIVE” as negative directional 
document) 
> require(austin) 




Loading required package: austin 






        wordfish(wfm = aflcio1data, dir = c(1, 2)) 
 
Document Positions: 
                         Estimate Std. Error   Lower    Upper 
NEGATIVE                  -0.4121    0.02264 -0.4565 -0.36774 
POSITIVE_AFLCIO.1968.txt   0.7549    0.01809  0.7195  0.79035 
DEM.1960.txt              -0.3178    0.02907 -0.3748 -0.26080 
DEM.1964.txt              -0.1150    0.02652 -0.1669 -0.06298 
DEM.1968.txt              -0.4138    0.02881 -0.4702 -0.35732 
DEM.1972.txt              -0.1290    0.02294 -0.1740 -0.08409 
DEM.1976.txt              -0.1512    0.02503 -0.2002 -0.10212 
DEM.1980.txt              -0.2987    0.01874 -0.3354 -0.26196 
DEM.1984.txt              -0.6622    0.01920 -0.6998 -0.62452 
DEM.1988.txt              -0.9565    0.05144 -1.0573 -0.85566 
DEM.1992.txt              -1.1936    0.03647 -1.2651 -1.12210 
DEM.1996.txt              -1.6634    0.02248 -1.7074 -1.61930 
DEM.2000.txt              -1.3199    0.02207 -1.3631 -1.27662 
DEM.2004.txt              -1.4899    0.02394 -1.5369 -1.44301 
DEM.2008.txt              -1.2239    0.02122 -1.2655 -1.18230 
DEM.2012.txt              -1.3838    0.02027 -1.4236 -1.34410 
REP.1960.txt              -0.3561    0.03624 -0.4272 -0.28510 
REP.1964.txt              -0.6902    0.03994 -0.7685 -0.61193 
REP.1968.txt              -0.4094    0.03661 -0.4812 -0.33765 
REP.1972.txt              -0.5661    0.02382 -0.6128 -0.51939 
REP.1976.txt              -0.6032    0.02603 -0.6542 -0.55218 
REP.1980.txt              -0.7503    0.01967 -0.7888 -0.71172 
REP.1984.txt              -0.9450    0.02180 -0.9877 -0.90224 
REP.1988.txt              -1.1460    0.01832 -1.1819 -1.11006 
REP.1992.txt              -1.3784    0.01969 -1.4170 -1.33977 
REP.1996.txt              -1.3887    0.02002 -1.4279 -1.34946 
REP.2000.txt              -1.3939    0.01786 -1.4289 -1.35890 
REP.2004.txt              -1.6456    0.01493 -1.6748 -1.61629 
REP.2008.txt              -1.2323    0.02234 -1.2761 -1.18849 
REP.2012.txt              -1.0835    0.02031 -1.1233 -1.04365 
AFLCIO.1960.txt            0.6416    0.02785  0.5870  0.69620 
AFLCIO.1964.txt            0.7400    0.02037  0.7001  0.77997 
AFLCIO.1971.txt            1.0497    0.01799  1.0144  1.08493 
AFLCIO.1972.txt            0.7429    0.01622  0.7111  0.77472 
AFLCIO.1973.txt            1.0306    0.01642  0.9984  1.06276 
AFLCIO.1975.txt            1.0969    0.01516  1.0672  1.12666 
AFLCIO.1976.txt            0.8116    0.01281  0.7865  0.83674 
AFLCIO.1977.txt            1.0317    0.01471  1.0029  1.06050 
AFLCIO.1979.txt            1.0416    0.01461  1.0130  1.07024 
AFLCIO.1980.txt            0.7195    0.02251  0.6754  0.76366 
AFLCIO.1981.txt            1.0517    0.01601  1.0203  1.08305 
AFLCIO.1983.txt            1.1017    0.01422  1.0739  1.12961 
AFLCIO.1984.txt            0.7888    0.03143  0.7272  0.85043 
AFLCIO.1985.txt            1.0552    0.01418  1.0275  1.08303 
AFLCIO.1987.txt            1.0642    0.01360  1.0375  1.09084 
AFLCIO.1989.txt            1.0887    0.01302  1.0631  1.11418 
AFLCIO.1991.txt            1.0749    0.01402  1.0474  1.10239 
AFLCIO.1993.txt            1.0671    0.01406  1.0395  1.09463 
AFLCIO.1995.txt            1.1288    0.01014  1.1089  1.14865 
AFLCIO.1997.txt            1.0383    0.01254  1.0137  1.06289 
AFLCIO.1999.txt            0.9658    0.01164  0.9430  0.98861 




AFLCIO.2001.txt            0.8820    0.02710  0.8289  0.93509 
AFLCIO.2005.txt            1.2242    0.01322  1.1983  1.25014 
AFLCIO.2009.txt            1.1179    0.01388  1.0907  1.14514 
AFLCIO.2013.txt            1.0023    0.01082  0.9811  1.02354 
 
1.7 Dataset II: Position estimates for AFL-CIO platform proposals as compared with 





        wordfish(wfm = aflcio2stemmednocontroldata, dir = c(1, 2)) 
 
Document Positions: 
                         Estimate Std. Error     Lower   Upper 
NEGATIVE_REP.1968.txt    -0.57753    0.04055 -0.657000 -0.4981 
POSITIVE_AFLCIO.1968.txt  1.60252    0.02840  1.546854  1.6582 
DEM.1960.txt             -0.45425    0.03319 -0.519310 -0.3892 
DEM.1964.txt              0.06828    0.03291  0.003786  0.1328 
DEM.1968.txt             -0.43772    0.03304 -0.502479 -0.3730 
DEM.1972.txt             -0.19758    0.02766 -0.251792 -0.1434 
DEM.1976.txt             -0.55450    0.02823 -0.609834 -0.4992 
DEM.1980.txt             -0.96373    0.01656 -0.996186 -0.9313 
DEM.1984.txt             -0.91999    0.01804 -0.955351 -0.8846 
REP.1960.txt             -0.44477    0.04145 -0.526003 -0.3635 
REP.1964.txt             -0.88030    0.03821 -0.955188 -0.8054 
REP.1972.txt             -0.59508    0.02642 -0.646871 -0.5433 
REP.1976.txt             -0.86886    0.02531 -0.918460 -0.8193 
REP.1980.txt             -1.21837    0.01031 -1.238579 -1.1982 
REP.1984.txt             -1.08740    0.01621 -1.119171 -1.0556 
AFLCIO.1960.txt           0.65465    0.04336  0.569673  0.7396 
AFLCIO.1964.txt           1.47382    0.03229  1.410537  1.5371 
AFLCIO.1972.txt           1.71920    0.02480  1.670585  1.7678 
AFLCIO.1976.txt           1.57430    0.02133  1.532489  1.6161 
AFLCIO.1980.txt           0.84089    0.03722  0.767947  0.9138 
AFLCIO.1984.txt           1.18067    0.05379  1.075242  1.2861 
 
1.8 Dataset IIA: Position estimates for AFL-CIO platform proposals as compared with 
Democratic and Republican platforms 1960-1984, not stemmed (only AFL-CIO platforms, 





        wordfish(wfm = aflcio2stemmeddata, dir = c(1, 2)) 
 
Document Positions: 
                         Estimate Std. Error    Lower    Upper 
NEGATIVE.1968.txt        -0.62224   0.023084 -0.66748 -0.57699 
POSITIVE_AFLCIO.1968.txt  1.62213   0.028959  1.56538  1.67889 
DEM.1960.txt             -0.50903   0.031152 -0.57009 -0.44798 
DEM.1964.txt              0.02025   0.032284 -0.04302  0.08353 
DEM.1968.txt             -0.55316   0.030375 -0.61269 -0.49363 
DEM.1972.txt             -0.15831   0.027168 -0.21156 -0.10506 
DEM.1976.txt             -0.47540   0.027439 -0.52918 -0.42162 
DEM.1980.txt             -0.86075   0.015267 -0.89068 -0.83083 
DEM.1984.txt             -0.79297   0.017413 -0.82710 -0.75884 
REP.1960.txt             -0.49808   0.038973 -0.57447 -0.42170 




REP.1964.txt             -0.85712   0.032452 -0.92072 -0.79351 
REP.1968.txt             -0.72305   0.034833 -0.79132 -0.65478 
REP.1972.txt             -0.55809   0.025176 -0.60744 -0.50875 
REP.1976.txt             -0.78467   0.023519 -0.83076 -0.73857 
REP.1980.txt             -1.08765   0.008856 -1.10501 -1.07029 
REP.1984.txt             -0.96909   0.014543 -0.99759 -0.94058 
AFLCIO.1960.txt           0.57015   0.043401  0.48508  0.65521 
AFLCIO.1964.txt           1.49535   0.032841  1.43099  1.55972 
AFLCIO.1972.txt           1.80179   0.025065  1.75266  1.85091 
AFLCIO.1976.txt           1.69452   0.021426  1.65253  1.73652 
AFLCIO.1980.txt           0.96344   0.037395  0.89015  1.03673 
AFLCIO.1984.txt           1.32010   0.053970  1.21432  1.42588 
 
1.9 Dataset IIA: Position estimates for AFL-CIO platform proposals as compared with 
Democratic and Republican platforms 1960-1984, stemmed (only AFL-CIO platforms, 





        wordfish(wfm = aflcio2data, dir = c(1, 2)) 
 
Document Positions: 
                         Estimate Std. Error     Lower   Upper 
NEGATIVE.1968.txt        -0.65528    0.01992 -0.694319 -0.6162 
POSITIVE_AFLCIO.1968.txt  1.58938    0.02691  1.536642  1.6421 
DEM.1960.txt             -0.43382    0.02885 -0.490361 -0.3773 
DEM.1964.txt              0.05249    0.02978 -0.005878  0.1109 
DEM.1968.txt             -0.63452    0.02575 -0.684986 -0.5841 
DEM.1972.txt             -0.21051    0.02463 -0.258779 -0.1622 
DEM.1976.txt             -0.49888    0.02442 -0.546754 -0.4510 
DEM.1980.txt             -0.83147    0.01355 -0.858028 -0.8049 
DEM.1984.txt             -0.77738    0.01526 -0.807295 -0.7475 
REP.1960.txt             -0.50688    0.03487 -0.575225 -0.4385 
REP.1964.txt             -0.89779    0.02559 -0.947938 -0.8476 
REP.1968.txt             -0.68741    0.03135 -0.748860 -0.6260 
REP.1972.txt             -0.59835    0.02197 -0.641411 -0.5553 
REP.1976.txt             -0.81463    0.01938 -0.852615 -0.7767 
REP.1980.txt             -1.06112    0.00811 -1.077016 -1.0452 
REP.1984.txt             -0.96157    0.01246 -0.985993 -0.9372 
AFLCIO.1960.txt           0.75092    0.04030  0.671928  0.8299 
AFLCIO.1964.txt           1.52991    0.03019  1.470734  1.5891 
AFLCIO.1972.txt           1.73538    0.02347  1.689375  1.7814 
AFLCIO.1976.txt           1.70224    0.01978  1.663469  1.7410 
AFLCIO.1980.txt           0.95339    0.03445  0.885864  1.0209 
AFLCIO.1984.txt           1.30511    0.04996  1.207184  1.4030 
 
1.10 Dataset III: Position estimates for AFL-CIO documents excluding AFL-CIO platform 
proposals, as compared with Democratic and Republican platforms 1960-2013, stemmed 





        wordfish(wfm = AFLCIO3stemmeddata, dir = c(1, 2)) 
 
Document Positions: 
                         Estimate Std. Error   Lower    Upper 




NEGATIVE_REP.1972.txt     -0.5485    0.02401 -0.5956 -0.50148 
POSITIVE_AFLCIO.1971.txt   1.1113    0.02207  1.0681  1.15456 
DEM.1960.txt              -0.3539    0.02968 -0.4121 -0.29572 
DEM.1964.txt              -0.1831    0.02739 -0.2368 -0.12943 
DEM.1968.txt              -0.3614    0.02936 -0.4189 -0.30383 
DEM.1972.txt              -0.1205    0.02368 -0.1669 -0.07406 
DEM.1976.txt              -0.1274    0.02579 -0.1779 -0.07682 
DEM.1980.txt              -0.2437    0.01925 -0.2814 -0.20598 
DEM.1984.txt              -0.6010    0.01936 -0.6389 -0.56301 
DEM.1988.txt              -0.8279    0.05151 -0.9289 -0.72696 
DEM.1992.txt              -1.0034    0.03674 -1.0754 -0.93141 
DEM.1996.txt              -1.4747    0.02215 -1.5181 -1.43130 
DEM.2000.txt              -1.0863    0.02229 -1.1300 -1.04264 
DEM.2004.txt              -1.2533    0.02413 -1.3006 -1.20605 
DEM.2008.txt              -0.9790    0.02153 -1.0212 -0.93677 
DEM.2012.txt              -1.1113    0.02073 -1.1519 -1.07067 
REP.1960.txt              -0.3675    0.03688 -0.4398 -0.29522 
REP.1964.txt              -0.6548    0.03974 -0.7327 -0.57692 
REP.1968.txt              -0.3841    0.03721 -0.4571 -0.31119 
REP.1976.txt              -0.5031    0.02636 -0.5548 -0.45149 
REP.1980.txt              -0.6843    0.01974 -0.7230 -0.64559 
REP.1984.txt              -0.8473    0.02167 -0.8898 -0.80484 
REP.1988.txt              -0.9846    0.01833 -1.0205 -0.94866 
REP.1992.txt              -1.1955    0.01948 -1.2337 -1.15736 
REP.1996.txt              -1.2195    0.01973 -1.2582 -1.18088 
REP.2000.txt              -1.2082    0.01771 -1.2429 -1.17348 
REP.2004.txt              -1.4609    0.01462 -1.4896 -1.43229 
REP.2008.txt              -1.0037    0.02252 -1.0478 -0.95956 
REP.2012.txt              -0.8949    0.02037 -0.9348 -0.85495 
AFLCIO.1973.txt            1.0606    0.02053  1.0204  1.10088 
AFLCIO.1975.txt            1.1532    0.01905  1.1159  1.19051 
AFLCIO.1977.txt            1.0790    0.01812  1.0435  1.11454 
AFLCIO.1979.txt            1.0948    0.01798  1.0595  1.13000 
AFLCIO.1981.txt            1.1287    0.01936  1.0908  1.16669 
AFLCIO.1983.txt            1.1783    0.01757  1.1438  1.21270 
AFLCIO.1985.txt            1.1292    0.01721  1.0955  1.16293 
AFLCIO.1987.txt            1.1454    0.01640  1.1132  1.17752 
AFLCIO.1989.txt            1.1998    0.01537  1.1696  1.22988 
AFLCIO.1991.txt            1.1850    0.01652  1.1526  1.21736 
AFLCIO.1993.txt            1.1737    0.01655  1.1413  1.20614 
AFLCIO.1995.txt            1.2615    0.01185  1.2383  1.28475 
AFLCIO.1997.txt            1.1231    0.01485  1.0940  1.15222 
AFLCIO.1999.txt            1.0705    0.01326  1.0446  1.09653 
AFLCIO.2001.txt            0.9994    0.02952  0.9416  1.05729 
AFLCIO.2005.txt            1.2979    0.01706  1.2645  1.33132 
AFLCIO.2009.txt            1.1651    0.01756  1.1307  1.19957 





2.1 Dataset,  not stemmed 
 
> require(austin) 
Loading required package: austin 
Loading required package: numDeriv 
> setwd ("c:/users/dower/documents/blufin/German/DGB/filtered") 
> DGBdata<-wfm("DGB.csv") 
> DGBresults<-wordfish(DGBdata,c(1,2)) 






        wordfish(wfm = DGBdata, dir = c(1, 2)) 
 
Document Positions: 
                     Estimate Std. Error   Lower   Upper 
NEGATIVE_FDP1969.txt  0.87003   0.020790  0.8293  0.9108 
POSITIVE_DGB1969.txt  1.16225   0.004904  1.1526  1.1719 
CDU1961.txt           0.43696   0.104970  0.2312  0.6427 
CDU1965.txt           0.03103   0.108767 -0.1821  0.2442 
CDU1969.txt           0.84469   0.030154  0.7856  0.9038 
CDU1972.txt           0.71538   0.017668  0.6808  0.7500 
CDU1990.txt          -1.10534   0.004250 -1.1137 -1.0970 
CDU.CSU1976.txt       0.74626   0.019784  0.7075  0.7850 
CDU.CSU1980.txt      -1.10318   0.003105 -1.1093 -1.0971 
CDU.CSU1983.txt      -1.08472   0.005496 -1.0955 -1.0739 
CDU.CSU1987.txt      -1.09724   0.002719 -1.1026 -1.0919 
CDU.CSU1994.txt      -1.03702   0.006616 -1.0500 -1.0240 
CDU.CSU1998.txt      -1.10282   0.003816 -1.1103 -1.0953 
CDU.CSU2002.txt      -1.03928   0.005342 -1.0497 -1.0288 
CDU.CSU2005.txt      -1.03689   0.007457 -1.0515 -1.0223 
CDU.CSU2009.txt      -1.02869   0.004952 -1.0384 -1.0190 
CDU.CSU2013.txt       0.73982   0.008190  0.7238  0.7559 
CSU1969.txt           0.60867   0.039873  0.5305  0.6868 
CSU1990.txt          -1.10187   0.003341 -1.1084 -1.0953 
DGB1962.txt           1.18197   0.004499  1.1731  1.1908 
DGB1966.txt           1.16799   0.004097  1.1600  1.1760 
DGB1972.txt           1.16687   0.003337  1.1603  1.1734 
DGB1975.txt           1.18026   0.003255  1.1739  1.1866 
DGB1978.txt           1.15426   0.002984  1.1484  1.1601 
DGB1982.txt           1.13723   0.003077  1.1312  1.1433 
DGB1986.txt           1.12487   0.002905  1.1192  1.1306 
DGB1990.txt           1.11354   0.002686  1.1083  1.1188 
DGB1994.txt           1.08123   0.003725  1.0739  1.0885 
DGB1998.txt           1.10090   0.004516  1.0921  1.1098 
DGB2002.txt           1.08541   0.004030  1.0775  1.0933 
DGB2006.txt           1.08317   0.003589  1.0761  1.0902 
DGB2010.txt           1.07668   0.003331  1.0702  1.0832 
DieGruenen1980.txt    0.96995   0.009029  0.9523  0.9876 
DieGruenen1983.txt   -1.09036   0.005410 -1.1010 -1.0798 
DieGruenen1987.txt   -1.14283   0.001125 -1.1450 -1.1406 
DieGruenen1990.txt    0.91474   0.010930  0.8933  0.9362 
DieGruenen1994.txt    0.89569   0.008088  0.8798  0.9115 
DieGruenen1998.txt    0.91775   0.007271  0.9035  0.9320 
DieGruenen2002.txt    0.80007   0.010491  0.7795  0.8206 
DieGruenen2005.txt    0.76262   0.009963  0.7431  0.7821 
DieGruenen2009.txt    0.80743   0.007185  0.7934  0.8215 
DieGruenen2013.txt    0.85477   0.005279  0.8444  0.8651 
FDP1961.txt           0.91280   0.026256  0.8613  0.9643 
FDP1972.txt           0.51179   0.073296  0.3681  0.6554 
FDP1976.txt           0.89707   0.015047  0.8676  0.9266 
FDP1980.txt          -1.10658   0.001919 -1.1103 -1.1028 
FDP1983.txt          -1.10542   0.003446 -1.1122 -1.0987 
FDP1987.txt          -1.09691   0.004141 -1.1050 -1.0888 
FDP1990.txt          -1.10960   0.001932 -1.1134 -1.1058 
FDP1994.txt          -1.02791   0.003951 -1.0357 -1.0202 
FDP1998.txt          -1.10970   0.002068 -1.1138 -1.1057 
FDP2002.txt          -1.03565   0.004371 -1.0442 -1.0271 
FDP2005.txt          -1.10803   0.002289 -1.1125 -1.1035 
FDP2009.txt          -1.04006   0.004461 -1.0488 -1.0313 
FDP2013.txt           0.79037   0.008343  0.7740  0.8067 
DieLinke2005.txt      0.92118   0.014383  0.8930  0.9494 




DieLinke2009.txt     -1.01740   0.006416 -1.0300 -1.0048 
DieLinke2013.txt      0.92887   0.006883  0.9154  0.9424 
PDS1990.txt          -1.09261   0.004176 -1.1008 -1.0844 
PDS1994.txt          -0.98702   0.010906 -1.0084 -0.9656 
PDS1998.txt          -1.09653   0.002440 -1.1013 -1.0917 
PDS2002.txt          -1.02722   0.007004 -1.0409 -1.0135 
SPD1961.txt           0.80927   0.015352  0.7792  0.8394 
SPD1965.txt           0.98431   0.007554  0.9695  0.9991 
SPD1969.txt           0.83410   0.025343  0.7844  0.8838 
SPD1972.txt           0.87812   0.012653  0.8533  0.9029 
SPD1976.txt           0.78072   0.012567  0.7561  0.8054 
SPD1980.txt          -1.09917   0.003435 -1.1059 -1.0924 
SPD1983.txt          -1.10242   0.003315 -1.1089 -1.0959 
SPD1987.txt          -1.10242   0.003315 -1.1089 -1.0959 
SPD1990.txt          -1.09980   0.004341 -1.1083 -1.0913 
SPD1994.txt          -1.02990   0.006647 -1.0429 -1.0169 
SPD1998.txt          -1.10699   0.002622 -1.1121 -1.1019 
SPD2002.txt          -1.02027   0.005968 -1.0320 -1.0086 
SPD2005.txt          -1.01006   0.008366 -1.0265 -0.9937 
SPD2009.txt          -1.01269   0.005548 -1.0236 -1.0018 
SPD2013.txt           0.83569   0.007420  0.8211  0.8502 
 





        wordfish(wfm = DGBstemmeddata, dir = c(1, 2)) 
 
Document Positions: 
                     Estimate Std. Error    Lower   Upper 
NEGATIVE_FDP1969.txt   0.8911   0.018125  0.85561  0.9267 
POSITIVE_DGB1969.txt   1.1065   0.004377  1.09791  1.1151 
CDU1961.txt            0.4832   0.096315  0.29442  0.6720 
CDU1965.txt            0.2293   0.100468  0.03237  0.4262 
CDU1969.txt            0.8792   0.025951  0.82837  0.9301 
CDU1972.txt            0.7388   0.015897  0.70763  0.7699 
CDU1990.txt           -1.1009   0.005484 -1.11166 -1.0902 
CDU.CSU1976.txt        0.7809   0.017644  0.74634  0.8155 
CDU.CSU1980.txt       -1.0653   0.005262 -1.07564 -1.0550 
CDU.CSU1983.txt       -1.0642   0.007306 -1.07854 -1.0499 
CDU.CSU1987.txt       -1.0835   0.003621 -1.09063 -1.0764 
CDU.CSU1994.txt       -1.0628   0.005351 -1.07334 -1.0524 
CDU.CSU1998.txt       -1.0915   0.005128 -1.10156 -1.0815 
CDU.CSU2002.txt       -1.0713   0.004085 -1.07928 -1.0633 
CDU.CSU2005.txt       -1.0487   0.006745 -1.06188 -1.0354 
CDU.CSU2009.txt       -1.0679   0.003599 -1.07491 -1.0608 
CDU.CSU2013.txt        0.7801   0.007251  0.76590  0.7943 
CSU1969.txt            0.6562   0.035775  0.58607  0.7263 
CSU1990.txt           -1.0806   0.004841 -1.09006 -1.0711 
DGB1962.txt            1.1167   0.004132  1.10856  1.1248 
DGB1966.txt            1.1116   0.003656  1.10442  1.1188 
DGB1972.txt            1.1141   0.002930  1.10836  1.1198 
DGB1975.txt            1.1251   0.002850  1.11954  1.1307 
DGB1978.txt            1.1079   0.002575  1.10284  1.1129 
DGB1982.txt            1.0869   0.002722  1.08160  1.0923 
DGB1986.txt            1.0782   0.002566  1.07316  1.0832 
DGB1990.txt            1.0805   0.002285  1.07603  1.0850 
DGB1994.txt            1.0555   0.003170  1.04933  1.0618 
DGB1998.txt            1.0793   0.003711  1.07206  1.0866 




DGB2002.txt            1.0690   0.003298  1.06253  1.0755 
DGB2006.txt            1.0699   0.002902  1.06424  1.0756 
DGB2010.txt            1.0644   0.002710  1.05908  1.0697 
DieGruenen1980.txt     0.9589   0.007920  0.94335  0.9744 
DieGruenen1983.txt    -1.0800   0.006614 -1.09300 -1.0671 
DieGruenen1987.txt    -1.0795   0.003214 -1.08583 -1.0732 
DieGruenen1990.txt     0.9187   0.009518  0.90003  0.9373 
DieGruenen1994.txt     0.9087   0.007007  0.89500  0.9225 
DieGruenen1998.txt     0.9368   0.006158  0.92473  0.9489 
DieGruenen2002.txt     0.8340   0.009165  0.81599  0.8519 
DieGruenen2005.txt     0.8033   0.008709  0.78620  0.8203 
DieGruenen2009.txt     0.8404   0.006255  0.82811  0.8526 
DieGruenen2013.txt     0.8802   0.004563  0.87123  0.8891 
FDP1961.txt            0.8929   0.024260  0.84537  0.9405 
FDP1972.txt            0.5179   0.069632  0.38144  0.6544 
FDP1976.txt            0.9176   0.012921  0.89228  0.9429 
FDP1980.txt           -1.1019   0.002473 -1.10676 -1.0971 
FDP1983.txt           -1.1085   0.004115 -1.11658 -1.1004 
FDP1987.txt           -1.0921   0.005110 -1.10215 -1.0821 
FDP1990.txt           -1.1038   0.002558 -1.10879 -1.0988 
FDP1994.txt           -1.0867   0.002380 -1.09138 -1.0821 
FDP1998.txt           -1.1180   0.002402 -1.12270 -1.1133 
FDP2002.txt           -1.0761   0.003105 -1.08214 -1.0700 
FDP2005.txt           -1.1086   0.002831 -1.11418 -1.1031 
FDP2009.txt           -1.0869   0.002989 -1.09277 -1.0811 
FDP2013.txt            0.8210   0.007354  0.80660  0.8354 
DieLinke2005.txt       0.9391   0.012108  0.91536  0.9628 
DieLinke2009.txt      -1.0331   0.005575 -1.04406 -1.0222 
DieLinke2013.txt       0.9342   0.005942  0.92258  0.9459 
PDS1990.txt           -1.0734   0.005625 -1.08444 -1.0624 
PDS1994.txt           -1.0352   0.007916 -1.05072 -1.0197 
PDS1998.txt           -1.0706   0.003556 -1.07762 -1.0637 
PDS2002.txt           -1.0535   0.005624 -1.06450 -1.0425 
SPD1961.txt            0.8120   0.013888  0.78478  0.8392 
SPD1965.txt            0.9706   0.006669  0.95749  0.9836 
SPD1969.txt            0.8497   0.022612  0.80539  0.8940 
SPD1972.txt            0.8921   0.011110  0.87028  0.9138 
SPD1976.txt            0.8252   0.010892  0.80384  0.8465 
SPD1980.txt           -1.0923   0.004353 -1.10084 -1.0838 
SPD1983.txt           -1.0785   0.004963 -1.08819 -1.0687 
SPD1987.txt           -1.0785   0.004963 -1.08819 -1.0687 
SPD1990.txt           -1.0918   0.005531 -1.10269 -1.0810 
SPD1994.txt           -1.0768   0.004485 -1.08561 -1.0680 
SPD1998.txt           -1.0939   0.003712 -1.10122 -1.0867 
SPD2002.txt           -1.0565   0.004490 -1.06527 -1.0477 
SPD2005.txt           -1.0311   0.007166 -1.04511 -1.0170 
SPD2009.txt           -1.0565   0.003988 -1.06428 -1.0486 





Loading required package: austin 




Warning: optim failed to converge while estimating theta[ 50 ] and alpha[ 50 ] 
> RENGOweightedresults 
Call: 




        wordfish(wfm = RENGOdata, dir = c(28, 21)) 
 
Document Positions: 
                 Estimate Std. Error    Lower      Upper 
DPJ.2007.txt      0.37886   0.002596  0.37377  0.3839474 
DPJ.2009.txt      0.35717   0.003229  0.35084  0.3634995 
DPJ.2010.txt      0.37176   0.003926  0.36406  0.3794499 
DPJ.2012.txt      0.35040   0.003246  0.34404  0.3567627 
DPJ.2013.txt      0.35887   0.004009  0.35102  0.3667312 
DPJ.1998.txt      0.34406   0.005998  0.33231  0.3558194 
DPJ.2000.txt      0.34406   0.005998  0.33231  0.3558194 
DPJ.2001.txt      0.34802   0.002548  0.34302  0.3530089 
DPJ.2003.txt      0.36659   0.002729  0.36124  0.3719414 
DPJ.2004.txt      0.35846   0.002609  0.35334  0.3635707 
DPJ.2005.txt      0.36761   0.002174  0.36335  0.3718720 
RENGO.2005.txt    0.49742   0.004367  0.48886  0.5059783 
RENGO.2006.txt    0.47085   0.001911  0.46711  0.4745969 
RENGO.2007.txt    0.48212   0.002504  0.47721  0.4870240 
RENGO.2008.txt    0.49049   0.003778  0.48309  0.4978995 
RENGO.2009.txt    0.46954   0.003976  0.46174  0.4773293 
RENGO.2010.txt    0.47764   0.003394  0.47099  0.4842925 
RENGO.2011.txt    0.46372   0.005120  0.45369  0.4737565 
RENGO.2012.txt    0.45456   0.003986  0.44675  0.4623738 
RENGO.2013.txt    0.44680   0.006730  0.43361  0.4599868 
RENGO.1998.txt    0.43669   0.003650  0.42953  0.4438404 
RENGO.1999.txt    0.45479   0.001805  0.45125  0.4583237 
RENGO.2000.txt    0.45093   0.003212  0.44463  0.4572255 
RENGO.2001.txt    0.44695   0.003470  0.44015  0.4537463 
RENGO.2002.txt    0.46845   0.003562  0.46146  0.4754271 
RENGO.2003.txt    0.47908   0.002458  0.47427  0.4839027 
RENGO.2004.txt    0.47271   0.002823  0.46718  0.4782413 
LDP_1998         -0.13248   0.007564 -0.14731 -0.1176543 
LDP_2000         -0.16248   0.004915 -0.17212 -0.1528517 
LDP_2001         -0.13702   0.004922 -0.14667 -0.1273715 
LDP_2003         -0.10789   0.015241 -0.13777 -0.0780225 
LDP_2004         -0.06033   0.007091 -0.07423 -0.0464326 
LDP_2005         -0.29757   0.011152 -0.31943 -0.2757140 
LDP_2007         -0.35335   0.026197 -0.40469 -0.3020037 
LDP_2009         -0.09045   0.040086 -0.16902 -0.0118848 
LDP_2010         -0.15423   0.004750 -0.16354 -0.1449211 
LDP_2012         -0.09456   0.003740 -0.10189 -0.0872302 
LDP_2013         -0.09067   0.003340 -0.09722 -0.0841260 
NK_1998          -0.35781   0.020390 -0.39777 -0.3178474 
NK_2000          -0.22015   0.017490 -0.25443 -0.1858691 
NK_2001          -0.12628   0.005247 -0.13656 -0.1159950 
NK_2003          -0.43177   0.042109 -0.51430 -0.3492331 
NK_2005          -0.30596   0.015670 -0.33667 -0.2752486 
NK_2007          -0.26385   0.012209 -0.28778 -0.2399229 
NK_2009          -0.15946   0.005020 -0.16930 -0.1496245 
NK_2010          -0.15129   0.004454 -0.16002 -0.1425586 
NNP_2007          0.10422   0.047801  0.01053  0.1979051 
NNP_2009          0.04256   0.033387 -0.02288  0.1079998 
PNP_2005          0.10748   0.025409  0.05768  0.1572836 
Restoration_2012 -5.99993   1.831780 -9.59015 -2.4097095 
SDP_1998         -0.13248   0.007564 -0.14731 -0.1176543 
SDP_2000         -0.06155   0.004853 -0.07106 -0.0520382 
SDP_2003         -0.05690   0.004437 -0.06559 -0.0481988 
SDP_2004         -0.35747   0.065623 -0.48609 -0.2288545 
SDP_2005         -0.06037   0.034984 -0.12893  0.0082013 
SDP_2007         -0.42254   0.049967 -0.52048 -0.3246079 
SDP_2010         -0.12395   0.005856 -0.13543 -0.1124727 
SDP_2012         -0.11520   0.005191 -0.12537 -0.1050270 




YP_2010          -0.01916   0.009467 -0.03772 -0.0006084 





4.1 LULAC I, position estimates for LULAC compound texts (policy platforms and 





        wordfish(wfm = lulac1nocontroldata, dir = c(1, 2)) 
 
Document Positions: 
                        Estimate Std. Error   Lower   Upper 
NEGATIVE_REP.1996.txt    -1.2102   0.012501 -1.2347 -1.1857 
POSITIVE_LULAC.1995.txt   0.7013   0.013383  0.6751  0.7275 
LULAC.1994.txt            0.3831   0.109482  0.1685  0.5977 
LULAC.1997.txt            0.6552   0.027138  0.6020  0.7084 
LULAC.1998.txt            0.8069   0.010798  0.7857  0.8281 
LULAC.1999.txt            0.8519   0.007664  0.8369  0.8669 
LULAC.2000.txt            0.7943   0.010416  0.7739  0.8147 
LULAC.2001.txt            0.8485   0.009814  0.8292  0.8677 
LULAC.2002.txt            0.8515   0.009274  0.8334  0.8697 
LULAC.2003.txt            0.8423   0.010227  0.8222  0.8623 
LULAC.2004.txt            0.7885   0.007566  0.7737  0.8033 
LULAC.2005.txt            0.8265   0.009964  0.8069  0.8460 
LULAC.2006.txt            0.8124   0.009998  0.7928  0.8320 
LULAC.2007.txt            0.8097   0.008390  0.7933  0.8261 
LULAC.2008.txt            0.7907   0.007945  0.7751  0.8063 
LULAC.2009.txt            0.7899   0.008423  0.7734  0.8064 
LULAC.2010.txt            0.8022   0.010272  0.7820  0.8223 
LULAC.2011.txt            0.8519   0.007317  0.8375  0.8662 
LULAC.2012.txt            0.8012   0.010835  0.7799  0.8224 
LULAC.2013.txt            0.7828   0.008274  0.7666  0.7990 
REP.1992.txt             -1.2332   0.012169 -1.2571 -1.2093 
REP.2000.txt             -1.2035   0.011198 -1.2255 -1.1816 
REP.2004.txt             -1.1683   0.010349 -1.1886 -1.1480 
REP.2008.txt             -1.0877   0.014323 -1.1157 -1.0596 
REP.2012.txt             -1.0004   0.013011 -1.0259 -0.9749 
DEM.1992.txt             -1.2590   0.021455 -1.3010 -1.2169 
DEM.1996.txt             -1.3553   0.013444 -1.3816 -1.3289 
DEM.2000.txt             -1.3166   0.012284 -1.3406 -1.2925 
DEM.2004.txt             -1.3780   0.013239 -1.4039 -1.3520 
DEM.2008.txt             -1.2309   0.012617 -1.2557 -1.2062 
DEM.2012.txt             -1.3622   0.010992 -1.3837 -1.3407 
 
4.2 LULAC II, position estimates for LULAC policy platforms (excluding resolutions) and 





        wordfish(wfm = lulac2nocontroldata, dir = c(1, 2)) 
 
Document Positions: 




                       Estimate Std. Error   Lower    Upper 
NEGATIVE_REP.1996.txt   -1.1797   0.005010 -1.1895 -1.16991 
POSITIVE_LULAC1995.txt  -0.1453   0.027998 -0.2002 -0.09046 
LULAC1994.txt           -0.2787   0.106717 -0.4878 -0.06950 
LULAC1997.txt            0.5668   0.031636  0.5048  0.62880 
LULAC1998.txt            0.5120   0.029118  0.4549  0.56906 
LULAC1999.txt            0.5996   0.027244  0.5462  0.65304 
LULAC2000.txt            0.6739   0.030527  0.6141  0.73378 
LULAC2002.txt            0.8973   0.029929  0.8387  0.95600 
LULAC2003.txt            1.0480   0.024081  1.0008  1.09518 
LULAC2004.txt            1.0411   0.022256  0.9975  1.08477 
LULAC2005.txt            1.0561   0.020655  1.0156  1.09654 
LULAC2006.txt            1.0718   0.020193  1.0323  1.11142 
LULAC2007.txt            1.0748   0.019994  1.0356  1.11402 
LULAC2008.txt            1.0483   0.020180  1.0087  1.08782 
LULAC2009.txt            1.0697   0.022475  1.0257  1.11379 
LULAC2010.txt            1.0327   0.021411  0.9907  1.07466 
LULAC2011.txt            0.8891   0.020021  0.8499  0.92837 
LULAC2012.txt            0.9257   0.020093  0.8863  0.96511 
LULAC2013.txt            0.9011   0.019487  0.8629  0.93932 
REP.1992.txt            -1.2185   0.004243 -1.2269 -1.21022 
REP.2000.txt            -1.1950   0.004231 -1.2033 -1.18669 
REP.2004.txt            -1.2717   0.002681 -1.2769 -1.26640 
REP.2008.txt            -1.0784   0.007110 -1.0924 -1.06449 
REP.2012.txt            -1.1117   0.005885 -1.1233 -1.10019 
DEM.1992.txt            -1.1253   0.010361 -1.1456 -1.10495 
DEM.1996.txt            -1.1625   0.006441 -1.1751 -1.14989 
DEM.2000.txt            -1.0918   0.006957 -1.1055 -1.07820 
DEM.2004.txt            -1.1665   0.006411 -1.1790 -1.15389 
DEM.2008.txt            -1.0297   0.007354 -1.0441 -1.01531 
DEM.2012.txt            -1.1090   0.006246 -1.1212 -1.09673 
 
4.3 LULAC I, position estimates for LULAC compound texts (policy platforms and 





        wordfish(wfm = lulac1stemmednocontroldata, dir = c(1, 2)) 
 
Document Positions: 
                        Estimate Std. Error   Lower   Upper 
NEGATIVE_REP.1996.txt    -1.2273   0.013441 -1.2536 -1.2009 
POSITIVE_LULAC.1995.txt   0.7047   0.013865  0.6775  0.7319 
LULAC.1994.txt            0.4518   0.109367  0.2374  0.6661 
LULAC.1997.txt            0.6345   0.029299  0.5770  0.6919 
LULAC.1998.txt            0.8112   0.010971  0.7897  0.8327 
LULAC.1999.txt            0.8613   0.007568  0.8465  0.8762 
LULAC.2000.txt            0.7990   0.010585  0.7783  0.8197 
LULAC.2001.txt            0.8613   0.009605  0.8425  0.8801 
LULAC.2002.txt            0.8417   0.009521  0.8230  0.8603 
LULAC.2003.txt            0.8391   0.010432  0.8187  0.8596 
LULAC.2004.txt            0.7881   0.007766  0.7729  0.8034 
LULAC.2005.txt            0.8120   0.010437  0.7916  0.8325 
LULAC.2006.txt            0.7961   0.010509  0.7755  0.8167 
LULAC.2007.txt            0.8043   0.008639  0.7873  0.8212 
LULAC.2008.txt            0.7867   0.008210  0.7706  0.8028 
LULAC.2009.txt            0.7862   0.008693  0.7691  0.8032 
LULAC.2010.txt            0.7960   0.010637  0.7752  0.8169 
LULAC.2011.txt            0.8545   0.007341  0.8401  0.8689 




LULAC.2012.txt            0.7845   0.011410  0.7622  0.8069 
LULAC.2013.txt            0.7750   0.008601  0.7582  0.7919 
REP.1992.txt             -1.2304   0.013244 -1.2564 -1.2045 
REP.2000.txt             -1.2036   0.012153 -1.2274 -1.1798 
REP.2004.txt             -1.1785   0.011133 -1.2003 -1.1567 
REP.2008.txt             -1.0518   0.015545 -1.0822 -1.0213 
REP.2012.txt             -0.9864   0.013919 -1.0136 -0.9591 
 
DEM.1992.txt             -1.2529   0.023590 -1.2991 -1.2066 
DEM.1996.txt             -1.4002   0.014694 -1.4290 -1.3714 
DEM.2000.txt             -1.2925   0.013904 -1.3197 -1.2652 
DEM.2004.txt             -1.3904   0.014954 -1.4197 -1.3611 
DEM.2008.txt             -1.2363   0.013716 -1.2632 -1.2094 
DEM.2012.txt             -1.3543   0.012546 -1.3788 -1.3297 
 
4.4 LULAC IA, position estimates for LULAC compound texts (policy platforms and 
resolutions) and Democratic and Republican presidential platforms, not stemmed 
> require(austin) 
Loading required package: austin 






        wordfish(wfm = lulac1data, dir = c(1, 2)) 
 
Document Positions: 
                        Estimate Std. Error   Lower   Upper 
NEGATIVE.LULAC.txt       -1.3565   0.006885 -1.3700 -1.3430 
POSITIVE_LULAC.1995.txt   0.7312   0.013229  0.7053  0.7571 
LULAC.1994.txt            0.4320   0.107296  0.2217  0.6423 
LULAC.1997.txt            0.6867   0.026805  0.6341  0.7392 
LULAC.1998.txt            0.8328   0.010727  0.8118  0.8538 
LULAC.1999.txt            0.8802   0.007594  0.8653  0.8951 
LULAC.2000.txt            0.8227   0.010308  0.8025  0.8429 
LULAC.2001.txt            0.8772   0.009715  0.8582  0.8963 
LULAC.2002.txt            0.8786   0.009208  0.8605  0.8966 
LULAC.2003.txt            0.8684   0.010166  0.8485  0.8883 
LULAC.2004.txt            0.8200   0.007454  0.8054  0.8346 
LULAC.2005.txt            0.8576   0.009823  0.8383  0.8769 
LULAC.2006.txt            0.8432   0.009861  0.8239  0.8625 
LULAC.2007.txt            0.8404   0.008276  0.8242  0.8566 
LULAC.2008.txt            0.8236   0.007813  0.8083  0.8389 
LULAC.2009.txt            0.8227   0.008285  0.8064  0.8389 
LULAC.2010.txt            0.8362   0.010084  0.8164  0.8560 
LULAC.2011.txt            0.8829   0.007215  0.8688  0.8971 
LULAC.2012.txt            0.8361   0.010622  0.8152  0.8569 
LULAC.2013.txt            0.8164   0.008130  0.8004  0.8323 
REP.1992.txt             -1.1793   0.011389 -1.2016 -1.1570 
REP.1996.txt             -1.3325   0.009309 -1.3508 -1.3143 
REP.2000.txt             -1.1443   0.010629 -1.1651 -1.1235 
REP.2004.txt             -1.0908   0.010050 -1.1105 -1.0711 
REP.2008.txt             -1.0273   0.013951 -1.0546 -1.0000 
REP.2012.txt             -0.9636   0.012691 -0.9885 -0.9388 
DEM.1992.txt             -1.1789   0.020474 -1.2190 -1.1388 
DEM.1996.txt             -1.3884   0.010177 -1.4084 -1.3685 
DEM.2000.txt             -1.1983   0.012077 -1.2220 -1.1746 
DEM.2004.txt             -1.2542   0.013017 -1.2797 -1.2287 
DEM.2008.txt             -1.1051   0.012598 -1.1298 -1.0804 




DEM.2012.txt             -1.1816   0.011564 -1.2042 -1.1589 
 
4.5 LULAC IA, position estimates for LULAC compound texts (policy platforms and 





        wordfish(wfm = lulac1stemmeddata, dir = c(1, 2)) 
 
Document Positions: 
                        Estimate Std. Error   Lower   Upper 
NEGATIVE.LULAC.txt       -1.3636   0.007136 -1.3776 -1.3496 
POSITIVE_LULAC.1995.txt   0.7359   0.013658  0.7092  0.7627 
LULAC.1994.txt            0.5020   0.106615  0.2930  0.7109 
LULAC.1997.txt            0.6681   0.028834  0.6116  0.7246 
LULAC.1998.txt            0.8377   0.010884  0.8164  0.8590 
LULAC.1999.txt            0.8893   0.007507  0.8746  0.9040 
LULAC.2000.txt            0.8266   0.010479  0.8061  0.8471 
LULAC.2001.txt            0.8891   0.009530  0.8704  0.9078 
LULAC.2002.txt            0.8702   0.009423  0.8517  0.8886 
LULAC.2003.txt            0.8666   0.010345  0.8463  0.8868 
LULAC.2004.txt            0.8188   0.007648  0.8038  0.8338 
LULAC.2005.txt            0.8437   0.010262  0.8235  0.8638 
LULAC.2006.txt            0.8273   0.010341  0.8070  0.8475 
LULAC.2007.txt            0.8353   0.008502  0.8186  0.8520 
LULAC.2008.txt            0.8190   0.008063  0.8032  0.8348 
LULAC.2009.txt            0.8195   0.008524  0.8028  0.8362 
LULAC.2010.txt            0.8290   0.010435  0.8085  0.8494 
LULAC.2011.txt            0.8847   0.007244  0.8705  0.8989 
LULAC.2012.txt            0.8198   0.011151  0.7980  0.8417 
LULAC.2013.txt            0.8083   0.008437  0.7917  0.8248 
REP.1992.txt             -1.1769   0.011971 -1.2004 -1.1534 
REP.1996.txt             -1.3342   0.009728 -1.3533 -1.3151 
REP.2000.txt             -1.1413   0.011227 -1.1633 -1.1193 
REP.2004.txt             -1.0971   0.010556 -1.1177 -1.0764 
REP.2008.txt             -1.0015   0.014966 -1.0308 -0.9721 
REP.2012.txt             -0.9534   0.013470 -0.9798 -0.9270 
DEM.1992.txt             -1.1731   0.021662 -1.2156 -1.1307 
DEM.1996.txt             -1.4023   0.010431 -1.4227 -1.3818 
DEM.2000.txt             -1.1973   0.012728 -1.2222 -1.1723 
DEM.2004.txt             -1.2537   0.013684 -1.2805 -1.2268 
DEM.2008.txt             -1.1156   0.013171 -1.1414 -1.0898 
DEM.2012.txt             -1.1875   0.012108 -1.2112 -1.1637 
 
4.6 LULAC II, position estimates for LULAC policy platforms (excluding resolutions) and 





        wordfish(wfm = lulac2stemmednocontroldata, dir = c(1, 2)) 
 
Document Positions: 
                       Estimate Std. Error   Lower    Upper 
NEGATIVE_REP.1996.txt  -1.17469   0.005438 -1.1853 -1.16403 
POSITIVE_LULAC1995.txt -0.08933   0.030999 -0.1501 -0.02857 
LULAC1994.txt          -0.20463   0.119744 -0.4393  0.03007 




LULAC1997.txt           0.62674   0.034788  0.5586  0.69493 
LULAC1998.txt           0.57153   0.032097  0.5086  0.63444 
LULAC1999.txt           0.65624   0.029937  0.5976  0.71492 
LULAC2000.txt           0.72863   0.033597  0.6628  0.79448 
LULAC2002.txt           0.92791   0.033240  0.8628  0.99306 
LULAC2003.txt           1.02931   0.027482  0.9754  1.08317 
LULAC2004.txt           1.02629   0.025392  0.9765  1.07606 
LULAC2005.txt           1.01879   0.023834  0.9721  1.06551 
LULAC2006.txt           1.03640   0.023289  0.9908  1.08205 
LULAC2007.txt           1.03804   0.023095  0.9928  1.08330 
LULAC2008.txt           1.01280   0.023345  0.9670  1.05856 
LULAC2009.txt           1.03359   0.025971  0.9827  1.08450 
LULAC2010.txt           0.99780   0.024611  0.9496  1.04604 
LULAC2011.txt           0.87808   0.022604  0.8338  0.92238 
LULAC2012.txt           0.90563   0.022796  0.8609  0.95030 
LULAC2013.txt           0.88451   0.022061  0.8413  0.92775 
REP.1992.txt           -1.22259   0.004363 -1.2311 -1.21404 
REP.2000.txt           -1.20368   0.004331 -1.2122 -1.19519 
REP.2004.txt           -1.27344   0.002724 -1.2788 -1.26811 
REP.2008.txt           -1.06978   0.007832 -1.0851 -1.05443 
REP.2012.txt           -1.10342   0.006461 -1.1161 -1.09076 
DEM.1992.txt           -1.14368   0.010657 -1.1646 -1.12279 
DEM.1996.txt           -1.18503   0.006407 -1.1976 -1.17247 
DEM.2000.txt           -1.11475   0.007140 -1.1287 -1.10076 
DEM.2004.txt           -1.18561   0.006426 -1.1982 -1.17301 
DEM.2008.txt           -1.05661   0.007635 -1.0716 -1.04164 
DEM.2012.txt           -1.12173   0.006563 -1.1346 -1.10887 
 
4.7 LULAC IIA, position estimates for LULAC policy platforms (excluding resolutions) and 





        wordfish(wfm = lulac2stemmeddata, dir = c(1, 2)) 
 
Document Positions: 
                       Estimate Std. Error   Lower     Upper 
NEGATIVE.LULAC.txt      -1.1349   0.003432 -1.1417 -1.128221 
POSITIVE_LULAC1995.txt  -0.1138   0.030536 -0.1737 -0.053980 
LULAC1994.txt           -0.2255   0.116758 -0.4543  0.003365 
LULAC1997.txt            0.6473   0.035126  0.5785  0.716152 
LULAC1998.txt            0.5848   0.032457  0.5212  0.648448 
LULAC1999.txt            0.6775   0.030238  0.6183  0.736798 
LULAC2000.txt            0.7534   0.033939  0.6869  0.819899 
LULAC2002.txt            0.9567   0.033699  0.8906  1.022744 
LULAC2003.txt            1.0577   0.027968  1.0029  1.112555 
LULAC2004.txt            1.0537   0.025851  1.0030  1.104379 
LULAC2005.txt            1.0468   0.024251  0.9993  1.094322 
LULAC2006.txt            1.0646   0.023710  1.0181  1.111090 
LULAC2007.txt            1.0664   0.023513  1.0203  1.112449 
LULAC2008.txt            1.0421   0.023733  0.9956  1.088647 
LULAC2009.txt            1.0638   0.026413  1.0120  1.115542 
LULAC2010.txt            1.0283   0.024992  0.9793  1.077243 
LULAC2011.txt            0.9074   0.022875  0.8626  0.952260 
LULAC2012.txt            0.9363   0.023073  0.8911  0.981554 
LULAC2013.txt            0.9136   0.022332  0.8699  0.957408 
REP.1992.txt            -1.1691   0.003685 -1.1763 -1.161863 
REP.1996.txt            -1.1382   0.004363 -1.1468 -1.129685 
REP.2000.txt            -1.1524   0.003657 -1.1595 -1.145194 




REP.2004.txt            -1.2077   0.002396 -1.2124 -1.202959 
REP.2008.txt            -1.0434   0.006489 -1.0562 -1.030717 
REP.2012.txt            -1.0706   0.005353 -1.0811 -1.060075 
DEM.1992.txt            -1.0936   0.009175 -1.1116 -1.075632 
DEM.1996.txt            -1.1298   0.005555 -1.1407 -1.118924 
DEM.2000.txt            -1.0658   0.006174 -1.0779 -1.053665 
DEM.2004.txt            -1.1231   0.005746 -1.1344 -1.111851 
DEM.2008.txt            -1.0060   0.006706 -1.0192 -0.992907 
DEM.2012.txt            -1.0574   0.005918 -1.0690 -1.045771 
 
4.8 LULAC IIA, position estimates for LULAC policy platforms (excluding resolutions) and 





        wordfish(wfm = lulac2data, dir = c(1, 2)) 
 
Document Positions: 
                       Estimate Std. Error   Lower   Upper 
NEGATIVE.LULAC.txt      -1.1340   0.002989 -1.1398 -1.1281 
POSITIVE_LULAC1995.txt  -0.2133   0.027177 -0.2666 -0.1601 
LULAC1994.txt           -0.3677   0.100315 -0.5643 -0.1711 
LULAC1997.txt            0.5755   0.032349  0.5121  0.6389 
LULAC1998.txt            0.5094   0.029799  0.4510  0.5678 
LULAC1999.txt            0.6091   0.027892  0.5544  0.6637 
LULAC2000.txt            0.6883   0.031309  0.6270  0.7497 
LULAC2002.txt            0.9242   0.030950  0.8635  0.9849 
LULAC2003.txt            1.0797   0.025151  1.0304  1.1290 
LULAC2004.txt            1.0737   0.023222  1.0282  1.1192 
LULAC2005.txt            1.0893   0.021574  1.0470  1.1315 
LULAC2006.txt            1.1061   0.021111  1.0647  1.1475 
LULAC2007.txt            1.1100   0.020901  1.0690  1.1509 
LULAC2008.txt            1.0824   0.021055  1.0411  1.1237 
LULAC2009.txt            1.1072   0.023458  1.0612  1.1532 
LULAC2010.txt            1.0692   0.022284  1.0255  1.1128 
LULAC2011.txt            0.9182   0.020672  0.8777  0.9587 
LULAC2012.txt            0.9579   0.020774  0.9172  0.9986 
LULAC2013.txt            0.9306   0.020135  0.8911  0.9700 
REP.1992.txt            -1.1555   0.003486 -1.1623 -1.1486 
REP.1996.txt            -1.1453   0.003693 -1.1526 -1.1381 
REP.2000.txt            -1.1354   0.003445 -1.1422 -1.1287 
REP.2004.txt            -1.1898   0.002391 -1.1945 -1.1851 
REP.2008.txt            -1.0475   0.005539 -1.0583 -1.0366 
REP.2012.txt            -1.0767   0.004550 -1.0856 -1.0678 
DEM.1992.txt            -1.0674   0.008531 -1.0841 -1.0507 
DEM.1996.txt            -1.1151   0.005059 -1.1250 -1.1052 
DEM.2000.txt            -1.0380   0.005712 -1.0492 -1.0268 
DEM.2004.txt            -1.0839   0.005687 -1.0951 -1.0728 
DEM.2008.txt            -0.9722   0.006179 -0.9843 -0.9601 
DEM.2012.txt            -1.0327   0.005407 -1.0433 -1.0222 
 
5. TGD 
5.1 Dataset, not stemmed (cdu/csu98= negative, tgd98 = positive) 
> setwd ("c:/users/dower/documents/blufin/German/TGD/filtered") 
> TGDdata<-wfm("TGD.csv") 
> TGDresults<-wordfish(TGDdata,c(2,33)) 






        wordfish(wfm = TGDdata, dir = c(2, 33)) 
 
Document Positions: 
                   Estimate Std. Error   Lower   Upper 
CDUCSU1994.txt      -0.8354   0.006893 -0.8489 -0.8218 
CDUCSU1998.txt      -0.8267   0.008942 -0.8442 -0.8092 
CDUCSU2002.txt      -0.8140   0.006329 -0.8264 -0.8016 
CDUCSU2005.txt      -0.8129   0.008669 -0.8299 -0.7959 
CDUCSU2009.txt      -0.8006   0.005752 -0.8118 -0.7893 
CDUCSU2013.txt      -0.7540   0.005565 -0.7649 -0.7431 
DieGruenen1994.txt  -0.5439   0.011191 -0.5658 -0.5219 
DieGruenen1998.txt  -0.7379   0.006708 -0.7510 -0.7247 
DieGruenen2002.txt  -0.7536   0.007593 -0.7685 -0.7387 
DieGruenen2005.txt  -0.7181   0.008374 -0.7346 -0.7017 
DieGruenen2009.txt  -0.6443   0.007513 -0.6590 -0.6295 
DieGruenen2013.txt  -0.6235   0.006119 -0.6355 -0.6115 
PDS1994.txt         -0.6024   0.016500 -0.6347 -0.5701 
PDS1998.txt         -0.6087   0.009770 -0.6278 -0.5895 
PDS2002.txt         -0.6876   0.011660 -0.7104 -0.6647 
DieLinke2005.txt    -0.6985   0.015348 -0.7286 -0.6684 
DieLinke2009.txt    -0.6861   0.009921 -0.7055 -0.6666 
DieLinke2013.txt    -0.6180   0.008277 -0.6342 -0.6018 
FDP1994.txt         -0.8767   0.002953 -0.8825 -0.8709 
FDP1998.txt         -0.8401   0.004991 -0.8499 -0.8303 
FDP2002.txt         -0.8806   0.003351 -0.8872 -0.8741 
FDP2005.txt         -0.8864   0.003983 -0.8942 -0.8786 
FDP2009.txt         -0.8956   0.003211 -0.9019 -0.8893 
FDP2013.txt         -0.8083   0.004785 -0.8177 -0.7989 
SPD1994.txt         -0.7943   0.008100 -0.8101 -0.7784 
SPD1998.txt         -0.8540   0.005629 -0.8650 -0.8429 
SPD2002.txt         -0.7786   0.007203 -0.7928 -0.7645 
SPD2005.txt         -0.8158   0.007934 -0.8313 -0.8002 
SPD2009.txt         -0.7854   0.006176 -0.7975 -0.7733 
SPD2013.txt         -0.7283   0.006150 -0.7404 -0.7163 
TGD1996.txt          1.0345   0.125216  0.7890  1.2799 
TGD1997.txt          0.9148   0.032254  0.8516  0.9781 
TGD1998.txt          1.5217   0.073634  1.3773  1.6660 
TGD1999.txt          1.3040   0.053238  1.1996  1.4083 
TGD2000.txt          1.0325   0.053870  0.9269  1.1381 
TGD2001.txt          1.2230   0.037827  1.1488  1.2971 
TGD2002.txt          0.8920   0.053624  0.7869  0.9971 
TGD2003.txt          1.2095   0.050482  1.1105  1.3084 
TGD2004.txt          0.9325   0.052674  0.8292  1.0357 
TGD2005.txt          0.9958   0.047908  0.9019  1.0897 
TGD2006.txt          1.4534   0.015051  1.4239  1.4829 
TGD2007.txt          1.4923   0.012727  1.4674  1.5173 
TGD2008.txt          1.4762   0.012302  1.4521  1.5003 
TGD2009.txt          1.4671   0.012263  1.4431  1.4911 
TGD2010.txt          1.5001   0.011705  1.4771  1.5230 
TGD2011.txt          1.5195   0.012709  1.4946  1.5444 
TGD2012.txt          1.4794   0.012144  1.4556  1.5032 
TGD2013.txt          1.4103   0.011374  1.3880  1.4326 
 
5.2  Dataset, stemmed (cdu/csu98= negative, tgd98 = positive) 
> require(austin) 
Loading required package: austin 
Loading required package: numDeriv 
> setwd ("c:/users/dower/documents/blufin/German/TGD/filtered") 








        wordfish(wfm = TGDstemmeddata, dir = c(2, 33)) 
 
Document Positions: 
                   Estimate Std. Error   Lower   Upper 
CDUCSU1994.txt      -0.8307   0.006977 -0.8444 -0.8170 
CDUCSU1998.txt      -0.8111   0.009624 -0.8299 -0.7922 
CDUCSU2002.txt      -0.7993   0.006778 -0.8126 -0.7860 
CDUCSU2005.txt      -0.8250   0.008044 -0.8407 -0.8092 
CDUCSU2009.txt      -0.7939   0.005969 -0.8056 -0.7822 
CDUCSU2013.txt      -0.7485   0.005820 -0.7599 -0.7371 
DieGruenen1994.txt  -0.5890   0.011117 -0.6108 -0.5672 
DieGruenen1998.txt  -0.7162   0.007327 -0.7305 -0.7018 
DieGruenen2002.txt  -0.7571   0.007655 -0.7721 -0.7421 
DieGruenen2005.txt  -0.7321   0.008301 -0.7484 -0.7158 
DieGruenen2009.txt  -0.6783   0.007370 -0.6927 -0.6638 
DieGruenen2013.txt  -0.6558   0.006064 -0.6677 -0.6439 
DieLinke2005.txt    -0.6991   0.015823 -0.7301 -0.6680 
DieLinke2009.txt    -0.6716   0.010643 -0.6925 -0.6507 
DieLinke2013.txt    -0.6276   0.008532 -0.6443 -0.6109 
FDP1994.txt         -0.8848   0.002671 -0.8900 -0.8796 
FDP1998.txt         -0.8510   0.004553 -0.8600 -0.8421 
FDP2002.txt         -0.8866   0.003110 -0.8927 -0.8805 
FDP2005.txt         -0.8919   0.003705 -0.8992 -0.8847 
FDP2009.txt         -0.9008   0.002989 -0.9067 -0.8949 
FDP2013.txt         -0.8370   0.004030 -0.8449 -0.8291 
PDS1994.txt         -0.5757   0.017880 -0.6108 -0.5407 
PDS1998.txt         -0.5717   0.010666 -0.5926 -0.5508 
PDS2002.txt         -0.6769   0.012386 -0.7012 -0.6526 
SPD1994.txt         -0.7911   0.008207 -0.8072 -0.7750 
SPD1998.txt         -0.8370   0.006199 -0.8492 -0.8249 
SPD2002.txt         -0.7723   0.007496 -0.7870 -0.7577 
SPD2005.txt         -0.8127   0.008046 -0.8285 -0.7970 
SPD2009.txt         -0.7830   0.006332 -0.7954 -0.7706 
SPD2013.txt         -0.7330   0.006228 -0.7452 -0.7208 
TGD1996.txt          1.1379   0.114979  0.9126  1.3633 
TGD1997.txt          0.8929   0.031811  0.8306  0.9553 
TGD1998.txt          1.4405   0.070502  1.3023  1.5787 
TGD1999.txt          1.3373   0.049405  1.2405  1.4342 
TGD2000.txt          1.0199   0.051545  0.9189  1.1209 
TGD2001.txt          1.1876   0.036543  1.1160  1.2592 
TGD2002.txt          0.9404   0.052013  0.8385  1.0424 
TGD2003.txt          1.2327   0.048150  1.1383  1.3271 
TGD2004.txt          0.9531   0.051179  0.8528  1.0534 
TGD2005.txt          1.0415   0.045992  0.9513  1.1316 
TGD2006.txt          1.4400   0.014431  1.4117  1.4683 
TGD2007.txt          1.4823   0.012173  1.4585  1.5062 
TGD2008.txt          1.4662   0.011765  1.4432  1.4893 
TGD2009.txt          1.4601   0.011740  1.4371  1.4831 
TGD2010.txt          1.4876   0.011193  1.4657  1.5096 
TGD2011.txt          1.4898   0.012270  1.4658  1.5139 
TGD2012.txt          1.4525   0.011734  1.4295  1.4755 




Loading required package: austin 










        wordfish(wfm = blldata, dir = c(24, 8)) 
 
Document Positions: 
                   Estimate Std. Error     Lower     Upper 
BLL2003.txt       0.4803086   0.002493   0.47542  0.485195 
BLL2004.txt       0.4952377   0.001613   0.49208  0.498398 
BLL2005.txt       0.4950171   0.001211   0.49264  0.497391 
BLL2006.txt       0.4716039   0.001111   0.46943  0.473782 
BLL2007.txt       0.4919513   0.001218   0.48956  0.494339 
BLL2008.txt       0.5002426   0.001361   0.49758  0.502909 
BLL2009.txt       0.5209648   0.003283   0.51453  0.527399 
BLL1998.txt       0.4977378   0.001318   0.49515  0.500321 
BLL1999.txt       0.4854505   0.001383   0.48274  0.488161 
BLL2000.txt       0.4824708   0.001435   0.47966  0.485284 
BLL2001.txt       0.5099338   0.001268   0.50745  0.512420 
BLL2002.txt       0.4966989   0.001641   0.49348  0.499915 
DPJ.2003.txt      0.3531598   0.002446   0.34837  0.357954 
DPJ.2004.txt      0.3550276   0.002282   0.35056  0.359500 
DPJ.2005.txt      0.3564270   0.001939   0.35263  0.360228 
DPJ.2007.txt      0.3562120   0.002366   0.35158  0.360849 
DPJ.2009.txt      0.3359540   0.002956   0.33016  0.341748 
DPJ.2010.txt      0.3512346   0.003593   0.34419  0.358276 
DPJ.2012.txt      0.3341286   0.002957   0.32833  0.339924 
DPJ.2013.txt      0.3589234   0.003548   0.35197  0.365878 
DPJ.1998.txt      0.3370232   0.005182   0.32687  0.347180 
DPJ.2000.txt      0.3370232   0.005182   0.32687  0.347180 
DPJ.2001.txt      0.3563055   0.002238   0.35192  0.360692 
LDP_1998         -0.0689635   0.008080  -0.08480 -0.053127 
LDP_2000         -0.1035728   0.005406  -0.11417 -0.092978 
LDP_2001         -0.0758820   0.005325  -0.08632 -0.065444 
LDP_2003         -0.0515788   0.016822  -0.08455 -0.018609 
LDP_2004         -0.0460098   0.007784  -0.06127 -0.030753 
LDP_2005         -0.2701283   0.014128  -0.29782 -0.242438 
LDP_2007         -0.3379355   0.034819  -0.40618 -0.269691 
LDP_2009          0.0050063   0.040855  -0.07507  0.085080 
LDP_2010         -0.1090339   0.005351  -0.11952 -0.098546 
LDP_2012         -0.0541811   0.004076  -0.06217 -0.046192 
LDP_2013         -0.0387474   0.003530  -0.04567 -0.031830 
NK_1998          -0.3864703   0.029769  -0.44482 -0.328123 
NK_2000          -0.1622615   0.020059  -0.20158 -0.122947 
NK_2001          -0.0580986   0.005609  -0.06909 -0.047105 
NK_2003          -1.2241612   0.213700  -1.64301 -0.805316 
NK_2005          -0.3263651   0.022441  -0.37035 -0.282381 
NK_2007          -0.2731218   0.016382  -0.30523 -0.241013 
NK_2009          -0.1254779   0.005789  -0.13682 -0.114131 
NK_2010          -0.1074076   0.005012  -0.11723 -0.097584 
NNP_2007          0.1700213   0.046172   0.07953  0.260517 
NNP_2009          0.0938949   0.033221   0.02878  0.159006 
PNP_2005          0.1519768   0.024657   0.10365  0.200303 
Restoration_2012 -5.9999285   2.355043 -10.61573 -1.384129 
SDP_1998         -0.0689635   0.008080  -0.08480 -0.053127 
SDP_2000         -0.0152442   0.005034  -0.02511 -0.005378 
SDP_2003         -0.0073485   0.004571  -0.01631  0.001611 
SDP_2004         -0.4079334   0.100256  -0.60443 -0.211436 
SDP_2005          0.0053431   0.036237  -0.06568  0.076366 
SDP_2007         -0.5567968   0.091484  -0.73610 -0.377491 




SDP_2010         -0.0833435   0.006404  -0.09589 -0.070792 
SDP_2012         -0.0622817   0.005540  -0.07314 -0.051423 
YP_2010           0.0006278   0.010132  -0.01923  0.020485 
YP_2012          -0.0488472   0.010982  -0.07037 -0.027322 
 
 




E 1 E 2 E3 PT 1 PT 2 
1960 180671 53418 7935 45483 6845 2855 
1961 183691 53601 8175 45426 7121 3142 
1962 186537 54963 8691 46272 7527 2661 
1963 189241 56387 9082 47305 7746 2620 
1964 191888 58026 9350 48676 8155 2455 
1965 194302 60031 9608 50423 8466 2209 
1966 196560 62362 10323 52039 8112 1960 
1967 198712 64848 11146 53702 8701 2163 
1968 200706 66519 11590 54929 9075 1970 
1969 202676 68528 12025 56503 9652 2056 
1970 205052 69491 12431 57059 9999 2446 
1971 207660 70120 12799 57321 10152 2688 
1972 209896 72785 13393 59393 10612 2648 
1973 211908 75580 13655 61925 10972 2554 
1974 213853 77094 14124 62970 11153 2988 
1975 215973 76249 14675 61575 11228 3804 
1976 218035 79175 15132 64044 11607 3607 
1977 220239 82121 15361 66759 12120 3608 
1978 222584 85753 15525 70228 12650 3516 
1979 225055 88222 15635 72587 12893 3577 
1980 227224 88525 15912 72612 13067 4321 
1981 229465 89543 15689 73853 13025 4768 
1982 231664 88462 15516 72945 12953 6170 
1983 233791 89500 15537 73963 12911 6266 
1984 235824 93565 15770 77794 13169 5744 
1985 237923 95871 16031 79841 13489 5590 
1986 240132 98299 16342 81957 13935 5588 
1987 242288 100771 16800 83970 14395 5401 
1988 244498 103021 17114 85907 14963 5206 
1989 246819 105259 17469 87790 15393 4894 
1990 249464 106598 17769 88829 15341 5204 
1991 252153 105373 17934 87438 15172 6161 
1992 255029 106437 18136 88301 14918 6520 
1993 257782 107966 18579 89387 15240 6481 
1994 260327 110517 18293 92224 17638 4625 
1995 262803 112448 18362 94086 17734 4473 
1996 265228 114171 18217 95954 17770 4315 
1997 267783 116983 18131 98852 18149 4068 
1998 270248 119019 18383 100637 18530 3665 
1999 272690 121323 18903 102420 18758 3357 
2000 281424 125114 19248 105866 18814 3227 
2001 284968 125407 19335 106072 18790 3715 
2002 287625 125156 19636 105521 18843 4213 
















Tot. Pop.: Total U.S. population 
E 1: Nonagriculture, Wage and Salary Workers Total population and employment U.S. 1960-2013 (in thousands) 
E 2: Employment Level - Nonagriculture, Government Wage and Salary Workers  
E 3: Employment Level - Nonagriculture, Private Industries Wage and Salary Workers  
PT 1: Work Part Time Noneconomic Reasons  
PT 2: Persons at Work 1-34 Hours, Economic Reasons, All Industries 
Sources: Population Estimates Program, Population Division, U.S. Census Bureau; Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. 
Department of Labor 
 














providing / tertiary 
economy 
2013 42 281 1,5 24,7 73,8 
2012 42 033 1,6 24,7 73,7 
2011 41 570 1,6 24,6 73,8 
2010 41 020 1,6 24,5 73,9 
2009 40 892 1,6 24,8 73,5 
2008 40 856 1,6 25,3 73,1 
2007 40 325 1,7 25,2 73,2 
2006 39 635 1,6 25,2 73,1 
2005 39 326 1,7 25,7 72,6 
2004 39 337 1,8 26,2 72,0 
2003 39 200 1,8 26,8 71,4 
2002 39 630 1,8 27,4 70,9 
2001 39 809 1,8 28,0 70,1 
2000 39 917 1,9 28,5 69,6 
1999 39 031 2,0 29,1 68,9 
1998 38 407 2,0 29,9 68,1 
1997 37 947 2,1 30,4 67,5 
1996 37 969 2,1 31,1 66,8 
1995 37 958 2,3 32,0 65,8 
1994 37 798 2,4 32,4 65,1 
1993 37 786 2,5 33,3 64,2 
1992 38 283 2,7 34,4 62,9 
1991 38 790 3,0 35,7 61,3 
1990 30 409 3,5 36,6 59,9 
1989 29 480 3,7 36,7 59,6 
1988 28 937 3,9 36,9 59,2 
2003 290107 126015 19634 106381 19014 4701 
2004 292805 127463 19983 107480 19380 4567 
2005 295516 129931 20357 109573 19491 4350 
2006 298379 132449 20337 112111 19591 4162 
2007 301231 134283 21003 113280 19756 4401 
2008 304093 133882 21258 112624 19343 5875 
2009 306771 128713 21178 107535 18710 8913 
2010 310339 127914 21003 106911 18251 8874 
2011 312602 128934 20536 108398 18334 8560 
2012 314687 131452 20360 111093 18806 8122 
2013 NA 133111 20247 112864 NA 7935 




1987 28 531 4,1 37,3 58,6 
1986 28 138 4,3 37,8 57,9 
1985 27 608 4,4 38,1 57,5 
1984 27 226 4,6 38,5 56,9 
1983 26 993 4,8 38,9 56,3 
1982 27 241 4,9 39,6 55,5 
1981 27 453 5,0 40,5 54,5 
1980 27 420 5,1 41,1 53,8 
1979 26 968 5,3 41,2 53,6 
1978 26 457 5,7 41,3 53,0 
1977 26 198 5,9 41,8 52,4 
1976 26 139 6,2 41,8 52,1 
1975 26 248 6,6 42,4 51,0 
1974 26 924 6,8 44,0 49,1 
1973 27 181 7,1 44,9 47,9 
1972 26 857 7,5 45,2 47,2 
1971 26 710 7,9 46,1 46,0 
1970 26 589 8,4 46,5 45,1 
1969 26 228 9,1 48,5 42,3 
1968 25 826 9,8 47,7 42,5 
1967 25 804 10,2 47,5 42,3 
1966 26 673 10,5 48,8 40,7 
1965 26 755 10,7 49,2 40,1 
1964 26 604 11,3 48,8 39,9 
1963 26 581 11,8 48,6 39,5 
1962 26 518 12,5 48,7 38,8 
1961 26 426 13,1 48,5 38,5 
1960 26 063 13,7 47,9 38,3 
Source: DESTASIS (2014)  
 







total Unemployed T + D 
1989 20830 36940 4130 NA 61900 1340 5030 
1990 21120 37890 3920 NA 62930 1300 5190 
1991 21630 38660 3880 NA 64170 1370 5250 
1992 21880 38930 3790 NA 64600 1550 5300 
1993 21790 39500 3430 NA 64720 1870 5450 
1994 21320 39800 3410 NA 64530 1900 5460 
1995 21080 40050 3330 NA 64460 2280 5530 
1996 21290 40480 3250 NA 65020 2270 5680 
1997 20980 41420 3210 NA 65520 2390 6000 
1998 20520 41170 3100 NA 64790 3000 6190 
1999 19930 41600 3030 NA 64560 3150 6310 
2000 19560 42120 2940 NA 64620 3250 6710 
2001 18680 42230 2910 NA 63820 3660 6920 
2002 18110 40290 2310 2200 62910 3600 7270 
2003 17880 40790 2130 2270 63070 3270 7370 
2004 17240 41380 2160 2280 63060 2960 7460 
2005 17140 41760 2060 2210 63170 2910 7620 




2006 17320 42030 2110 2190 63650 2660 7700 
2007 17110 42500 2270 2270 64150 2510 7730 
2008 16790 42200 2230 2370 63590 2920 7600 
2009 16060 42130 2160 2250 62600 3410 7540 
2010 15610 42880 2060 2220 62770 3210 7600 
2011 15370 43030 1980 2280 62660 2970 7590 
2012 14780 43260 1900 2340 62280 2800 7600 
2013 15310 43570 1920 2390 63190 2440 4720 
Source: JMIAC (2014)  
Agr.: Agricultural sector; NA: not available separately, subsumed in service-sector; T + D: Temporary and day 




10. Discrepancies scores identity-interest organizations and parties (Chapter 5) 
10.1 Score discrepancies for AFL-CIO dataset I, not stemmed 
 
 
0.93796 DEM.1960         
0.83097 DEM.1964              
1.11357 DEM.1968             
1.39422(afl71/dem68) 
0.85062 DEM.1972              
1.13705(afl73/dem72) 
1.19815(afl75/dem72) 
0.93596 DEM.1976             
1.15517(afl77/dem76) 
1.16518(afl79/dem76) 
0.99807 DEM.1980             
1.32141(afl81/dem80) 
1.37178(afl83/dem80) 
1.43598 DEM.1984             
1.70034(afl85/dem84) 
1.70844(afl87/dem84) 
2.02680(afl89) DEM.1988             
2.01149(afl91/dem88) 
2.24599(afl93) DEM.1992             
2.30343(afl95/dem92) 
2.64718(afl97) DEM.1996              
2.57380(afl99/dem96) 
2.19473(afl2001) DEM.2000              
2.32652(afl2005) DEM.2004              
2.31226(afl2009) DEM.2008             
2.37551(afl2013) DEM.2012              
 
0.97365 REP.1960             
1.57965 REP.1964              
1.07222 REP.1968   
1.35287 (Afl71/dem68) 
                                                                 
137137
 All numbers are rounded down to zero because the original tables follow the convention of displaying 
multiples per ten thousand instead of per thousand. 




1.28033 REP.1972             
1.56676(afl73/Rep72) 
1.62786(afl75/Rep72) 
1.38622 REP.1976              
1.60543 (afl77/Rep76) 
1.61244(afl79/Rep76) 
1.44398 REP.1980             
1.76732 (afl81/rep80) 
1.81769(afl83/rep80) 
1.70952 REP.1984             
1.97388(afl85/rep84) 
1.98198(afl87/rep84) 
2.21099(afl89) REP.1988              
2.19568(afl91/rep88) 
2.42925(afl93) REP.1992              
2.48669(afl95/rep 92) 
2.39781(afl97) REP.1996             
2.32381(afl99/rep 96) 
2.25342 Afl2001/REP.2000              
2.83283 Afl2005/REP.2004              
2.31278 Afl2009/REP.2008              
2.5661 Afl2013/REP.2012             
 
10.2 Score discrepancies for DGB dataset, not stemmed 
 
0.74501 Dgb62 CDU1961           
1.13696 Dgb66 CDU1965            
0.32330 Dgb66 CDU1969            
0.55932 Dgb66 CSU1969         
0.45149 Dgb72 CDU1972           
0.43400 Dgb75 CDU.CSU1976       
2.25744 Dgb78 CDU.CSU1980       
2.22195 Dgb82 CDU.CSU1983       
2.22211 Dgb86 CDU.CSU1987       
2.21541 Dgb90 CSU1990         
2.21888 Dgb90 CDU1990          
2.11825 Dgb94 CDU.CSU1994      
2.20372 Dgb98 CDU.CSU1998       
2.12469 Dgb02 CDU.CSU2002      
2.12006 Dgb06 CDU.CSU2005      
2.10537 Dgb10 CDU.CSU2009       
0.33686 Dgb10 CDU.CSU2013  
 
0.37270 Dgb62 SPD1961  
0.18368 Dgb66 SPD1965            
0.33389 Dgb66 SPD1969           
0.28875 Dgb72 SPD1972            
0.39954 Dgb75 SPD1976            
2.25343 Dgb78 SPD1980         
2.23965 Dgb82 SPD1983           
2.22729 Dgb86 SPD1987           
2.21334 Dgb90 SPD1990           
2.11113 Dgb94 SPD1994          
2.20789 Dgb98 SPD1998           
2.10568 Dgb02 SPD2002           




2.09323 Dgb06 SPD2005           
2.08937 Dgb10 SPD2009          
0.24108 Dgb10 SPD2013 
            
0.26917 Dgb62 FDP1961            
0.25519 Dgb66 FDP1961 
0.51179 Dgb69 FDP1969   
0.28319 Dgb75 FDP1976            
2.26084 Dgb78 FDP1980           
2.24265 Dgb82 FDP1983          
2.22178 Dgb86 FDP1987           
2.22314 Dgb90 FDP1990           
2.10914 Dgb94 FDP1994           
2.21060 Dgb98 FDP1998           
2.12106 Dgb02 FDP2002           
2.19120 Dgb06 FDP2005          
2.11674 Dgb10 FDP2009           
0.28631 Dgb10 FDP2013            
 
0.18431 Dgb78 DieGruenen1980     
2.22759 Dgb82 DieGruenen1983    
2.26770 Dgb86 DieGruenen1987    
0.19880 Dgb90 DieGruenen1990     
0.18554 Dgb94 DieGruenen1994     
0.18315 Dgb98 DieGruenen1998     
0.28534 Dgb02 DieGruenen2002     
0.32279 Dgb06 DieGruenen2005     
0.26925 Dgb10 DieGruenen2009     
0.22191 Dgb10 DieGruenen2013     
 
2.20615 dgb90 PDS1990           
2.06825 Dgb94 PDS1994           
2.19743 Dgb98 PDS1998           
2.11263 Dgb02 PDS2002           
0.16199 Dgb06 DieLinke2005       
2.09408 Dgb10 DieLinke2009      
0.14781 Dgb10 DieLinke2013       
 
 
10.3 Score discrepancies for RENGO 
 
0.56917 LDP_1998          
0.61341 LDP_2000          
0.58397 LDP_2001          
0.58697 LDP_2003         
0.53304 LDP_2004          
0.79499 LDP_2005          
0.83547 LDP_2007          
0.55999 LDP_2009          
0.63187 LDP_2010          
0.54912 LDP_2012          
0.53747 LDP_2013  
 
0.09263 DPJ_1998 













0.08793 DPJ_2013         
 
0.79450 NK_1998           
0.67108 NK_2000           
0.57323 NK_2001           
0.91085 NK_2003           
0.80338 NK_2005           
0.74597 NK_2007           
0.62900 NK_2009           
0.62893 NK_2010           
 
0.56917 SDP_1998          
0.51248 SDP_2000         
0.53598 SDP_2003          
0.83018 SDP_2004          
0.55779 SDP_2005          
0.90466 SDP_2007          
0.60159 SDP_2010          
0.56976 SDP_2012          
 
0.37790 NNP_2007           
0.42698 NNP_2009 
           
0.38994 PNP_2005           
 
6.45449 Restoration_2012  
 
0.49680 YP_2010           
0.53151 YP_2012           
 
10.4 Score discrepancies for LULAC dataset I, not stemmed 
 
1.6163 Lulac94 REP.1992 
1.9115 Lulac95 REP.1996  
1.8654 Lulac97 rep96 
2.0171 Lulac98 rep96 
2.0621 Lulac99 rep96 
1.9978 Lulac00 REP.2000 
2.0520 Lulac01 rep00 
2.0550 Lulac02 rep00 
2.0458 Lulac03 rep00 
1.9568 Lulac04 REP.2004 
1.9948 Lulac05 rep04 
1.9807 Lulac06 rep04 
1.9780 Lulac07 rep04 




1.8784 Lulac08 REP.2008 
1.8776 Lulac09 rep08 
1.8899 Lulac10 rep08 
1.9396 Lulac11 rep08 
1.8016 Lulac12 REP.2012 
 
1.6421 Lulac94 DEM.1992 
2.0566 Lulac95 DEM.1996 
2.0105 Lulac97 dem96 
2.1622 Lulac98 dem96 
2.2072 Lulac99 dem96 
2.1109 Lulac00 DEM.2000 
2.1651 Lulac01 dem00 
2.1681 Lulac02 dem00 
2.1589 Lulac03 dem00 
2.1630 Lulac04 DEM.2004 
2.2045 Lulac05 dem04 
2.1904 Lulac06 dem04 
2.1877 Lulac07 dem04 
2.0216 Lulac08 DEM.2008 
2.0208 Lulac09 dem08 
2.0331 Lulac10 dem08 
2.0828 Lulac11 dem08 
2.1634 Lulac12 DEM.2012 
 
10.5 Score discrepancies for TGD 
 
1.8699 Tgd96 CDUCSU1994 
1.7502 Tgd97 C94 
2.3484 Tgd98 CDUCSU1998 
2.1307 Tgd99 c98 
1.8592 Tgd00 c98 
2.0497 Tgd01 c98 
1.7060 Tgd02 CDUCSU2002 
2.0235 Tgd03 c02 
1.7465 Tgd04 c02 
1.8087 Tgd05 CDUCSU2005 
2.2663 Tgd06 c05 
2.3052 Tgd07 c05 
2.2891 Tgd08 c05 
2.2677 Tgd09 CDUCSU2009 
2.3007 Tgd10 c09 
2.2677 Tgd11 c09 
2.2800 Tgd12 c09 
2.1643 Tgd13 CDUCSU2013     
 
1.5784 Tgd96 DieGruenen1994 
1.4587 Tgd97 




1.6456 Tgd02 DieGruenen2002  
1.9631 Tgd03 













2.0338 Tgd13 DieGruenen2013 
  
1.6369 Tgd96 PDS1994 
1.5172 Tgd97 




1.5796 Tgd02 PDS2002 
1.8971 Tgd03 
1.6201 Tgd04 








2.0283 Tgd13 DieLinke2013 
 
1.9112 Tgd96 FDP1994 
1.7915 Tgd97 




1.7726 Tgd02 FDP2002 
2.0901 Tgd03 
1.8131 Tgd04 




2.3627 Tgd09 FDP2009 
2.3957 Tgd10 
2.4151 Tgd11  
2.3750 Tgd12 
2.2186 Tgd13 FDP2013 
 
1.8288 Tgd96 SPD1994 
1.7091 Tgd97 








1.7460 Tgd02 SPD2002 
1.9881 Tgd03 
1.7111 Tgd04 








2.1386 Tgd13 SPD2013 
 
10.6 Score discrepancies for BLL 
 
0.5667013 LDP_1998          
0.5860436 LDP_2000          
0.5858158 LDP_2001          
0.5318874 LDP_2003          
0.5412475 LDP_2004          
0.7651454 LDP_2005          
0.8298868 LDP_2007          
0.5259711 LDP_2009           
0.6299987 LDP_2010          
0.5751459 LDP_2012          










0.1697302 (bll09) DPJ.2010 
0.1868362 (bll09) DPJ.2012 
0.1620414 (bll09) DPJ.2013 
 
0.8842081 NK_1998           
0.6447323 NK_2000            
0.5680324 NK_2001           
1.7044698 NK_2003           
0.8213822 NK_2005           
0.7650731 NK_2007           
0.6464427 NK_2009           
0.6283724 (bll09) NK_2010           
 
0.5667013 SDP_1998          
0.4977150 SDP_2000          
0.4876571 SDP_2003          
0.9031711 SDP_2004          
0.5003602 SDP_2005           
1.0487481 SDP_2007          
0.6043083 (bll09) SDP_2010          




0.5832465 (bll09) SDP_2012          
 
0.6619726 NNP_2007           
0.6148597 NNP_2009           
0.5196741 PNP_2005           
6.5208933 Restoration_2012  
 
0.5215926 (bll09) YP_2010            
0.5698120 (bll09) YP_2012           
 
 




11 DGB Resolution Categories 
DGB - BUNDESKONGRESS 
Berlin, 11. - 16. Mai 2014 
 
 
Empfehlungen der Antragsberatungskommission und ihre Bedeutung  
Lfd. Nr. Empfehlung Bedeutung 
   
 Grundsatz Da über Anträge abgestimmt wird, kann ein Antrag 
grundsätzliche entweder angenommen oder abgelehnt 
werden. Bei Anträgen zur Satzung wird dies ganz deutlich.  
1. Nichtbefassung Kann über einen Antrag nicht abgestimmt werden, wird 
Nichtbefassung empfohlen. Dies ist dann der Fall, wenn der 
DGB-Bundeskongress nicht zuständig ist oder der Antrag z.B. 
fehlerhaft formuliert ist oder das im Antrag angesprochene 
Ereignis bereits überholt ist. Der Antrag ist dann weder 
angenommen, noch abgelehnt. 
2. Erledigt bei Annahme von 
Antrag 
Liegen wort- oder sinngleiche Anträge vor, lautet die 
Empfehlung Erledigt bei Annahme von Antrag ... / bzw. der 
Anträge..... 
3. Ablehnung Die Empfehlung Ablehnung ist eindeutig und bedarf keiner 
Erläuterung. 
4. Annahme Die Empfehlung Annahme hat mehrere Ausprägungen: 
 
Verpflichtet den im Antrag genannten Adressaten, die vom 
Kongress beschlossenen Meinungen und Maßnahmen 
umzusetzen. 
 
Der Adressat muss über die Erledigung des Antrages berichten. 




5. Annahme in geänderter 
Fassung138 
Es wird empfohlen, wenn aus sachlichen Gründen eine 
Änderung oder Ergänzung des eingereichten Textes durch die 
ABK notwendig war. Dabei bleibt das Anliegen des 
Antragsstellers grundsätzlich unverändert.  
 








DGB - BUNDESKONGRESS 
Berlin, 11. - 16. Mai 2014 
 
 
Empfehlungen der Antragsberatungskommission und ihre Bedeutung 
 
 
Lfd. Nr. Empfehlung Bedeutung 
   
6. Annahme als Material zu 
Antrag 
Wird gewählt, wenn der Antrag überwiegend oder im weitesten 
Sinne  mit dem Antragsinhalt übereinstimmt, dem er 
zugeordnet wird. 
 
„Annahme als Material zum Antrag...“ bedeutet, dass nicht 
                                                                 
138
 Das kann auch bedeuten, dass nur einzelne Passagen (Absätze) angenommen werden. 




alle Details des Antrages geteilt werden. Der im zugeordneten 
Antrag genannte Antragsadressat ist verpflichtet, die im 
Materialantrag genannten Aussagen zu berücksichtigten, 
soweit sie dem Antragsbegehren im zugeordneten Antrag nicht 
widersprechen. Die auf anderen Kongressen gewählte 
Formulierung „Material zum Antrag ...“ meint das gleiche. 
 
Der Adressat muss über die Erledigung des Material-Antrages 
berichten. 
7. Annahme als Material an 
(Gremium) 
z. B. an den Bundesvorstand. Dies ist ein 
Überweisungsbeschluss.  
 
„Annahme als Material an ...“ bedeutet, dass für das 
Antragsbegehren eine Lösung gefunden werden muss. Der 
Kongress kann die Details oder Folgen jedoch nicht eindeutig 
übersehen oder entscheiden, z.B. bei Finanzierungsfragen 
(Hoheit Bundesvorstand oder Bundesausschuss) oder die 
Details müssen erst genauer geprüft werden. Der Antrag wird 
also an den Adressaten überwiesen. 
 
Der Adressat muss über die Erledigung des Material-Antrages 
berichten.  
Source: DGB Bundesvorstand (DGB National Headquarters) 
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 These are merely the official websites of the six interest groups under analysis. Websites of political parties, 
archives, research institutes, and organizations and institutes affiliated with the above six organizations that were 
used for this project will be listed in the respective chapters.   
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